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ABSTRACT 
Global value chain (GVC) participation has been placed on a high level policy agenda by 
Development Partners as a prescription template for agri-business growth and competitiveness 
of developing countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa. Despite, the GVC participation 
popularity in application, there is an intense debate questioning why some countries are 
advancing in the global marketplace, while others are failing to do so. Actors’ (entrepreneur’s) 
behavior has been highlighted by the value chain fraternity researchers as an area of interest to 
investigate this phenomenon. The purpose of this research was to contribute to the 
understanding of the link between the entrepreneur’s behavioral practices and better enhanced 
competitiveness in GVC, and as such offer some key insights into the emerging GVC theory.  
Case Study Approach was the major research strategy complemented by the Survey. Polar 
types of Ugandan commercial sugarcane and forestry farmers were selected, namely high and 
low performing entrepreneurs. Principal unit of analysis was the entire value chain, analyzed at 
three levels: Micro (Farm Enterprises), Meso (Farmer/Miller) and Macro (National Policies & 
Regulatory Environment). Principal component analysis was run for purposes of grouping 
items. Empirical data was analyzed using within case analysis, and cross-case pattern analysis.  
Theoretically and policy practice this study has brought into insight new research frontiers:  (1) 
The finding of internality behavior demonstrates that entrepreneur’s traits, characteristics and 
actions are basically behaviors that can be learnt, nurtured, and developed into a business 
culture, competencies and capabilities for enterprise growth, productivity and competitiveness. 
vi 
Therefore, policy program designs should focus on igniting these behaviors which are already 
embedded in the minds of the entrepreneurs, and then supporting the strengthening of such 
behavioral changes for entrepreneurs to effectively participate in GVC in developing 
economies. (2) Institutional quality defined by the set of rules of the game with the associated 
governance power matters with respect to equitable wealth distribution and ultimately 
competitiveness. Findings of this study are being used to inform both the drafting of the 
National Sugar Bill ‘Draft Uganda Sugar Act 2015’ and improvement of the regulatory 
environment of Uganda’s Forestry Industry Sector. 
vii 
NATIONAL ANTHEM: 
Oh, Uganda! may God uphold thee, 
We lay our future in thy hand;  
United, free for liberty  
together we'll always stand. 
--------------------- 
Oh, Uganda! the land of freedom, 
Our love and labour we give;  
And with neighbours all  
At our country's call  
In peace and friendship we'll live. 
---------------------- 
Oh, Uganda! the land that feeds us, 
By sun and fertile soil grown;  
For our own dear land,  
We'll always stand,  
The Pearl of Africa 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the study 
 “It is often assumed that an economy of private enterprise has an automatic bias towards 
innovation, but this is not so. It has a bias only towards profit” (Hobsbawm, 1969, pp.40, 
cited by Baumol, 1990, pp. 893). 
This research provides an analysis of Uganda’s agricultural participation in the global 
economy, using the Global Value Chain Analysis (GVCA) framework as used by authors such 
as Gereffi (1999) and Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005). The analysis is useful for 
examining the behaviour of key entrepreneurs and lead firms in setting the governance 
parameters responsible for shaping, coordinating and transforming global economic processes 
and inter-firm relationships.  These behaviours can be exhibited by the entrepreneurial 
practices along the value chain, which can be classified as productive, unproductive and at 
times predatory in nature (Baumol, 1990; Dejardin, 2000; Mehlum, Moene & Torvik 2003; 
Douhan & Henrekson, 2007). This classification is reflective of the appropriation of economic 
rents and income distribution among chain actors - a core matter of investigation in this study. 
It is analysed in conjunction with the way key entrepreneurs control the diffusion of standards 
and production capabilities among upstream value chain players (Frederick & Gereffi, 2009).  
In conformity with Velde, Rushton, Schreckenberg, Marshall, Edouard, Newton and Arancibia 
(2005) this study contends that entrepreneurs may stimulate or hinder value chain 
competitiveness. This is assessed by the way they set governance parameters under which 
others within the chain operate. By setting parameters the entrepreneurs influence who 
acquires production capabilities, who accesses markets and how gains are distributed along the 
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value chain (Fredrick & Gereffi, 2009).  Understanding these issues helps to facilitate the 
design of appropriate institutional policies and development interventions, which are often 
based on the assumption that poor and politically powerless upstream value chain actors suffer 
from high levels of exploitation by intermediaries (Velde et al., 2005). 
According to Velde et al., (2005), contend that GVCA is deemed to be a more superior 
methodological analysis tool than the chain analysis applied by Porter’s chain analysis model 
(Porter 1985), because he focused on value addition by examining the activities within and 
around the firm, with emphasis on firm competitiveness GVCA does not focus on firm 
competitiveness, but rather on how ties between firms are governed (Hammervoll, 2009) to 
achieve competitiveness of the chain as a whole (Velde et al., 2005). Further studies argue that 
competition itself is no longer about the firm, but the entire value chain of which the firm is 
only a part (Christopher, 1992; Lummus & Vokurka, 1999; Christopher & Towill, 2001). 
Few empirical studies have used GVCA to obtain new information on the role and behaviour 
of entrepreneurs in driving the value chain in agricultural markets. Frederick and Gereffi 
(2009),  Petkova (2006) and Oosterhuis, Molleman & Vaart (2005) all bemoaned the absence 
of research into the behaviours played by key chain actors in value chains, while Velde et al. 
(2005) highlighted the importance and influence of key entrepreneurs in determining the 
success and failure of value chains in the capitalist economy. This research was about 
examining the behavioural practices of entrepreneurs in stimulating or hindering the value 
chain competitiveness of Uganda’s participation in agricultural global markets. 
3 
Uganda’s economy is highly dependent on agriculture, however while 70% of Ugandans are 
employed in the sector, it contributes only 21% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and 90% of total export earnings as per Uganda Bureau of Statistics {UBOS} report 
(UBOS, 2010). 
Uganda covers an area of 241,550.7 square kilometers (sq. km), of which 41,743.2 sq. km 
(approx. 18%) are open water and swamps (UBOS, 2010). The country has two major unique 
engines for the development of agriculture - Lake Victoria (shared among three countries), 
which is the second largest freshwater body in the world after Lake Superior in North America, 
and the Nile River (serving 10 countries), which is the longest river in the world with its source 
in Lake Victoria. In addition to these two major water bodies, the country encompasses three 
other large lakes and approximately 160 minor lakes, rivers and wetlands (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries {MAAIF}, 2011), some of which are well 
positioned on gentle meandering slopes to facilitate gravity irrigation.    
“The Country’s President said that Uganda is well engineered by GOD with rivers 
flowing through mountains to provide gravity water for agricultural production” 
(Presidential Investors Round Table Meeting 25th November 2011, Speke Resort 
Munyonyo, Kampala). 
Despite this abundance, 50 years after independence almost a third of the population (31.1%) 
were still living in despair and poverty (UBOS, 2011).  
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Up until the early 1970s Uganda’s economic performance was on a par with countries such as 
South Korea, Ghana, Kenya and Malaysia as per the National Development Plan I (NDPI) 
report (NDPI, 2010), however while these countries have grown - with some on the path to 
becoming first world economies - Uganda has regressed. The NDPI report (2010) highlighted 
that the key to Malaysia’s advancement in particular, was the transformation of agriculture 
from extraction to value addition through processing industries. 
Before 1990, the production and marketing of agriculture and agricultural products in Uganda 
were addressed through established infrastructure in the form of marketing boards, co-
operative unions and key state enterprises (parastatals), such as the Uganda Development 
Corporation (UDC), Coffee Marketing Board (CMB), Lint Marketing Board (LMB) and 
Produce Marketing Board (PMB). These were serviced by attendant sister bodies such as the 
Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB), Uganda Cooperative Bank and the Uganda Electricity 
Board (UEB). These organisations acted as links between producers (farmers) and markets. 
They also provided producers with affordable credit, improved inputs, storage facilities, 
hedging mechanisms to counter price fluctuations, extension advisory services and reliable 
market access. The sole reason for the existence of these organisations was to build farmers’ 
capabilities and to foster the competitiveness of farmers’ produce. Although there was a 
relative improvement in the standard of living and social welfare, the inefficiencies in the 
parastatals were significant, hence the enactment of liberal reforms in the post 1990s era. This 
meant that a formerly state-led economy was now embracing trade liberalisation and export-led 
development, as prescribed by the Bretton Woods Institutions and some development partners  
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Liberal reforms undertaken by Uganda were considered as the template economic policy 
prescription by the Bretton Woods Institutions and are founded on the assumptions that liberal 
reforms are the pathway for bridging the economic gap between ‘North’ and ‘South’ countries. 
It is a broad framework governance theory that is understood in the context of a neo-liberal 
ideology, comprising of trade liberalisation, market forces, free trade, ‘getting prices right’, the 
privatisation of public enterprises and the reduced role of the state in the economy (Schurman, 
1996; Stiglitz, 1996). The assumption behind the theory is that long-term economic growth 
will be achieved through the pursuit of short-term efficiency gains (Schurman, 1996). The neo-
liberal school of thought is very similar to Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” theory, i.e. markets 
lead to efficient outcomes, thus contributing to the welfare of society as a whole.  
Under the sponsorship of the World Bank (WB)/International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Government of Uganda (GoU) adopted the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which 
necessitated the divestiture of public organisations, lifting of price controls, liberalising capital 
markets and creating the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) under the investment code of 
1991 to facilitate the processes for those interested in investing in the economy. The broad 
function of the UIA is to promote, facilitate and supervise investments in Uganda. Specifically, 
the UIA’s Strategy and Business Plan (2007-2012) sets the key objectives, which include: 
(1) Attracting value adding investment that brings technology, skills and jobs to Uganda;
(2) Promoting Uganda as a leading African investment destination;
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(3) Providing serviced sites, buildings and competitive infrastructure to meet the needs of
growing Ugandan-based businesses; and
(4) Stimulating and leading key stakeholders in creating a competitive business
environment.
In order for the UIA to execute its mandate, a number of outward missions have been carried 
out in the USA, Europe, India, Thailand, South Africa and Middle East etc., with the intention 
of attracting foreign investors. The aim of the outward missions was to explain the trade and 
investment opportunities in Uganda, especially in agro-farming, fishing, forestry, mining, 
power generation and tourism.  Attractive incentive packages have also been provided to 
prospective investors.  
Uganda was ranked 58th in the world and 9th in Africa with respect to inward Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), according to the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)’s performance index of the World Investment Report {WIR}(WIR 2003). It also 
scored 4.96 out of 6.04 with regard to investor perceptions of investment protection and 
favourable policies pertaining to the remittance of dividends and profits.  Data from the WIR 
(2006) illustrates that Uganda’s FDI inflows grew from an average of USD 82 million in a 
period of (1990/2000) to USD 258 million in 2005.  According to the Ministry of Finance, 
Planning and Economic Development {MFPED} (MFPED, 2007a), the share of investment in 
GDP increased from 12.4% in financial year 2002/03 to 17.9% in financial year 2006/07. By 
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2010, Uganda had a total FDI of USD 4,988 million (WIR, 2010). Much of this performance 
has been attributed to the acceptance of a capitalist economy, which often stimulates 
entrepreneurship and the growth of a private sector.  
The growth of the private sector in Uganda also coincided with the new global phenomena of 
trade and production being organised in the form of Global Supply Chains (GSCs), which is 
synonymous with the Global Commodity Chains (GCCs) framework and has evolved into 
Global Value Chains (GVCs) framework. This framework is described as a set of inter-firm 
networks which connect manufacturers, suppliers and subcontractors in global industries, and 
ultimately to international markets (Bair, 2005; Gereffi et al., 2005; Sturgeon, Biesebroeck & 
Gereffi, 2008). According to Tijaja (2010, pp. 17),  
“Proponents of GVC participation argue that by entering GVCs, developing countries 
and firms will gain access to foreign markets, capital, investment, technology and 
knowhow”.  
Since the mid-1990s, a body of literature has developed on GVC analysis and participation 
across North America, Europe, Africa, Asia and South America. Among the industries studied 
are apparel and textiles (Gereffi & Evgeniev , 2008; Gibbon, 2008; Evgeniev, 2009; Palpacuer, 
2009; Starmanns, 2010; Goto, 2011; Goto, Natsuda & Thoburn, 2011; Morris, Staritz & 
Barnes, 2011) automobiles and electronics (Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2009; Hatani, 2010; Singh, 
2010; Ozatagan, 2010; Azadegan & Wagner, 2011; Fortwengel, 2011; Kawakami & Sturgeon, 
2011; Staritz, Gereffi & Cattaneo, 2011; ), tourism and services (Lessmeister, 2009; Parnreiter, 
2010; Fernandez-Stark, Bamber & Gereffi, 2011; Romero & Tejada, 2011 ), and agriculture 
and forestry products (Hough, 2007; Selwyn, 2007; Bitzer, Francken & Glasbergen, 2008; 
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Harper, 2008; Vieira & Maia, 2009; Gereffi & Christian , 2010; Gibbon, Ponte & Lazaro, 
2010; Neilson & Pritchard, 2010; Ouma, 2010; Wiegratz, 2010;  Challies & Murray, 2011, 
Kaplinsky, Terheggen & Tijaja, 2011; Aponte-Garcia, 2011; Ford & Larsen, 2011; Mugabira 
& Ssekiboobo, 2011; Riisgaard & Hammer, 2011; Ponte, Gibbon & Vestergaard, 2011; 
Mugabira & Chivaka2015). 
However, participation in global production networks does not deliver the sustainable benefits 
envisaged by crusaders for liberal reforms. As countries and industries are exposed to fierce 
competition, some start experiencing resource depletion, falling profit margins, loss of jobs and 
environmental degradation, among other challenges. Studies also show that GVC participation 
and governance creates winners and losers, due to the distribution implication of gains along 
the value chain (Fitter & Kaplinsky, 2001a; Gereffi & Kaplinsky, 2001; Tijaja, 2010; Mugabira 
& Ssekiboobo, 2011). The winners are mainly the ‘North’ countries, while the losers are the 
‘South’ countries. Although the issue of distribution in GVC participation is widely recognised 
theoretically (Gereffi & Kaplinsky, 2001; Gereffi & Fredrick, 2009), few empirical studies 
exist (Fitter & Kaplinsky, 2001b; Tijaja, 2010; Terheggen, 2010). Further, scholarly literature 
analysing GVC participation and governance in the perspective of entrepreneurial/chain 
behaviour is scanty, with the exception of Velde et al., (2005) and Oosterhuis et al., (2005). 
This study intended to contribute to both the academic and policy debates on distribution 
implications in GVC participation and governance, especially for countries in the global South. 
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The study examined how and why entrepreneurial/chain actors’ behavioural practices could be 
considered beneficial or disadvantageous to value chain competitiveness. The study further 
investigated the behaviour al practices of entrepreneurs in agricultural GVCs in Uganda, a 
country that has received little attention, given the fact that agriculture is not only the backbone 
of the economy employing more than 70% of the population and providing 90% of export 
revenue, but also provides food, energy and shelter – the basic human needs.  While this study 
is not an authority on forecasting the future health of Uganda’s economy, it provides valuable 
insights by opening up the debate on the appropriate policies and regulatory and governance 
models for trade in agricultural GVCs. 
1.2 Problem statement 
GVC participation for competitiveness is the name of the game today. The nature of the 
competitive game has gained prominence with the notion that in a globalizing economy; it is 
value chains that compete, and not firms. The globalisation of economic activities requires an 
understanding of the dispersed value creation activities that capture processes across space and 
time, which in turn has precipitated interest in GVCs.  Global value chain participation for 
competitiveness is therefore imperative for the sustainability of firms, with participating firms 
being competitive while non-participating firms uncompetitive.  This has placed GVC 
participation on a high level policy agenda amongst development partners as a prescription 
template for agri-business growth and the competitiveness of developing countries, especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the popularity of GVC, there is an intense debate questioning 
why some countries are advancing in the global marketplace, while others are failing to do so. 
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The behavioural practices of actors (entrepreneurs) have been highlighted by the value chain 
research fraternity as an area of interest in regard to this phenomenon. The purpose of this 
research was thus to contribute to the understanding of the link between entrepreneurs’ 
behavioural practices  and enhanced competitiveness in GVCs, and as such to offer some key 
insights into the emerging GVC theory. This was achieved by investigating entrepreneurs’ 
behavioural practices - both in the form of perceptions regarding critical success factors/critical 
management practices and competitive potential/competitive advantage factors - to explain the 
competitive performance (success/ failure) of agri-business enterprises participating in 
Uganda’s Commercial Sugarcane and Forestry Value Chains.   
1.3 General objective and research question 
General objective: To examine how entrepreneurs’/actors’ behavioural practices may stimulate 
or hinder the competitive performance of GVC participation in Uganda. 
Major research question: How do entrepreneurs’ behavioral practices determine the competitive 
performance of agri-business enterprises undertaking GVC participation in Uganda? 
1.3.1 Specific objectives and research questions 
1.3.1.1 Sub-theme 1: Critical success factors (CSFs) for value chain competitiveness 
Specific objective 1: To assess whether there is a fit in perceptions regarding the critical 
success factors for value chain competitiveness amongst high, medium and low 
performing entrepreneurs undertaking GVC participation and between VC sectors. 
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Specific objective 2: To assess whether producers’ competitiveness expectations are 
compatible with market expectations amongst high, medium and low producers and 
between VC sectors. 
Research question 1: Why and how do perceptions of CSFs for competitiveness determine 
performance differences amongst high, medium and low producers and between VC sectors? 
Research question 2: How are producers’ competitiveness expectations compatible with market 
expectations amongst high, medium and low producers and between VC sectors? 
1.3.1.2 Sub-theme 2: Equitable value chain sharing (miller – producer) 
Specific objective 3: To examine the extent to which income distribution is perceived to be a 
challenge for competitive success amongst VC participants and between VC sectors, 
thus creating winners and losers.  
Research question 3: How is the equitable value chain sharing of proceeds perceived as a 
challenge for competitive success amongst VC participants and between VC sectors, thus 
creating winners and losers? 
1.3.1.3 Sub-theme 3: Entrepreneurial alertness and regulatory regime  
Specific  objective 4: To examine how entrepreneurial alertness could explain enterprise and VC 
sector performance differences, with possibilities for the shaping and re-shaping of 
governance structures. 
Specific objective 5: To examine how institutional quality influences the emergence of the 
productive, unproductive and/or predatory behaviours that are reflected in the 
competitive success or failure of enterprises and VC sectors. 
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Research question 4: How does entrepreneurial alertness explain enterprise and VC sector 
performance differences, with possibilities for the shaping and re-shaping of governance 
structures? 
Research question 5: How does institutional quality explain the emergence of the productive, 
unproductive and/or predatory behaviours reflected in the competitive success or failure of 
enterprises and VC sectors? 
1.3.1.4 Sub-theme 4: Compliance with standards for market access 
Specific objective 6: To assess perceptions with respect to compliance with standards for market 
access in explaining performance differences amongst high, medium and low producers 
and between VC sectors.  
Research question 6: How do the perceptions of compliance with standards for market access 
explain the performance differences amongst high, medium and low producers and between VC 
sectors? 
1.3.1.5 Sub-theme 5: Vertical and horizontal collaboration for the diffusion of supplier 
production capabilities 
Specific objective 7: To examine the extent of vertical and horizontal collaboration for the 
diffusion of supplier production capabilities in explaining performance differences 
amongst VC participants and between VC sectors. 
Research question 7: How does vertical and horizontal collaboration for the diffusion of 
supplier production capabilities explain the performance differences amongst VC participants 
and between VC sectors? 
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The above specific objectives and research questions were not viewed in isolation from one 
another, but were rather addressed simultaneously to give a more complete picture of the agri-
business, sugar and forestry industry dynamics in Uganda. The study employed a multiple-
method approach to gather empirical evidence. The survey instrument collected information 
about entrepreneurs’ and/or chain actors’ practices in the Ugandan commercial sugar and 
forestry value chains, i.e. it established the context in which the behaviour of entrepreneurs in 
value chains is studied. The interview protocol, together with observations and a documentary 
review, provided an in-depth understanding of how and why the behavioural prcatices of 
entrepreneurs stimulates or hinders value chain competitiveness for Uganda’s agri-business 
enterprises undertaking GVC participation.  
1.4 Scope 
The research focused on two agri-business value chain sectors, namely sugar and forestry. The 
study examined mainly entrepreneurs involved in primary production, categorising them into 
high, medium and low VC performers.  Millers and/or buyers and policy/regulatory-related 
organisations based in the domestic value chain were also examined to obtain data for 
triangulation. Chain actors beyond Uganda’s borders were not explored, but information 
relating to the value chain was accessed from their representatives in Uganda and using 
secondary literature.  
1.5 Thesis structure 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one which is the introduction informed 
readers on what brought about the need for the study (problem statement), what it intends to 
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achieve (objectives), and the coverage. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature and related 
theoretical frameworks while chapter 3 discusses the methodology used in this study. The 
results are presented in chapter 4 to chapter 7. In brief, chapter 4 presents a narrative 
perspective of Uganda’s commercial sugar and forestry value chain industrial sectors; chapter 
5 and 6 presents the field data analysis results. Chapter 7 provides a comprehensive discussion 
of results presented in chapters 5 and 6.  Lastly chapter 8 presents the summary of the findings, 
conclusions and recommendations.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature and related theoretical frameworks. It 
also details the historical evolution of the global value chain framework as the major analytical 
framework for this study. The chapter finally gives a summary of the inter-dependence of the 
theoretical frameworks which mitigates their weaknesses. 
2.2 Overview of theoretical frameworks informing this study 
This study applied the following related theoretical frameworks that explain the formation of 
inter-company value chain relationships. The Transactional Cost Analysis or Economics 
(TCA/TCE) by (Williamson 1975; 1979) explains why do firms/enterprises exist, i.e., 
motivations for business start-up and/or growth. The Entrepreneurship Behavioural Approach 
by (Gatner 1989; Baumol 1990), offers insights on why do entrepreneurial firms differ, i.e., the 
theory assists in assessments of, traits, perceptions and capabilities for achieving productivity 
gains. The New Institutional Theory (NIT) by (Williamson 1998, North 1992) basically defines 
the rules of the game and governance institutions governing the play of the game by the value 
chain actors. The aim of NIT is to explain the nature of institutions, how they emerge, what 
purposes they serve, how they evolve over time, and how, if at all, they could be reformed for 
market/value chain efficiency.  The application of the Global Value Chain Analytical (GVCA) 
diagnostic framework (Gereffi 2005) assists in assessment of how do firms/enterprises interact, 
i.e., mapping inter firm-relationships and the flow of goods & information, identification of
value chain constraints  and possible interventions especially in vertical linkages. The cluster 
approach complements the GVCA by analyzing the horizontal relationships between firms. 
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Therefore, this study applied these theoretical frameworks as they are seen reinforcing each 
other in the assessment of Uganda’s agri-business value chains. 
2.3 The global value chain analytical framework and its evolution 
A value chain (VC) is most commonly defined as: 
“…the full range of activities which are required to bring a product or service from 
conception, through the different phases of production […and…] delivery to final 
consumers, and final disposal after use” (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2000, pp. 4). 
A VC is a useful unit of analysis seen in the literature on the evolution and organisation of the 
world capitalist economy (Bair, 2008; Tijaja, 2010). After mapping a VC, researchers can 
apply it as a case study to analyse the spatially dispersed and organisationally complex global 
production systems (Tijaja, 2010). VC analysis differs from comparable market analytical 
approaches in that it examines the dynamics of firms/countries within global production 
networks and focuses on productive systems as opposed to sectors or industries in isolation 
(Farfan, 2005).  Most importantly, a VC can be used to analyse how relationships amongst 
participants are governed, enabling a deeper analysis to be done on the highly abstract notion 
of economic globalisation (Gibbon, Bair & Ponte, 2008). In this case study, the VC approach 
was used to dissect and obtain information on what drives entrepreneurship in Uganda’s 
agricultural sector by finding answers to the research questions listed in subsection 1.3. 
While VC analysis itself is theoretically neutral, it enhances the theoretical understanding of 
the working of the world capitalist economy. It allows for the identification of industry actors, 
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mapping of their positions, and accounting of individual actors’ activities, and thus the 
governance structure of production that dictates how the chain operates and who controls the 
diffusion of technology, standards, value creation and distribution of rent along the GVC 
(Gereffi & Christian, 2010; Tijaja, 2010; Terheggen, 2010). At a more practical level, 
information obtained assists in the design of appropriate policies and development 
interventions, thus improving the position of developing countries’ firms/industries, workers 
and other marginalised groups in the specific GVC (Velde et al., 2005; Fredrick & Gereffi , 
2009; Gereffi & Christian, 2010).  
The GVCA theoretical framework helps to explain governance patterns in global value chains, 
which emerged as a result of globalisation of production and trade. This has fueled the growth 
of industrial capabilities in a number of developing countries, as well as the vertical 
disintegration of transnational corporations, which are focusing on core competencies and high 
value addition activities while relegating non-core activities to other firms, coupled with 
reduced direct ownership (Gereffi et al., 2005). This form of shift has produced a governance 
network situated between arm’s length markets on the one hand, and large vertically integrated 
corporations, referred to as hierarchies, on the other. The purpose of this thesis is to utilise and 
improve on the GVCA for a better understanding of the shaping and re-shaping of governance 
structures in sectors producing for global markets; structures referred to as ‘global value 
chains’ (Gereffi et al., 2005).  The evolution of the GVC structures affects not only the 
fortunes of firms and industries, but also how and why countries advance – or fail to advance – 
in the global economy (Gereffi et al., 2005; Sturgeon, 2008). A short summary of the evolution 
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and variants of commodity chain approaches from which the GVCA has emerged will give a 
reader a clear understanding of the historical development. The next section illustrates the 
evolution from the world system theory to global commodity chains.. 
2.3.1 Evolution from the world system theory to global commodity chains 
In a 1977 article by Terrence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, the authors defined the term 
‘commodity chain’ as “a network of labor and processes whose end results in a finished 
commodity” (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1986, pp. 159).  The term ‘commodity chain’ has its 
roots in the World Systems Theory (WST) developed in the 1970s (Wallerstein, 1974).   
WST posits that countries are located in the core, periphery, and semi-periphery of the global 
economy, with their position reflecting their development capabilities (Gereffi & Christian, 
2010). WST is interested in nation-states (i.e. countries) - the fundamental principle being how 
power and hierarchy are embodied in the relations between nation-states and their position in 
the global economy. Like the WST, GCC analysis addresses the issue of who controls global 
trade and industry, and how agents locked into lower-value segments of trade and industry can 
break out of this situation (Gibbon, 2000). Unlike WST, GCC analysis of commodity chains is 
less concerned with the holistic macro structure of the world capitalist economy and more with 
the meso-level structure, especially with sets of inter-firm networks that connect 
manufacturers, suppliers and sub-contractors in global industries to each other, and ultimately 
to international markets (Bair, 2005).  
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While global commodity trade has existed since the 16th century, GCC scholars contend that 
global production systems underwent a fundamental transformation after the second world war, 
becoming increasingly more functionally integrated and geographically dispersed through 
trade intensification in semi-finished products (Tijaja, 2010). This laid the foundation for the 
addition of ‘Global’ to ‘Commodity Chain’, to form the term ‘Global Commodity Chain’ 
(GCC) by Gereffi and others in the early 1990s (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994).    
GCCs have made a significant contribution to commodity chain studies in three areas: 
methodology, theory and policy. First, the development and application of the GCC approach 
is a methodological advance because it provides a basis for both academics and practitioners 
interested in global industries to map and analyse the spatially dispersed and organisationally 
complex production networks that are an important part of economic globalisation (Tijaja, 
2010). The framework assists in tracing the path of a commodity – be it fish caught in Lake 
Victoria in Uganda (sub-Saharan Africa) and sold in European Union (EU) chain 
supermarkets, garments sewn in Hong Kong from Egyptian cotton, or an assembly plant of 
electronic equipment in Japan from components produced in Latin America – forming a basis 
from which to study and operationalise the global-local nexus. The GCC approach permits 
product traceability in the globalising economy, directing attention to specific locations where 
particular production processes take place, while simultaneously shining light on how these 
discrete locations and activities are inter-connected to form a commodity chain. Through its 
focus on locality and place the GCC departs from WST; the former is principally concerned 
with finding ways of improving industrial upgrading; that is improving skills, and processes 
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(Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002) for developing exporters and places more emphasis on the role 
of firms as the change drivers and organising agents in the capitalist economy, while the latter, 
with its macro-orientation, dismisses this as a developmentalist ‘illusion’, claiming the 
systematic unequal exchange will simply reproduce hierarchies in the world capitalist economy 
(Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1994; Bair, 2005).    
Second, GCC has contributed theoretically to the understanding of power relation dynamics 
among chain actors. Further illustration at this point calls for a brief review of the GCC 
approach. Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) identified four key structures that shape GCCs:  
(1) an input-output structure (the process of transforming raw materials into final
products); 
(2) geographical (referring to spatial dispersion or concentration of activities within and
across locations); 
(3) a governance structure (referring to power relations within the chain that control
production processes and also determine appropriation and distribution of economic 
rents from the value created);  
(4) an institutional context (described by norms, values, and regulatory frameworks
within which firms operate). 
The concept of governance among the four has received much attention (Gereffi et al., 2005). 
Gereffi described the power relationships using the term global chain governance. Governance 
of the value chain is defined as  
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“authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material, and human 
resources are allocated and flow within the chain” (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994, pp. 
97),  
However most of the research agenda on governance analysis has been done in tourism, 
apparel and textiles, footwear, automobiles, electronics, plastics and a variety of agricultural 
commodities. Interestingly, most of these studies were carried out in Asia, Latin America, 
North America and Europe. The necessity of studying agricultural commodity chains in 
developing countries was highlighted by Cramer (1999), after which different researchers and 
organizations such as World Bank (WB) and African Development Bank (AfDB), United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) took up the challenge and studied: 
horticulture (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Vagneron, Faure & Loeillet, 2009; Gibbonet al.,, 
2010; Kaplinsky et al., 2010; Ouma, 2010; Fold & Larsen, 2011 ), forestry (Velde et al., 2005; 
Teischinger, 2009),  fishing (Mugabira & Ssekiboobo, 2011; Mugabira & Chivaka, 2015), 
coffee (Ponte, 2001; Fitter & Kaplinsky, 2001a; Wiegratz, 2010; WB, 2010; AfDB, 2015), 
textiles and apparel (UNIDO, 2009) and cocoa (Laven, 2005; Fold, 2001; Roldan, Fromm & 
Aidoo, 2013).  
Yet the focus of these studies has been on lead firms in the chain such as manufacturers, 
processors and buying companies operating in a formal economy. Few address the issue of 
suppliers (producers) who make up the bulk of the chain actors, operate in an informal 
economy and form the weakest ‘link’ in the chain (Laven, 2005). This is a lacuna that this 
thesis intends to fill. It can be argued that the bias in many existing studies has contributed to a 
widening income gap between international buyers and/or their local representatives and the 
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local suppliers operating in buyer-driven commodity chains. This economic imbalance is 
translated at the macro-level, possibly explaining why countries advance – or fail to advance – 
in the global economy. 
Further, the GCC research on governance is credited for shining light on how global industries 
are governed without direct ownership.   The governance concept elaborates on the inter-firm 
network as an organisational form that is neither a market nor a hierarchy, although it may 
exhibit characteristics of each. Gereffi (1994) made a distinction between two organisational 
forms: Producer–Driven Commodity Chains (PDCC) and Buyer–Driven Commodity Chains 
(BDCC). The former tend to have high barriers of entry and are characteristically more 
capital/technology-intensive production and economies of scale industries such as automobiles, 
electronics, telecoms and aeronautics, in which powerful manufacturers control and often own 
several tiers of vertically-integrated suppliers.  On the other hand, the latter (BDCCs) tend to 
have low barriers to entry, such as agriculture, forestry, apparel and textiles, where fur-flung 
subcontracting networks are managed with varying degrees of closeness by designers, retailers 
and brand-name firms that market, but do not necessarily make, the products that are sold 
under their name (Gereffi, 2001; Tijaja, 2010).  
Third, GCC research has enormously contributed to policy, mainly through the recent work 
done by the so-called global value chains (GVC) emanating from GCC. The GVC approach 
has focused on finding ways to leverage the insights afforded by the GCC approach into 
effective policy designs and interventions that can improve local firms’ competitiveness in 
value chains (Bair, 2005).  The value chain literature describes the process of local firm 
improvement as ‘chain upgrading’. “Understanding how value chains operate is very important 
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for developing country firms and policy–makers, because the way chains are structured has 
implications for new entrants. How can economic actors gain access to the skills, competencies 
and supporting services required to participate in global value chains? What potential is there 
for firms, industries, and societies from developing world to “upgrade” by actively changing 
the way they are linked to global value chains?” (Gereffi, Humphrey, Kaplinsky & Sturgeon, 
2001, , pp. 2). Local and national governments, as well as international institutions such as the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the United Nations International Development 
Organization (UNIDO), amongst others, have expressed an interest in the answers to these 
questions, viewing the GCC approach as a paradigm that can orient and inform policy (Gereffi 
& Fredrick, 2009; Bair, 2005). The role played by the Saw Log Production Grant Scheme 
(SPGS), a joint facility of the European Union, the Norwegian government and the Ugandan 
government, will give insights into policy design and interventions experienced in Uganda’s 
forestry value chains compared to the coffee and fish value chains (which are devoid of such 
arrangements).  
2.3.2 Evolution from global commodity chains to global value chains 
GVC analysis developed out of seminal works on GCC in the 1990s, which tied the concept of 
value-added chains directly to the global organisation of industries (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 
1994). The GVC approach emerged during the research network workshop titled ‘The Value of 
Value Chains: Spreading the Gains from Globalization’ of September 2000 held in Bellagio, 
Italy, where scholars agreed to develop a common language for promoting a research agenda 
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on the study of production networks in the global economy. As a paradigm of thinking, GCC is 
only one among the several network or chain-based approaches to the study of global 
economic industrial organisation that are popular today (Tijaja, 2010). Other constructs that 
have been applied include international production networks (Borrus, Ernst & Haggard , 2000), 
global production networks (Ernst & Kim, 2002; Herderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe & Yeung , 
2002), global production systems (Milberg, 2004), the French filiere concept (Raikes, Jensen 
and Ponte, 2000) and supply chains (Christopher, 1992; Christopher & Towill, 2001; Lummus 
& Vokurka, 1999). Among all these competing approaches, the GVC was adopted at the 
Bellagio workshop, Italy because it was perceived as being the most inclusive of the full range 
of possible chain activities from a commodity to the end products, (Gereffi et l., 2001). 
Gereffi et al. (2005) advanced the value chain research agenda by developing a formal theory 
of value chain governance. The GVC theory identified a typology of five governance structures 
that describe the network relationships linking suppliers in global industries to lead firms 
(Gereffi et al., 2005; Sturgeon et al., 2008). Gereffi et al. (2005 ), Frederick and Gereffi (2009) 
elaborated further and distinguished between five chain governance structure  types that firms 
apply to govern linkages between value chain activities: 
1. Markets. Market governance involves transactions that are relatively simple.
Information on product specifications is easily transmitted, and suppliers have the
capability to make products with minimal input from buyers. These are typically arms-
length exchanges associated with repeat transactions with little or no formal
cooperation between actors, and the cost of switching to new partners is low for both
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producers and buyers. The central governance mechanism is price rather than a 
powerful lead firm. 
2. Modular value chains. Modular governance occurs when complex transactions are
relatively easy to codify. Suppliers have the capability to make products to a customer’s
specifications and take full responsibility for process technology using generic
machinery that spreads investments across a wide customer base. This keeps switching
costs low and reduces transaction-specific investments’ ‘asset specificity’ and therefore
a buyer’s need for direct monitoring and control.
3. Relational value chains. Relational governance occurs when buyers and sellers rely on
complex information that is not easily transmitted or learned. This necessitates frequent
interactions and knowledge sharing between parties.  Such linkages generate trust and
mutual dependency regulated through reputation, social and spatial proximity, family
and ethnic ties, and the like. It can also be handled through mechanisms that impose
costs on a party that breaks a contract (Williamson, 1983). Despite mutual dependence,
lead firms still specify the requirements and thus have the ability to exert some level of
control over suppliers. Producers in relational chains are more likely to supply
differentiated products based on quality, geographic origin or other unique
characteristics. Relational linkages take time to build and require high levels of explicit
coordination, which makes switching costs to new partners high.
4. Captive value chains.  Captive chains occur when the ability to codify information and
product specifications’ complexity are both high, coupled with low supplier
capabilities. These networks are characterised by a high degree of monitoring and
control by the lead firm, creating a build-up of transactional dependence, as lead firms
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seek to lock-in suppliers in order to exclude others from reaping the benefits of their 
efforts. Suppliers thus face significant switching costs and are ‘captive’. Captive inter-
firm linkages control opportunism through the dominance of lead firms, which also 
ensure that suppliers receive fair treatment and an equitable share of the market price to 
make exit an unattractive proposition.  
5. Hierarchy. This type of governance describes chains that are characterised by vertical
integration and managerial control within lead firms that develop and manufacture
products in-house. This usually occurs when product specifications cannot be codified,
products are complex and competent suppliers cannot be found. This type of
governance is also driven by the need to exchange tacit knowledge between value chain
activities as well as to protect key resources such as intellectual property.
Gereffi et al. (2005),  Frederick and Gereffi (2009) suggested that the form of governance 
can change as an industry evolves and matures. The dynamic nature of the five governance 
typologies is due to the possible combinations resulting from the variations (measures such 
as ‘low’ or ‘high’) of three independent variables, as presented in Table 2.1: 
1. Information complexity. Refers to the intricacy of inter-firm information and
knowledge transfer required for transactions. This is vital because suppliers
working with complicated product and process specifications are more difficult to
control and coordinate, thus increasing switching costs. For this reason, transaction
costs are reduced through standardization and codification.
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2. Information codification. Refers to the extent to which complex information and
knowledge is converted into industry-wide standards through codification and
transmitted efficiently along the chain without a transaction specific investment.
Developments in information technology tools such as electronic data interchange
(EDI) or computer aided design (CAD) enable complex data to be easily handed off
between value chain partners.
3. Supplier capability. Refers to suppliers’ ability to meet all buyers’ transaction
requirements. These may include reliability in quality specifications, quantity, on-
time delivery, cost, and labour and safety standards. Suppliers need access to
support services such as input, equipment maintenance and upgrades, reliable
transportation and certification assistance to develop new capabilities. If supporting
markets are not in existence and/or cannot offer affordable and effective services,
then suppliers will depend more heavily on buyers to meet these needs and vice
versa.











Degree of explicit 
coordination and 
power asymmetry 
Market Low High High Low 
Modular High High High 
Relational High Low High 
Captive High High Low 
Hierarchy High Low Low High 
Source: Gereffi et al. (2005) 
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Table 2.1 presents the interplay between the governance types and the three variables. For 
instance, governance by ordinary market transactions takes place when product specification is 
simple, transactions are simple and easily codified, and supplier capability is high to produce 
products with little input from buyers, thus minimising specific inter-firm relationships. At the 
other extreme, a hierarchical governance structure (in-house production) occurs when product 
specifications are highly complex and cannot be codified, while competent suppliers cannot be 
found. 
In between these extremes, modular value chains arise when complex product specifications 
can be easily codified. Relational value chains exist when information on complex products is 
not easily codified, but suppliers with high capabilities are accessible by lead firms. Finally, 
captive value chains are associated with complex product specifications that can easily be 
codified through detailed instructions to enable suppliers with low capabilities to produce.  
The existence of these governance types renders a spectrum of explicit coordination and power 
asymmetry (as shown in the last column of Table 2.1) between buyers and suppliers, running 
from ‘low to high’ in the cases of markets and hierarchies respectively. The fact that the 
governance types illustrated above illuminate how power operates in global value chains merits 
elaboration (Gereffi et al., 2005). For instance, in global captive value chains, power is 
exercised directly by lead firms of suppliers. This is analogous to the direct administrative 
control exercised by multi-national companies (MNCs) over their subsidiaries or the affiliates 
of a vertically integrated firm (referred to as a hierarchy in this study). Such direct control 
reflects a high degree of explicit coordination and a large power asymmetry, with the lead firm 
and/or buyer (exercising top management) being the dominant party. In relational global value 
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chains both parties contribute key competencies, resulting in symmetrical power (balance of 
power) between the partners. Relational global value chains exhibit a great deal of explicit 
coordination, but this is achieved through intimate dialogue between more or less equal 
partners, contrary to the more unidirectional flow of information and control between unequal 
partners, as is the case with captive global value chains and hierarchies. Gereffi et al. (2005) 
went on to argue that power asymmetries are low in both modular global value chains and 
markets. This is attributed to low switching costs, which enable buyers and suppliers to work 
with multiple partners. 
The GVC approach has also come under attack with the following limitations being cited: (1) it 
does not take into account many of the factors influencing global trade (Bernstain & Campling, 
2006; Gibbon et al., 2008); (2) the GVC approach focuses primarily on MNCs, with little 
emphasis on the regulatory role of the state (Talbot, 1997); and (3) it fails to recognise that 
actors operate within certain rules set by non-chain actors in the form of trade rules and 
standards, i.e. tariffs, quotas, quality standards, labour and environmental standards (Schmitz, 
2005). 
Despite the above critiques, the GVC is recognised as an effective tool for tracing product 
flows, showing the value adding stages and identifying key actors and their relationships with 
other actors in the chain, thus being actor-oriented (Schmitz, 2005). This framework has 
provided invaluable contributions in the context of four distinct industries: bicycles, apparel, 
fresh vegetables and electronics. This study examined the value of this framework in the 
context of explaining the behavioural practices of entrepreneurs in the sectors of sugar and 
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forestry products value chains. This explanation used a simplified map (see figure 2.1 below) 
of an agro-value chain that was broken down into four broad steps: (i) input farm suppliers; (ii) 
farm and harvest; (iii) processing and manufacturing; and (iv) retail and distribution.  
Figure 2.1: Simplified agro-value chain map 
Source: Author 
2.3.3 Transition towards the global value chain competitiveness analytical (GVCCA) 
framework  
Businesses participate in GVCs to improve their competitiveness. Competitive pressure is 
increasingly being felt due to the globalisation of industries, as they strive to create and capture 
value across processes that are dispersed in space and time through coordinated global value 
chains (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994). Gereffi et al. (2005) identified five typologies for 
value addition and the coordination of global value chains in the world economy. The 
typologies oscillate on a continuum of two extremes, i.e. arm’s length markets and hierarchies. 
As pressure for competition intensifies with globalisation, so competitiveness determines 
international trade flows, location of production facilities, capital in-flows and out-flows, and 
foreign direct investments (Sasatani, 2009). For this reason, nations, regions, industries/sectors 
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and firms compete to capture value (profits, margins), lure investments, and win the hearts and 
minds of customers in markets across space and time in a globalising world. In this context of a 
competitive game, competitiveness describes the economic strength of a country, industry or a 
firm with respect to competitors as value for money (goods, services, skills and ideas) moves 
freely through coordinated VCs (Murths & Lenway, 1994). Consequently, highly competitive 
value chains are winners while less competitive value chains are losers in the global 
competitiveness game. 
2.3.3.1 Theoretical measures of competitiveness 
Competitiveness remains a vibrant contentious public debate issue for growth by both 
practitioners and academicians. Krugman (1994, pp. 30) argued that “obsession with 
competitiveness at (the) national level is not only wrong but dangerous”. Other studies contend 
that, despite its widely acknowledged importance, the concept of competitiveness itself is 
greatly misunderstood (Asian Development Bank {ADB}, 2003; Kohler, 2006; Smit, 2010; 
Aiginger, Barenthaler-Sieber & Vogel, 2013).  This sentiment was also acknowledged by the 
World Economic Forum (WEF) in its Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2004-5, which 
measured the competitiveness of countries or blocs (WEF 2004). On the other hand, Porter 
(2004) viewed competiveness as a major pathway for national economies to benefit from 
market liberal reforms. Yet despite this disagreement between Krugman (1994) and Porter 
(2004), who are both considered gurus of competitiveness, they agreed that it is firms that 
compete, not nations. This view is contradicted by the supply chain management discipline, 
however. 
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Christopher (1992), Lummus and Vokurka (1999), Christopher and Towill(2001), and Chivaka 
(2003) asserted that supply chains compete, but not firms.  
With the transition from supply chains to value chains, this study intends to build on this idea 
by asserting that value chains compete.  
Competitiveness at value chain level is of great importance to both practitioners and 
academics. According to Rao and Holt (2005), competitiveness at value chain level means 
improved efficiency, quality improvement, product improvement and cost savings. Other 
authors contend that productivity growth is the central factor for competiveness (Vukovic, 
Jovanovic & Dukic , 2012). Porter (1990) defined competitiveness at the organizational level 
as productivity growth that is reflected in either lower costs or differentiated products that 
command premium prices. Studies have also shown that companies, industries, or nations with 
the highest productivity could be seen as the most competitive (McKee & Sessions-Robinson, 
1989). 
The government of Uganda, through the Competitiveness and Investment Climate Strategy, 
measures competitiveness according to  
“a sustained increase in productivity, efficiency and innovation throughout the 
commodity/service value chain, and emphasises the need for a shared understanding of 
joint and collective action between and amongst the private and public sector actors” 
(MFPED, 2007 b pp. 6).   
This definition suggests that competitiveness spans across the entire value chain, necessitating 
a comprehensive approach to understanding the concept. Buckley et al. (1988) offered just 
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such a comprehensive approach, emphasizing that competitiveness should be examined using a 
framework that has three parts: (1) Competitive Potential – examines competiveness as 
comprising the generation and maintenance of competitive advantage; (2) Management 
Process – examines competitiveness as the process of managing decisions and processes in the 
‘right way’; and (3) Competitive Performance –examines competitiveness as the ability to 
perform well. 
This implies that competitiveness can be studied as both a dependent and independent variable, 
as they can be seen influencing each other. Therefore, as pointed out by Mehrotra and Kant 
(2010), a comprehensive evaluation of competiveness must benchmark the target entity on all 
three areas. This study adopts a comprehensive approach to evaluating competitiveness, and 
aims to contribute towards adding knowledge to the emerging Global Value Chain 
Competitiveness Analytical Framework.  Competitive potential and management processes 
will be treated as independent variables and competitive performance as a dependent variable. 
The independent variables will be examined in the context of entrepreneurship behavioural 
practices, with the purpose of predicting the competitive success or failure (competitive 
performance) of the Ugandan agri-businesses involved in commercial forestry and sugarcane 
value chains. 
2.3.4 Value chain governance concept 
The GVCA approach incorporates power relations into the study of global production systems 
through the application of the governance concept. An understanding of value chain 
governance was crucial in this study as the author sought to identify the role played by private 
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enterprise and/or entrepreneurs in structuring and re-structuring Uganda’s agri-business value 
chains such as sugar and forestry.     
GVC governance, simply characterises the relationships or linkages among participating 
stakeholders in the value chain. It refers to the power of a stakeholder to determine, control 
and/or coordinate the activities of other actors in the value added chain (Fredrick & Gereffi, 
2009).  Perrow (2002) infers that power is an integral part of economic life. By borrowing an 
adage from the rule of the jungle - only the strongest through adaptation survive. This holds 
true in the daily economic life of mankind. The effects of power or a lack of power can be 
discerned at all levels in the value chain. Non-firm chain actors including national policy and 
regulatory bodies and multi-lateral institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
shape GVCs through the enforcement or lack of enforcement of rules. Consumers have 
purchasing power and workers also have power in cases where they are organised into trade 
unions. 
At the firm level, power is wielded in different ways and amounts by various actors in the 
value chain. The value chain’s actors include lead firms who mainly yield the governance 
power (Sturgeon, 2008). Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) made the first categorisation of 
GVC governance power of lead firms by contrasting them between Producer Driven 
Commodity Chains (PDCC) and Buyer Driven Commodity Chains (BDCC). The former tend 
to have high entry barriers due to intensive capital and technology, while the latter is 
characterised by low entry barriers, as producers are bound to buyers’ decisions through the 
functions of design and marketing. 
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Lead firms wield the purchasing power in BDCCs; buyers place orders and specify standards, 
deliveries, buying prices etc., hence appropriating higher economic rents. Suppliers may also 
wield power in the value chain if they possess market and technological dominance. This has 
been found to take place particularly in high-tech industries such as electronics, automobiles, 
telecoms etc. (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994).  With respect to commodity chains and/or 
natural resource-based sectors, primary producers have been found to lack power, ultimately 
affecting the appropriation of economic rents and distribution of gains (Peppelenbos, 2008; 
Mugabira & Sekiboobo, 2011; Mugabira & Chivaka, 2015). 
There has been a progressive shift in global production organisation, as producer-driven chains 
have become more buyer-driven, including through outsourcing. This enabled Gereffi et al. 
(2005) to move towards a richer theory-based typology of GVC governance. The GVC theory 
based on the dichotomous (high-low) variation in three independent variables - the complexity 
of information to be exchanged between value chain tasks; the codifiability of that information; 
and the capabilities resident in the supply base - gave rise to five generic governance patterns: 
market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchies. 
The GVC governance framework was developed in the context of bicycles, apparel, fresh 
vegetables and electronics (Gereffi et al., 2005), and more recently the automotive industry 
(Sturgeon et al., 2008). The framework underscores the importance of transaction costs in the 
face of asset specificity, as well as the different motivations for constructing inter-firm 
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governance relationships. This study examined the value of this framework in the context of 
explaining governance in agriculture-based value chains. Agri-businesses value chains are the 
subject of great interest among government and development partner institutions as a pathway 
for the economic growth of developing countries, as it not only contributes to rural livelihoods 
but also poverty alleviation if practiced in a sustainable manner (Mugabira & Ssekiboobo, 
2011; Locke & Byrne, 2008; UNIDO, 2009). On the other hand, a World Bank Report (2010) 
contended that investments in agriculture have a quadruple impact on the economy compared 
to other sectors. 
As more research is carried out on individual agri-business sectors, there is growing awareness 
that the governance structures that dominate agri-business value chains may be highly 
inequitable, the best-known examples being coffee producing countries such as Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia and Brazil (Fitter & 
Kaplinsky, 2001a) and the Ugandan fish value chain (Mugabira & Sekiboobo, 2011; Mugabira 
& Chivaka, 2015). Upstream actors are undoubtedly the most maligned actors in the liberalised 
agri-business value chains in developing countries (Laven, 2005), yet some studies argue that 
upstream actors are mainly small-scale farmers - certainly private sector operators or small-to-
medium enterprises - and are already entrepreneurs in the sense that they seek out profitable 
opportunity, manage costs of production and marketing, and aspire to grow their businesses 
(Kahan, 2013; Hrangao & Sorokhaibam, 2015). The extent and effectiveness by which these 
rural entrepreneurs can ‘upgrade’ to become competitive requires a GVC analysis of three 
governance related factors: first, appropriation of economic rents and distribution of gains; 
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second, diffusion of production capabilities; and third, market access and standards (Frederick 
& Gereffi, 2009). Results from the analysis provided insights into policy interventions through 
investment incentives to enable shifts in governance structures to facilitate upgrading and chain 
competitiveness. The next section discusses complimentary theoretical frameworks to the 
GVCA approach. 
2.4 Complimentary theoretical frameworks 
A number of other theoretical frameworks could be considered variants of the GVCA 
approach, which can be thought of as extensions or complementary. This sub-section 
introduces the other four main complementary theoretical approaches:, the New Institutional 
Theory (NIT), Transactional Cost Analytical (TCA) framework ,the Cluster Approach and 
Entrepreneurship Behavioral Theory. 
2.4.1 New institutional theory 
The New Institutional Theory/Economics (NIT or NIE) approach offers important analytical 
tools for complementing the GVCA approach.  Historically, the Resource Based View (RBV) 
of the firm theory by Barney (1990), has been one of the key theories in entrepreneurship 
because access to resources is central to the success of a new venture (Bhide, 2000). Although 
this study recognises the importance of the RBV, this theory was not applied in the analysis 
because it is more suitable for large organisations (Mathur, 1999; Akio, 2005), rather than 
entrepreneurs or chain actors involved in running small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
participating in value chains, who are the main focus of this study. For this reason, the choice 
of entrepreneurial behavioural theory to highlight entrepreneurs’ behavioural characteristics 
and management practices that transform into entrepreneurs’ resources and capabilities is more 
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appropriate. While studying entrepreneurs’ behaviour is generating a lot of enthusiasm in the 
discipline of global value chains and competitiveness, it has become clear that the rules 
governing the game, the governance structures enforcing the rules, as well as the economic 
incentives, can all impact an industry and in turn its entrepreneurial success or failure (Baumol, 
1990; North, 1992).  
Williamson (1998) asserted that the NIT addresses two parts. Part one deals with the 
institutional environment – the rules of the game – and traces its origin to Ronald Coase’s 1960 
paper on ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. Part two deals with institutions of governance – the 
play of the game – and originates from Coase’s 1937 paper on ‘The Nature of the Firm’. NIT is 
considered to have emerged as an inter-disciplinary school of thought that combines 
economics, law, organisational theory, political science, sociology and anthropology to 
understand the development of institutions (Williamson, 1998; Olomola, 2010).  The aim of 
NIT is to explain the nature of institutions, how they emerge, what purposes they serve, how 
they evolve over time, and how, if at all, they could be reformed (Martin, 1993). NIT is thus 
concerned with addressing market imperfections and failures that result from 
actors’/entrepreneurs’ behaviours, manifesting in the form of productive or unproductive, 
and/or at times predatory, actions (Baumol, 1990). This study applied the NIT to investigate 
the prevailing institutional quality in Uganda, i.e. the prevailing rules of the game and the 
governance institutions that account for wealth distribution and competitiveness in value 
chains. The rules of the game were investigated in the form of monopoly and/or anti-monopoly 
policies, while governance institutions were investigated by looking at governance power 
distribution and fairness in the enforcement of the rules of the game, and by highlighting 
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possible reforms for the competitiveness of value chains. The next section discusses the 
transactional cost theory, which is also part of the NIT. 
2.4.2 Transactional cost analytical theoretical framework 
The GVCA approach is considered to be an extension of the TCA approach because it explains 
network intermediary governance market structures, i.e. modular, relational and captive, that lie 
between two extreme governance typologies: simple market linkages and hierarchies. The binary 
view of the extreme governance typologies depicting either markets or hierarchies is best 
explained by the TCA approach. 
The TCA by Williamson, (1975), or transaction cost economics (TCE) by Williamson, (1979), 
which are derived from Coase’s (1937) economic theorem, explain how global production might 
be organised. The organisation and co-ordination can either be arm’s-length market relationships, 
or within transnational firms, ‘vertical integration’ or hierarchies. The assumptions determining 
the choice of governance structure are:  
(1) Asset specificity – refers to the level to which specific investments inputs are required for a
particular transaction (Williamson, 1975). Asset specificity takes a variety of forms such as 
human assets, physical assets, site specificity, dedicated assets, brand name capital and temporal 
specificity. 
(2) Coordination and/or transaction costs – costs related to the management and mitigation of
risks due to uncertainties in carrying out the transaction. These costs can include search costs, 
contracting costs, monitoring costs, and enforcement costs (Williamson, 1985; North, 1990). The 
purpose of the TCE is cost minimisation (Williamson, 1975). 
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(3) Frequency/Scale of economies - refers to volume/number of transactions per period.
(4) Opportunism – refers to the guile and self-interest exhibited by individuals and/or actors
operating in a world subjected to bounded rationality and/or limited judgment (Williamson, 
1990).  
The four characteristics described above have a major influence on the efficiency of alternative 
coordination structure - either buy or make decisions. The decision to buy arm’s-length market 
relationships arise for standard products and services requiring low asset specificity and having 
many suppliers and buyers. On the other hand, the decision to make through ‘vertical integration 
or hierarchies’ arises for complex products or services requiring high asset specificity through 
specific transaction investments. This raises the risk of opportunism and uncertainty, which either 
rules out outsourcing altogether, or makes it costlier because safeguards have to be in place, thus 
increasing transaction costs (Williamson, 1998; Gereffi et al., 2005).  
Scholars have identified drawbacks in the TCA approach, such as methodological measurements 
and that the TCA approach views a firm as an independent entity structured either as purely 
market arm’s-length relationship or hierarchy vertically integrated with a purpose of earning rents 
through cost minimization (Hill, 1990; Shelanski & Klein, 1995; Hobbs, 1996; Wang, 2003; 
Macher & Richman, 2008). However, the GVCA approach fills this gap by arguing that inter-
firm relationships are a blend between a market and hierarchies (Gereffi et al., 2005). Further, 
Gereffi et al. argue that even without opportunism, transaction costs increase when inter-firm 
relationships require greater coordination. They cited two examples, one of which involved 
complex product specifications and designs which require closer coordination and complex 
information transfer across enterprise boundaries. The second example related to products whose 
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supply is time-sensitive, as separate processes need to be better coordinated in order to 
synchronise the flow of inputs through the chain.  
TCA views a firm as a bundle of transactions or contracts, negating the notion of firm capabilities 
and knowledge (Madhok, 1996). The literature on firm capabilities and knowledge, which has its 
roots in the resource-based view theory of the firm pioneered by Penrose (1959), provides 
insights on why firms may construct inter-firm relationships. According to Penrose, companies 
possess core competencies (i.e. resources) that are not easily replicated by competitors, regardless 
of frequency or scale of economies. This suggests that even the most integrated firm rarely 
possesses all the knowledge and capabilities required to bring a product or service to market. This 
implies that firms need each other (dependency) for the acquisition of some key inputs. Other 
resource-based view researchers have found out that firms that rely on the complementary 
capabilities of other firms achieve superior performance (Madhok, 1996; Dyer, 1997), while 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) observed that they perform better than vertically integrated firms.  
In conclusion, TCA fails to explain the complex structuring of inter-firm relationships due to its 
inability to recognise that relationships are formed for the mutual benefit of the participating 
partners and not isolated firms. Further, the growing body of work on the governance of global 
value chains suggests that the coordination and control of complex global scale production can be 
achieved without direct ownership, contrary to TCA predictions for hierarchies (vertical 
integration). 
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2.4.3 Cluster theoretical framework 
The industrial cluster approach is considered to be another variant of the GVC approach. In 
contrast to the GVC literature, the cluster literature views inter-firm co-operation within a single 
geographical locality rather than within the chain as the source of competitive advantage 
(Humphrey & Schimtz, 2000).  The allure of the cluster approach is its particular significance to 
boost SMEs’ cooperation for competitiveness alongside large firms, both in developed and 
developing countries (Giuliani, Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2005). Schmitz (1997, pp. 4) defined a 
cluster as “a group of small producers making the same or similar things in close vicinity to each 
other”. Clustering helps small firms overcome constraints such as a lack of specialised skills and 
difficulty of access to technology, inputs, market information, credit and external services 
(Giuliani et al., 2005; Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2006). The firms are said to benefit from collective 
efficiency defined as the ‘competitive advantage derived from local external economies and joint 
actions’” (Schmitz & Navdi, 1999, pp. 1504).  
Examples of successful clusters include Sinus Valley footwear in Brazil (Schmitz, 1999), the 
surgical instrument district in Germany and Pakistan (Navdi & Halder, 2005), the horticulture 
cluster in Spain (Aznar-Sanchez & Galdeano-Gomez, 2011), the horticulture cluster in Mexico 
(Maya-Ambia, 2011), the horticulture cluster in Kenya (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000) and the 
Detroit vehicle development cluster in the USA (Sturgeon et al., 2008).  
The origin of clusters was traced by Marshall in his book, Principles of Economics (1920), when 
he discussed specialised industrial locations (Marshal, 1890).Marshall recognised that the 
economic productivity of firms and businesses resulted from the location and proximity of 
economic agents to each other. This implies that the cluster definition provided by Schmitz 
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(1997), as cited above is a feature of Marshallian clusters. Porter (1990) is credited for having 
popularised the cluster concept through his Diamond of Advantage Framework, however this has 
been criticised as being a generic and vague way of thinking about regional economic 
development (Hofe & Chen, 2006). A similar critique by Martin and Sunley (2003) pointed out 
that Porter has been successful because he promotes competitiveness; a concept which appeals to 
politicians and policy makers, but has little contribution to academic rigour. In particular, they 
claimed that Porter’s Diamond Model in Industry Cluster Analysis gives insight into the 
innovative nature of competition rather than adding insights to the different aspects of cost 
minimisation, which is the traditional comparative advantage for cluster identification (Martin & 
Sunley, 2003). This makes Porter’s model insignificant in theoretical cluster identification. 
The cluster approach has been found to have some drawbacks. First, cluster studies fail to group 
industries according to inter-industry interdependencies, i.e. inter-industry trading patterns (Hofe 
& Chen, 2006). Second, the identification of clusters based on strength of linkages and 
‘spillovers’ poses measurement problems because the cut-off between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties is 
unspecified (Martin & Sunley, 2003). The third critique, which is most relevant to this study, is 
that the cluster theory focuses exclusively on intra cluster vertical and horizontal localised 
relationships, while conceptualising external linkages simplistically as either contained within 
multi-locational firms or made through arms-length trading relationships (Humphrey & Schmitz, 
2002). However, in reality, clusters are not limited to local spheres; clusters are closely linked 
with external actors who connect such clusters to global markets (Schmitz & Navdi, 1999). 
Sturgeon et al. (2008) contended that the best performing clusters are those that are well 
connected to external linkages that provide novel information and technical support not available 
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locally. To this end, the GVC approach (Gereffi, 1999) takes into account activities occurring 
outside the cluster, thus illuminating the crucial strategic role played by external actors.  
As domestic clusters are being inserted into GVCs, efforts are being made to combine the cluster 
and GVC approaches. Recently, input-output based industrial cluster analysis involving forward 
and backward linkages in the value chain has gained popularity (Bergman & Feser, 1999; 
Doeringer & Terkla, 1995; Hill & Brennan, 2000; Meyer-Stemer, Maggi & Seibel, 2004; Navdi 
& Halder, 2005).  Feser and Lugar (2002, pp. 3) defined a cluster as  
“concentrations of businesses that co-locate because of trading (buyer-supplier) 
relationships and/or to share common factor markets (including infrastructure, 
knowledge resources, and labor) and/or common goods markets”.  
This definition is a reflection of direct value chain linkages and complementary horizontal 
relationships, thus integrating the cluster and GVC approaches. 
In sum, both the cluster and GVC approach offer interesting opportunities for local firm 
upgrading and are not mutually exclusive (Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2006). Thus what this study 
leveraged upon in the review of the industrial cluster approach is its contribution to examining 
local linkages between the main actors and the support offered by private companies, 
development partners and public institutions. Clearly all approaches illustrate the 
organisational and spatial structure and dynamics of global industries, as well as the strategies 
and behaviours of major buyers and suppliers including power relations (Sturgeon, 2008). 
Throughout this thesis the term ‘GVC’ is used consistently, whilst recognising the usefulness 
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of other variants, for example those provided by the TCA and cluster approaches.  The next 
section discusses the entrepreneurship theoretical frameworks. 
2.4.4 The domain of entrepreneurship theoretical frameworks 
There are three dominant perspectives in the field of entrepreneurship: 
The first perspective is the functional approach which regards the economic function of the 
entrepreneur. This perspective views an entrepreneur as an innovator and innovation as the 
heart or the central characteristic of entrepreneurial effort (Schumpeter, 1934).  
Schumpeter described these innovations as “carrying out new combinations” that take various 
forms besides mere improvement in technology: (1) the introduction of new goods, (2) the 
introduction of new methods of production, (3) the opening of new markets, (4) the opening of 
new sources of raw material supply, and (5) the carrying out of new forms of industrial 
organisations, like the creation of a monopoly or the breaking of a monopoly through creative 
destruction. 
According to Schumpeter (1943), the above five entrepreneurial behavioural practices are 
sources of competition and not forces of supply and demand. Therefore, Schumpeter’s 
approach is in essence that entrepreneurs are competitive and always strive to gain an edge 
over their competitors (Gray, 2002). The drawback of this approach is its inability to recognise 
the role of the policy environment in moderating the behaviour of entrepreneurs while 
undertaking any of the above innovative five tasks. As change agents entrepreneurs exhibit 
behaviours that may be beneficial or detrimental to society in their pursuit of gains (North, 
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1990). The behaviours exhibited can be described as productive or unproductive, and at times 
predatory (Baumol, 1990).   
The second perspective is the trait approach which focuses on the identification of personal 
characteristics such as need for achievement, internal locus of control, high risk-taking 
propensity, and tolerance for ambiguity, drive and energy (McClelland, 1961; Rotter, 1966; 
MacMillan, 1965; Timmons, Smollen & Dingee, 1977; Brockhaus, 1980).  The trait approach 
has received much criticism because of its focus on trying to profile an entrepreneur (what he 
is and not what he does). This fails to provide empirical evidence for identifying a finite 
number of traits of entrepreneurs that distinguish between successful and unsuccessful 
entrepreneurs. 
The third perspective is the behavioural approach, which focuses on the behaviours of an 
entrepreneur including the process, function and activities in venture creation. The behavioural 
approach has made great progress because it focuses on the entrepreneurs’ behaviour (i.e. what 
they do instead of what they are) and on circumstances or situational factors that moderate the 
effects of entrepreneurs’ behaviour and performance (Gatner, 1989; Baumol, 1990). This study 
adopted the behavioural approach to examine entrepreneurs’ traits, characteristics and 
functional activities, which are basically behaviours that can be learnt, nurtured, and developed 
into a business culture, competencies and capabilities for enterprise growth, productivity and 
ultimately for an entire value chain’s competitiveness. In addition, entreprenuership bricolage; 
an emerging behavioral approach that examines business success amidst resource constraints 
(Baker & Nelson, 2003), informed analysis of entrepreneurs performances in this study. The 
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next section discusses linkages between entrepreneurial behavioral practices in determining the 
competitiveness of the agri-value chains. 
2.4.4.1 Entrepreneurs’ behavioural practices and entrepreneurship in agri-value chains 
Entrepreneurs are change agents (North, 1990), and as such they exhibit behaviours that may 
be beneficial or detrimental to society in their pursuit of gains. The behaviours exhibited can be 
described as productive, i.e. geared towards innovation (Schumpeter, 1934), or unproductive 
and at times predatory (Baumol, 1990). This study will make an effort to analyse and 
understand the behaviour of entrepreneurs in the context of the GVC literature.  
In the study of GVCs, entrepreneurs are the chain actors operating at different nodes of the 
chain. They are perceived as people who have an ‘eagle’s eye’ that enables them to spot an 
opportunity in the marketplace or along the value chain, and are able to mobilise resources to 
pursue the opportunity. The activities and processes surrounding opportunity seeking are 
known as entrepreneurial activities and entrepreneurship respectively (GEM, 2008; Ahmad & 
Hoffmann, 2008; Koellinger, 2008). 
Cantillon (1755) is considered to be the original author on entrepreneurship. He qualified the 
concept of entrepreneurship as someone bearing the financial risk of a business venture. The 
concept received much attention during the 1930s by the works of the economist Joseph 
Schumpeter, who stated that people who had the interest and skills to convert ideas or 
inventions into successful innovations caused creative destruction in markets (Schumpeter, 
1934). This is considered ‘Schumpeterian entrepreneurship’, which disturbs an existing 
equilibrium in the market. In the 1970s, Israel Kirzner objected to the Schumpeterian model by 
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proposing that entrepreneurship moves an economy towards equilibrium (Kirzner, 1973). This 
is described as ‘Kirznerian entrepreneurship’. From both schools of thought it can be deduced 
that entrepreneurship is about individuals and/or firms, be they new, old, large or small, which 
actively contribute to continuous renewal and change in the economy (Henrekson, 2007). 
According to GEM Studies (2008; 2009; 2010), entrepreneurship is no longer limited to 
innovations and inventions per say; it is now generally acknowledged that entrepreneurship is 
about starting a business.  
Agricultural value chains, especially in developing countries, are characterised by many 
complex and multi-tiered chain actors (input suppliers, primary producers (farmers), 
transporters, intermediaries, traders, processors, wholesalers, exporters and service providers 
(credit financing and consultants) and non-chain actors like public agencies and NGOs. The 
bulk of the chain actors are mainly smallholder farmers. The encouragement of these small-
scale growers (entrepreneur farmers) in developing countries to flourish in the agricultural and 
forestry sectors, which are characterised by seasonality, uncertainty, price fluctuations and 
information asymmetry, poses a challenge in maintaining an economically viable, secure and 
reliable supply ( Mpandeli & Maponya, 2014; Umar, 2016). 
To overcome these challenges, the chain actors have to work together to increase their 
productivity and raise the value of end products. By undertaking a value chain analysis, the 
actors can identify opportunities that offer increased efficiency, economies of scale, reduction 
of transaction costs or value added in the chain (Azouzi, LeBel & D’Amours, 2012). 
Entrepreneurs and businesses with an entrepreneurial focus are often the first to identify these 
opportunities and act on them. In the GVC literature, it is these entrepreneurs that become the 
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chain drivers and powerful actors who set governance parameters under which others operate. 
They influence who acquires production capabilities and market access and how gains are 
distributed throughout the chain (Gereffi et al., 2005).  
By setting governance parameters they determine admission and/or exclusion of chain 
participants. The scope of their actions (behaviour) may have an impact not only on the 
industry level but also on the national and global markets.   
“For instance, if the global value chains are governed by a few lead firms or 
entrepreneurs, market access for suppliers is dependent not only on the efficiency of the 
supply capabilities, but also on how suppliers fit into the strategies of the lead firms” 
(Velde et al. 2005, pp. 4). 
Further, the lead firms and/or entrepreneurs governing a chain are able to determine where 
high return activities (such as marketing and R&D) and low-return activities are located along 
the chain (Velde et al., 2005; Gereffi et al., 2005; Frederick & Gereffi, 2009). The location of 
value adding activities affects the distribution of gains among chain participants, contributing 
to winners and losers. In entrepreneurship literature, entrepreneurs exhibiting such behaviours 
are classified as either productive or non-productive, and at times evasive or predatory in 
nature (Baumol, 1990; Dejardin, 2000; Mehlum et al., 2003; Douhan & Henrekson, 2007 ).  
Unproductive entrepreneurs are driven by higher seeking rents through entrepreneurial 
activities that are costly to the general welfare of the society (Henrekson, 2007; Dejardin, 
2000). Dejardin (2000) cited rent seeking forms such as corruption, stealing, bribery and 
protection seeking with the purpose of limiting economic competition. Henrekson (2007) 
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offered a different perspective of rent seeking entrepreneurs, contending that they set up a 
business to exploit subsidies and tax breaks rather than value creation. This implies that they 
engage in unproductive activities that promote the inefficient use of resources.  
On the other hand, productive entrepreneurs create a kind of business-oriented 
entrepreneurship driven by opportunities to earn economic rents, emanating from innovations 
in the production system (Douhan & Henrekson, 2008). Foss and Foss (2006) emphasised that 
productive entrepreneurship is about value creation. This kind of entrepreneurship aims at 
achieving economies of scale for higher rents through efficiency, with rent being defined as the 
rate of return exceeding the risk-adjusted market rate of return or return in excess of a resource 
owner’s opportunity cost (Tollison, 1982).  
While productive entrepreneurship literature recognises the appropriation of economic rents 
emanating from value addition by entrepreneurs, it falls short of recognising the aspect of 
distribution implications along the value chain. This study contends that even though 
entrepreneurs can operate an efficient and effective value chain ‘competitively’, the issue of 
distribution of gains has an effect on sustaining the competitiveness of the value chain. This is 
a gap which this study intends to help fill in the arena of entrepreneurship in agricultural value 
chains. 
The above discussion reveals that chain actors’ actions can stimulate or hinder the 
competitiveness and/or competitive performance of the value chain. This stimulation or 
hindrance is not only industry-specific (meso-level), but also translates into a nation’s (macro-
level) prosperity or failure to prosper in the global economy.  The next section discusses the 
major themes of this study by examining entrepreneurial management processes and 
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entrepreneurial competitive potential factors determine competitive performance of the 
enterprises undertaking GVC participation.  
2.5 Themes on competitive performance, management processes and competitive potential 
factors. 
2.5.1 Competitive performance of agri-business value chains 
There is a dearth of empirical studies on the competitiveness of agri-business value chains in 
developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some available studies are from Asia 
(Sagheer, Yadav & Deshmukh, 2009), Europe (Henchion & McIntyre, 2005; Bilalis, Alvizos, 
Tsironis & Wassenhove, 2007) and Latin America (Zylbersztajn, Cláudio & Filho, 2003). In 
developing countries like Uganda, the majority of players belong to the unorganised informal 
entrepreneurial sector, which renders access to first-hand information cumbersome (Sagheer et 
al., 2009). This may be a contributing factor to the scarcity of empirical studies, which is why 
this study offers an invaluable contribution. 
Buckley et al. (1988) asserted that competitive performance examines competitiveness as the 
ability to perform well, while the competitive performance of value chains can be assessed in 
terms of the competitive success or failure of the value chain. In this study, competitiveness 
success or failure was analysed using productivity increases and/or decreases at the enterprise 
level in value chains. The benchmarking indicators were based at productivity industry norms 
within the country and against comparative benchmarks with other countries. The FAO Stat 
data (2013) was a useful source of information for providing country comparative productivity 
data by ranking in terms of yields per unit area. Other productivity measures such as time to 
market and quality were obtained from specialised industry reports. This study adopted these 
productivity measures in order to measure the competitiveness success or failure of Uganda’s 
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agri-business value chains. The research found these measures to be of profound importance 
because they are generally considered to be global competitiveness indicators for assessing the 
economic strength of entities such as firms, industries/sectors, regions and nations.  
The next section examines the relationship of the independent variables, i.e. entrepreneurial 
management processes’ critical success factors and entrepreneurial competitive potential 
factors, in explaining competitive performance.  
2.5.2 Entrepreneurs’ perceptions of management processes’ critical success factors  
An entrepreneur in the behavioural approach is perceived into two perspectives the first 
perspective an entrepreneur as a person who exhibits managerial behavioural characteristics 
and/or traits that lead to competitive success (Gartner, 1989; McClelland, 1961; Rotter, 1966; 
Brockhaus, 1980); and the second perspective perceives an entrepreneur behavior basing on 
situational factors that moderate the effects of entrepreneur’s behavior and performance 
(Gartner, 1989; Baumol, 1990). The first description of the entrepreneur in the behavioural 
approach corresponds with the way an entrepreneur manages decisions and processes for 
business success, while the second approach examines the effect of the external environmental 
factors or competitive potential factors in moderating entrepreneurs’ behaviour. 
Buckley et al. (1988) asserted that management processes entail examining competitiveness as 
the process of managing decisions and processes in the ‘right way’. The person at the centre of 
managing decisions and processes in the ‘right way’ or ‘wrong way’ is the entrepreneur and/or 
his/her manager.  This implies that the role of the entrepreneur in managing decisions and 
processes the ‘right way’ or ‘wrong way’ is what distinguishes successful from unsuccessful 
firms, investment projects and entrepreneurs. Rockart (1979) is credited for having identified 
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areas or activities in a business that must be managed right, which he termed critical success 
factors (CSFs), after which a number of studies emerged that investigated critical success 
factors (Munro, 1983; Chung, 1987; Lumpkin & Ireland, 1988; Attahir, 1995; Bessant & 
Kaplinsky, 1995; Barnes, 2000; Hackney & Dunn, 2000McCormick & Schmitz, 2001; 
Kaplinsky, Memodovic, Morris & Readman, 2003; Schmitz, 2005; Ewasechko 2005; Quesada 
& Gazo, 2007; Sebora, Lee, & Sukasame, 2009; Naqvi, 2011; Navas-Aleman 2011; Chong, 
2012; Ab Talib & Hamid, 2014; Kumar, Shankar & Singh, 2015). A study by the Australian 
Government’s Rural Industries Research & Development Corporation (RIRDC), conducted in 
(2009), revealed a growing interest by public institutions to apply CSFs to their project 
development models.   
Critical success factors represent those activities and areas that require constant and careful 
attention (Rockart, 1979) in order to achieve desired performance (Hackney & Dunn, 2000), 
which entail more management participation (Munro, 1983; Quesda & Gazo, 2007) to reduce 
business start-up failures and increase business survival or success (Chung, 1987; Lumpkin 
and Ireland, 1988). The value chain research fraternity has developed a tool for the assessment 
of perceptions of CSFs by value chain actors for value chain competitiveness (Schmitz, 2005; 
McCormick and Schmitz, 2001), whereby the suppliers rate their own performance with 
respect to buyers’ expectations and gaps for improvement are identified. This is utilised by the 
Dominican Republic garment industry (Bessant & Kaplinsky, 1995), the furniture industry in 
South Africa, Indonesia and Brazil (Kaplinsky et al., 2003; Ewasechko, 2005; Navas-Aleman, 
2011), and the auto industry in South Africa (Barnes, 2000). These studies applied CSFs such 
as quality, reliability, price, time from order to delivery, quantity, and innovation, which can be 
described as ‘hardware’ measures. In addition to examining the hardware measures, this study 
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also investigated CSFs according to ‘software’ measures, described as personal behavioural 
characteristics or traits such as locus of control, commitment and personal involvement, which 
have been found to determine competitive success (Rotter, 1966; Gartner, 1989; Sebora et al., 
2009).  
The next section investigates entrepreneurs’ perceptions with regards to availability of 
competitive potential factors and their efficiency in facilitating competitive success.  
2.5.3 Entrepreneurs’ perceptions of competitive potential factors 
An entrepreneur in the behavioural approach is viewed as a person whose behaviour, actions 
and activities are moderated by the prevailing environmental factors (Gartner, 1989; Baumol, 
1990). These factors are described as competitive potential in the competitiveness analytical 
framework (Buckley et al., 1988). As suggested by Buckley et al., potential factors should not 
be considered only as available assets or inputs, but the efficiency to which they are put to use 
and the results obtained from their use need to be evaluated. This study adopted this approach 
of examining the entrepreneurs’ perceptions with regards to efficiency of the external 
environmental factors or competitive potential in achieving business competitive success. 
The new institutional theory describes the environmental factors as the formal and informal 
rules of the game (North, 1990; Williamson, 1998), while the GVC framework describes them 
as chain governance (Gereffi et al., 2005). Buckley et al. (1988) asserted that competitive 
potential sees competiveness as comprising the generation and maintenance of competitive 
advantage. The existing competitive potential factors can create conditions that favour either 
productive entrepreneurship behaviours or unproductive and at times predatory 
entrepreneurship behaviours (Baumol, 1990). This study examined the following existing 
55 
competitive potential factors that are also regarded as chain governance factors: (1) equitable 
value chain sharing, (2) entrepreneurial alertness and regulatory environment, (3) compliance 
with standards for market access, and (4) collaboration for the diffusion of supplier production 
capabilities.  
2.5.3.1 Equitable value chain sharing  
The identification of winners and losers in Uganda’s agricultural GVC participation was one of 
the core objectives of this study. The appropriation of economic rents as a motivating factor for 
business start-ups can be traced to as early as the 18th century in relation to land owners and 
capitalist farmers (paid land rent to landlords for food production). 
Ricardo (1815) is credited for having propagated the theory on land rent by realising the 
existence of entry barriers (scarcity of resources) and protective barriers to importations (Corn 
Laws), which significantly altered the previous analyses on society and economy. Ricardo 
(1815) is also credited for having introduced the term ‘economic rent’ to describe payment for 
the uses of the original and indestructible powers of the soil. Schumpeter (1934) caused a 
revolution in Economic Rent Theory by introducing the concept of entrepreneurial rents; he 
regarded entrepreneurs as the engine of economic growth as they disturb the equilibrium. The 
process of disturbing the equilibrium, which he termed “creative destruction”, meant a process 
of introducing new combinations, thus destroying the existing combinations. He identified five 
types of ‘new combinations’: creating new products or new quality; new methods of 
production or new technology; opening up new markets; creating new sources of supply; and 
creating new organisations or structures in industry – such as the creation of a monopoly 
position or breaking up a monopoly position.   
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An entrepreneur is able to attract premium prices from these new combinations, providing 
greater returns to meet the cost of innovation. The super profits act as a stimulant, thus inviting 
imitators, which results in competition and a fall in prices and hence a new cycle of innovation 
- either by the same entrepreneur or another entrepreneur in search of new rents. In today’s
competitive environment, firms or entrepreneurs can appropriate economic rents through many 
value addition activities by creating barriers to entry or by taking advantage of existing entry 
barriers (Kaplinsky, 1998). One type of rent can be classified as static, based on the bounty of 
nature, access rights and commodity price markets known as Ricardian rents, while the second 
type of rent is created by dynamism or innovation, through purposive actions and is also 
eroded by forces of competition thus known as Schumpeterian rents. Still, appropriation of 
economic rents is not only limited to a single firm; within the GVC literature it is a reflection 
of how income is shared among the actors along the value chain. 
Income distribution from GVC participation can be analysed in different dimensions: different 
links in the chain, different countries (producing and consuming), different classes (employers 
and employees), different types of producers (large and small farms and firms), different 
regions, different genders and different ethnic groups (Fitter & Kaplinsky, 2001a).  Of these, 
Fitter and Kaplinsky applied the dimensions of different links and countries in the chain by 
analysing the spread of gains in the coffee value chains of Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia and Brazil. The findings revealed that the share 
of final sales value accrued to different links: 10% at farm level; 21% at ex-farm processing; 
8% at export agents; 2% at insurance/freight level; 8% at global buyer level; 29% at roaster 
level and 22% at retailer level. With respect to the distribution of gains between different 
countries, the data revealed that between the late 1980s and late 1990s most of the gains 
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(almost 80%) were appropriated by chain participants resided in the high consuming countries. 
Such a scenario depicts a picture of winners and losers in GVC participation. In the citrus 
value chain, farmers received approximately 10% of the final price (Lee, Gereffi and 
Barrientos 2011). In the case of the grapes export value chain to United Kingdom, 
supermarkets earned 42%, distributors earned 32% and growers received only 18% or (26% if 
pack houses included) based on the final price (Barrientos and Visser, 2012). 
Tijaja’s (2010) analysis of distributional implications into Thailand’s cassava VCs was done at 
both the firm level and at the macro level. Her findings revealed that weaker GVC participants, 
such as smallholder farmers and unskilled workers, were more vulnerable to market shocks and 
uncertainties. Strikingly, her study revealed that the trade in less value-added cassava VCs 
between South-South countries (Thailand and China) was less stringent and resulted in higher 
revenues, compared with trade involving a greater degree of value-addition between South-
North countries (Thailand – EU). A similar study by Terheggen (2010) on the Gabon forestry 
VCs between Gabon and China and Gabon and the EU arrived at the same finding.  
These findings confirm the appropriation of rents by the exporting countries based on factor 
utilization i.e, Ricardian rents, however neither study shows the revenue generated by Chinese 
retailers and/or supermarket companies in China. This highlights a gap in both Tijaja’s and 
Terheggen’s studies, since empirical evidence is lacking to challenge the GVC literature which 
argues that consumer countries (the ‘North’) appropriate a high percentage of rents through the 
location of low value addition activities to the ‘South’, preserving high yielding value addition 
activities in their home countries. This implies that the revenue generated by producer export 
companies is a reflection of the better commodity prices offered by China in comparison to the 
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EU. The analysis falls short of revealing whether there is a fair distribution of gains between 
producer export (engaging in extractive activities) and import countries (undertaking value 
addition activities).  
Value-addition activities are shielded from competitive pressure due to the creation of high 
entry barriers (Kaplinsky, 1998; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2000). This enables entrepreneurs 
engaging in value-addition activities to experience an appropriation of sustained income i.e 
earning Schumpeterian rents. Despite this omission, both studies i.e., Tijaja’s and Terheggen’s 
agreed that the failure of exporting countries to engage in value-addition activities will have 
dire consequences for the acquisition of specialised skills and technology in these sectors. The 
inadequacy of skills and production capabilities in these sectors will mean that these countries 
experience competitive pressure by operating on the extractive level of the GVC, which is 
associated with low entry barriers in the global economy.  
2.5.3.2 Entrepreneurial alertness and regulatory regimes 
Entrepreneurship promotion and the existence of an effective and efficient business investment 
climate and regulatory regime are high on most government policy agendas. Oya (2012), 
Leavy & Poulton (2007) observed that governments, especially in Africa, are now promoting a 
dual agricultural policy strategy based on: (a) a strong component of promotion of commercial 
smallholder production and their integration into global value chains through contract farming 
(CF) and other similar mechanisms; and (b) some measures to promote agricultural 
investments by large-scale investors (foreign or national) in an attempt to build up agricultural 
competitiveness in highly demanding markets.  
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What is clear from the above stated policy agenda is the need for the collective organisation 
and coordination of producers or farmers. The cluster approach is best suited to explain the 
collective organisation of producers to gain from collective efficiency and joint action. Schmitz 
(1997, pp. 4) defined a cluster as “a group of small producers making the same or similar 
things in close vicinity to each other”. Clustering helps small firms to overcome constraints 
such as a lack of specialised skills and difficulty of access to technology, inputs, market 
information, credit and external services (Giuliani et al., 2005; Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2006). 
“The firms are said to benefit from collective efficiency defined as the, ‘competitive advantage 
derived from local external economies and joint actions’” (Schmitz & Navdi, 1999, pp. 1504).  
Agriculture-based clusters’ successes are linked to the comparative advantages of a 
geographical area (Aznar-Sanchez & Galdeano-Gomez, 2011). In considering the geographical 
area, a number of external economies are of particular significance for clusters’ attractiveness 
and formation (Schmitz, 1995; Rabellotti, 1997). These include clients’ access to the cluster, 
free flow of information and innovation, factor production endowment (e.g. favourable 
climate, soils, and temperatures), market access, infrastructure (Aznar-Sanchez & Galdeano-
Gomez, 2011; Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2006), grant incentives and input support provision.  
Entrepreneurs who perceive the availability of these opportunities in clusters tend to pursue 
these business opportunities and are said to exhibit entrepreneurial or opportunity alertness. 
2.5.3.2.1 Entrepreneurial alertness  
Entrepreneurship alertness is of high interest in academia and policy by explaining business 
start-ups, growth and job creation in a country’s economy. The Global Entrepreneurship 
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Monitor (GEM) dedicates effort to undertaking global comparative ranking surveys of 
countries with respect to entrepreneurship activities.   According to the GEM Report of 2014, 
Uganda (28.1%) was the most entrepreneurial country in the world, followed by Thailand 
(16.7%) and Brazil (13.8%). Interestingly the USA was found to be lagging far behind with a 
score of 4.3%, as this country often comes to mind as being the most entrepreneurial in the 
world. The GEM Report also rated Uganda’s entrepreneurs as top in the world for perceived 
opportunities (76.9%), perceived capabilities (84.9%) and fear of failure (12.6%). This finding 
suggests that Uganda’s entrepreneurs are alert to finding business opportunities in their 
environment, and they also believe that they have the skills to exploit available opportunities 
coupled with a low fear of failure. This finding was of interest to this study with respect to 
pursuing investment opportunities in Uganda’s agri-business value chains. 
The GVC framework (Gereffi et al., 2005) assists in mapping a value chain to identify 
available incentives, investment opportunities and constraints, while entrepreneurial alertness 
enables entrepreneurs to perceive and exploit available investment opportunities (Kirzner, 
1979; 1981; 1997; Bygrave, 1993; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) in the value chain. When the 
entrepreneurs pursue these opportunities they are able to redress their earning potential and 
reduce exploitation, especially through upgrading. Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) and UNIDO 
(2009) identified the following four upgrading trajectories in value chains: 
 Process upgrading: improving the efficiency of internal processes to enhance
economies of scale (productivity) more significantly than rivals’. This may take place
within intra-firm chain links and between inter-firm chain links.
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 Product upgrading: introducing new products or improving old products faster than
rivals.
 Functional upgrading: deepening value added activities which takes place vertically
along the chain, especially undertaking activities such as design that attracts high rents.
 Chain upgrading: transiting to an entirely new value chain. Kaplinsky and Morris
(2000) cited an example of Taiwanese firms that moved from the manufacture of
transistor radios to calculators, TVs, computer monitors, laptops and now WAP phones.
Investments in any of the above upgrading activities determine the shaping and re-shaping of 
the existing governance structures, resulting in higher earnings and the competitive success of 
the enterprises and the entire value chain. However, the existence of a favourable investment 
climate and regulatory regime that sets the rules of the game is a precursor for the undertaking 
of successful entrepreneurial upgrading activities. 
2.5.3.2.2 Regulatory regime and/or institutional quality 
“If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations are the players” (North, 1992, pp. 10). 
Since 1999, the aim of the GEM surveys has been to offer insights into great leaps or 
slowdowns in economic growth - with the central actor being the entrepreneur. The pretext of 
the GEM surveys is that countries with high levels of entrepreneurial activities are likely to 
experience high levels of economic growth and job creation, while countries with low levels of 
entrepreneurial activities are likely to experience slowdowns in economic growth and job 
creation. What the GEM studies suggest is that at any given place and time, the supply of 
entrepreneurs in the economy is crucial.  
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This study recognises the central role of the entrepreneur as the engine of economic growth, 
but also agrees with Baumol’s paper (1990) which contended that without quality institutions, 
entrepreneurs’ activities can be detrimental to society’s growth and well-being. In a nutshell, 
Baumol emphasised that it is the prevailing institutional quality - the rules of the game 
determining the reward structure in the economy - which influences the allocation of 
entrepreneurial talent between productive activities such as innovation and largely 
unproductive activities such as rent-seeking.  
Studies show that institutional quality strongly influences wealth distribution (de Soto, 2000; 
Alonso & Garcimartin, 2013), competitiveness and growth (Easterly & Levine, 1997; 
Acemoglu et al., 2001; 2002; Rodrik, Subramanian and  Trebbi , 2002; Sala-i-Martin & 
Subramanian, 2008). A recent study in South Africa concurred with these studies and 
emphasised that sound institutional arrangements and good governance influences good 
performance (Chibanda, Ortmann & Lyne, 2009). As a result, institutional quality is now 
receiving much global attention, as witnessed by the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Reports which since 2005 have put it as the number 1 pillar among the 12 
pillars of the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) measures. According to the WEF (2010), 
revealed that a sound institutional environment became apparent during the most recent 
economic crisis and corporate scandals. Therefore, governments have been found to have a 
role to play. 
Governments can provide protection as an incentive regime to particular domestic sectors or 
clusters in the form of tariffs on imports or not allowing imports altogether. This form of 
protection was found to enable cluster growth and employment creation as it shields the cluster 
from competitive pressures, thus facilitating the earning of Schumpeterian rents. Rabellotti 
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(1999) conducted a study on the Mexican shoe industry cluster using in-depth interviews with 
key informants together with a quantitative survey covering 63 shoe manufacturing companies. 
He discovered that the Mexican shoe industry had contracted due to liberal reforms enacted in 
1985, but was able to recover after tariffs were re-imposed in 1993 on China and in 1995 on 
the rest of the world. Although he identified the devaluation of the peso as a possible other 
factor because it makes imports expensive, the tariffs provided an incentive regime for the 
cluster’s survival. He also noted, however, that liberalisation introduced competition, which 
enabled local firms to cooperate and improve their capabilities in order to stave off competition 
in both the domestic and export markets (Rabellotti, 1999). Other studies on regulatory 
regimes suggest that governments should discourage environments favouring rent-seeking 
behaviours such as monopolies unless a sound regulatory regime is in place (Poulton et al., 
2008; World Bank, 2013). 
The government of Uganda enacted policies that restrict the establishment of competing 
milling operations within a 25 kilometer radius, especially in the sugar industry (Uganda 
National Sugar Policy, 2010). This study examined this policy environment with the 
perspective of assessing entrepreneurs either for productivity gains based on innovative 
behaviours or rent-seeking entrepreneurial behaviours. The next section examines the 
importance of compliance with standards for market access in achieving productivity gains and 
ultimately the competitiveness of the value chains. 
2.5.4 Compliance with standards for market access  
Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) argued that even though trade liberalisation to dismantle trade 
barriers was introduced, developing country producers cannot gain market access in developed 
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countries. This argument is based on the premise that chains which developing country 
producers feed into are often governed by a limited number of buyers in the developed 
countries. For example, the coffee industry is governed by five roasters that control around 
50% of the roasted and instant coffee market (Gresser & Tickell, 2002 ). The implication of 
this analysis is that in order for developing country producers to gain market access to 
developed countries’ buyers, they need to access the lead firms of these chains. 
Yet the markets of the North countries have become increasingly complex with regard to food 
production and consumption in relation to ecological, health, environmental and labour 
standards (Murdoch & Meile, 1999; Dolan & Humphrey, 2000). These market requirements 
make global buyers unable to rely on purely market coordination mechanisms i.e., ‘arms-
length relationships’, and therefore the need to control value chains. Control is achieved by 
setting parameters that determines chain access and is enforceable, whereby suppliers who 
comply are assured of participation and those who fail to comply are denied market access and 
are thus marginalised (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2001).   
The GVC governance literature prescribes four key parameters that define chain participation, 
however this study adds a fifth parameter known as price, which was also identified by 
Humphrey and Schimtz (2001) but has received little attention in GVC studies.  Among these 
parameters, the most prominent ones that drive the value chain are the first two, i.e. product 
definition and process standards. The key parameters are detailed below: 
(1) What is to be produced?
(2) How it is to be produced?
(3) When it is to be produced?
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(4) How much should be produced?
(5) What price mark should be offered?
What is to be produced: this refers to product definition. Buyers define what is to be 
produced in the form of quality standards, which in turn communicate information about 
product attributes. Information on product attributes is relayed from buyers to upstream 
producers along the value chain, and product attributes in commodity chains are classified 
depending on the node of the chain. For instance, of the product attributes at the stage of farm 
gate and pre/minimal processing, the following are important: appearance, taste, cleanliness, 
absence of taints, uniformity in shape and size, and species (Ponte & Gibbon, 2005; Kaplinsky, 
Terheggen & Tijaja, 2010). In the fisheries industry freshness and legal size are important 
(Mugabira & Ssekiboobo, 2011). After processing and manufacturing, products may retain 
some of the above attributes in addition to packaging, labeling, and shelf-life. Actors and/or 
entrepreneurs who are able to meet these attributes contribute to reliability in product quality 
and hence chain competitiveness. 
How it is to be produced: this refers to production and process methods. This is the most 
critical aspect in standards, because product specifications are achieved as a result of 
implementing production and process parameters (Ponte & Gibbon, 2005). In agricultural 
value chains, production standards start with input materials such as quality of seeds and 
seedlings. This is followed up with good farm management practices for growing and 
harvesting. Implementation of these standards in developing countries highly depends on the 
type of market to be served - local, regional or international (Trienekens, 2011). For 
international markets, producers participating in the value chains have to comply to meet the 
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prescribed standards, while for local and regional markets; standards are not much of an issue. 
According to the transactional cost theory, no firm would incur the expense of undertaking a 
form of vertical integration, ‘controlling and monitoring suppliers’, to purchase products that 
the market freely provides. However, for lead firms to meet set standards, they have to develop 
inter-firm relationships with commodity producers in developing countries. 
The set standards are codified and embedded in technical instruments such as the International 
Standards Organization (ISO) 9000 for quality issues, the ISO 14,000 for environmental issues, 
and Hazard (HACCP) for food safety and hygiene standards. Further, civic organisations and 
consumers in developed countries have also put pressure on lead firms to practice ethical 
trading by introducing other instruments such as fair trade, sustainability and organic 
certifications (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; 2004; Ponte & Gibbon, 2005; Tallontire, 2009). The 
need to meet food safety, environmental and labour standards makes traceability critical in 
agricultural value chain coordination, thus necessitating tight chain control through closer 
inter-firm relationships. Since not all actors (especially small farmers) in the chain are able to 
meet these standards they act as barriers to entry, thus actors are shielded from competition and 
hence are able to appropriate monopoly rents i.e., Schumpeterian rents.  
When and how much to be produced: this refers to the timing and volume of production, 
which is inter-linked and have to be discussed together. They feed into the law of supply and 
demand; lead firms define the timing and scheduling of production to match quantities 
demanded by the markets. Timing and volumes not only have an effect on customer 
dissatisfaction due to frequent stock outs, but also on price fluctuations. Further, agricultural 
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commodities are seasonal and highly vulnerable to weather, climate and pest attacks (Mpandeli 
& Maponya, 2014; Umar, 2016). This poses a challenge of maintaining reliable product flows 
along the value chain. As predicted by the transaction cost theory, if transactions are arm’s-
length market-based, inadequacy in supply is an incentive for opportunistic behaviour or 
‘commodity hoarding’ (Williamson, 1990) in order to hike prices. Talbot (1997) illustrated the 
rise and fall of world prices in the coffee industry due to climatic conditions (frost) in Brazil 
distorting production volumes.  
To overcome such challenges, lead firms have to tightly coordinate agri-business value chains. 
Gerrefi et al. (2005) cited an example of fresh fruits and vegetables being imported from 
Kenya by UK supermarkets, which necessitated shifting from arm’s-length market 
coordination to own production by importers coupled with contract farming.  
What price mark should be offered: there is a link between price and product grading.  In 
classical economics, price is considered to be a market variable determined by the rule of 
supply and demand. This is mainly the case for on-spot market transactions, where goods are 
produced based on ‘make to forecast’.  However, for other forms of market coordination where 
goods are produced on ‘make-to-order’, a target price is always agreed upon by the parties 
involved in the transaction (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2001). Petkova’s (2006) study on fair trade 
coffee value chains asserted that prices were fixed and as a result growers were remunerated 
with a considerable net income in comparison to the main stream coffee markets. This meant 
that fair trade value chains were equitable in comparison with main stream markets, thus 
contributing to competitiveness.  
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Price is also a reflection of quality. This is true of commodity or non-commodity markets such 
as automobiles and electronics. For this reason, the aspect of product grading is important as it 
addresses the issue of quality for markets that compete more on quality than price. In agri-
business value chains pricing based upon product grading is not only a competitive strategy 
(Fitter & Kaplinsky, 2001b), but also acts as an incentive for producers/farmers to improve 
farm management practices (Tijaja, 2010). A study by Tijaja (2010) on Thai cassava value 
chains linked premium prices with starch content. Similar studies linked price with coffee 
grades (Talbot, 1997; Ponte, 2001; Fitter & Kaplinsky, 2001b). 
Wiegratz’s (2010) study on agricultural liberalisation in Uganda found that the adulteration of 
produce compromised quality, because farmers were seeking volume enhancement to increase 
revenue. He observed the same trend with traders’ ‘intermediaries’, who exhibited the same 
behaviour of quality adulteration along the value chain. The cause of quality adulteration is 
linked to the absence of a grading system matched with price in the market. This has an effect 
on the value chain’s competitiveness, which is also reflected at the national level, since the 
country’s commodities may not be competitive in international markets.  
2.5.5 Collaboration for diffusion of supplier production capabilities 
In the previous section it was revealed that meeting standards was the first major reason why a 
firm may opt for value chain coordination with suppliers, rather than buying products that the 
market freely provides. The second reason was risk of supplier failure or lack of production 
capabilities in the supply base. Risk of supplier failure is attributed mainly to non-price 
competition-based factors such as consistency in quality, response time and reliability of 
delivery, together with increasing concerns about safety and standards (Schmitz, 2005). 
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Brown and Sander (2007) cited an example in Kenya, where of over 200 licensed fresh 
produce exporters, only 50 (25%) were continuously active.  The remainder (75%) were 
considered to be part-timers who exploited favourable short-term market conditions, i.e. they 
entered and exited the market sporadically. Such a situation paints a picture of supply failure, 
impacting upon buyers’ reputations in the market.  
The TCA theory  highlights why a firm may opt to ‘buy or make’ products (Williamson, 1975). 
The theory offers two possibilities available for firms - either arms’-length market relationships 
or vertical integration ‘hierarchies’. Given the demand for firms to incorporate competitive 
strategies such as reliability in quality, consistency in supply (volume), timely deliveries, 
differentiated products and stable prices (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000), companies cannot rely on 
spot markets. The alternative offered by TCA theory for the organisation and coordination of 
production is hierarchies. With the development of the GVC theory (Gereffi et al., 2005), 
which is considered an extension of the TCA theory, firms facing such a dilemma need not 
implement hierarchies. The GVC theory offers an alternative organisation and coordination of 
production through networks or ‘quasi-hierarchies’ (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000) e.g. modular, 
relational and captive value chains. In networks there is cooperation among the firms of more 
or less equal power that share competencies within the chain, while quasi-hierarchies involve 
relationships between legally independent firms in which one is a subordinate of the other, 
with the chain leader defining and setting rules which the rest of the actors have to comply 
with.  Although the GVC theory offers alternative ‘governance structures’ as a form of 
production organisation, the TCA theory offers rich, insightful literature on the assumptions 
determining the choice of a governance structure. These assumptions are: (1) asset specificity, 
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(2) coordination and/or transaction costs, (3) frequency/scale of economies, and (4)
opportunism. 
To build production capabilities, firms undertake asset-specific investment inputs which take a 
variety of forms such as human assets, physical assets, site specificity, dedicated assets, brand 
name capita and temporal specificity (Williamson, 1975). However, the degree of asset 
specific investment depends on the form of governance structure being adopted. For instance, 
in modular value chains suppliers have production capabilities, implying that supplier 
dependency on the lead firm ‘buyer’ is low. This also implies that suppliers can produce for a 
wide spectrum of buyers, thus making switching costs low. With respect to relational value 
chains, suppliers have high production capabilities but they rely heavily on buyers for 
managing complex production information. This produces a balanced or mutual dependency 
network, requiring explicit coordination and thus making switching costs high. The third 
category is captive value chains, which are characterised by low production capabilities. Low 
capability producers are common both in developing countries (Brown & Sander, 2007; Dolan 
& Humphrey, 2000) and in countries that are new to global markets (Gereffi, 1999, Piore & 
Ruiz , 1998). 
Lead firms involved with producers in such value chains have to incur significant specific 
investment costs; investment in the human resource has to be treated as an asset rather than a 
cost (Pettigrew & Whipp, 1993). Studies show that captive chains create a fast track to the 
acquisition of production capabilities (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000; 2002; Schimtz, 2005; 
Brach,& Kappel, 2009). These studies revealed that those producers who gained access to lead 
firms’ chains found themselves on a steep learning curve. The absorption of knowledge 
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‘software’ has to be accompanied by physical assets’ ‘hardware’. Producers, especially in 
developing countries, lack physical production inputs such as irrigation, greenhouses, 
fertilizers, trucks, cooling sheds and packaging technologies (Brown & Sander, 2007). 
Producers also have to be able to sort and grade the produce, document their farming practices 
and meet tight delivery timelines as demanded by lead firms (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; 
Humphrey & Schmitz, 2001). To achieve this level of supplier performance the lead firms 
offer production inputs, transmit best practices and provide hands–on training on how to 
improve layout, production flows, and improves skills (Humphrey & Schimtz, 2001).  
The need for tight chain coordination to overcome supplier failure introduces the notion of 
coordination and/or transaction costs, categorised as search costs, contracting costs, monitoring 
costs and enforcement costs (Williamson, 1985; North, 1990). The lead firms meet the costs of 
searching and contracting with suppliers and/or farmers, and also have to periodically monitor, 
audit and inspect their suppliers’ production and processing systems (Brown & Sander, 2007). 
This is done to ensure that produce is grown, processed and transported not only in compliance 
with set parameters, but is also traceable. Traceability plays a key role in affirming that the 
farms/firms are able to meet the health, safety, environmental and labour standards demanded 
by consumers (Schimtz, 2005; Ponte & Gibbon, 2005).  Supermarkets, for one, have realised 
that a failure to meet food safety or environmental standards results in bad publicity and a loss 
of position in the marketplace (Brown & Sander, 2007).  
The previous two paragraphs discussed asset specificity and the transactional costs involved in 
managing inter-firm relationships.  The TCA also recognises the element of opportunism due 
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to the guile and self-interest exhibited by actors operating in a world subjected to bounded 
rationality (Williamson, 1990).  As a result, the TCA approach advocates for hierarchies where 
transactions involve high asset specificity, with a purpose of cost minimisation due to 
transactional costs. On the other hand, the GVCA approach differs from TCA by arguing that 
relationships are formed for the mutual benefit of the participating partners, as opposed to 
isolated firms. Therefore, according to GVCA, a mutually beneficial relationship develops trust 
(Chivaka, 2003; Dyer, 1997), which controls opportunism. On the other hand, relationships in 
value chains which are perceived not to be mutually beneficial or exploitative are characterised 
by low levels of trust. A study by Tijaja (2010) on Thai cassava value chains discovered that 
farmers had a tendency of disregarding their contractual obligations by selling cassava roots to 
other buyers who were offering better prices. A similar observation was found with farmers 
contracted by Farmapine Ghana Ltd, who also used credits and inputs for purposes other than 
pineapple growing, leading to sub-optimal farming practices that affected quality and yield 
(Brown & Sander, 2007). 
This portrays a value chain which may not have been mutually beneficial and was therefore not 
equitable for the GVC participants. A lack of equitability attributed to perceived unfairness in 
the sharing of benefits impacts upon value chain competitiveness, because firms have to incur 
high transactional costs associated with contract monitoring and enforcement. For this reason, 
this study will investigate whether the relationships are mutually beneficial to the GVC 
participants or not. 
A combination of technical assistance with connectivity and/or strong collaboration provides a 
platform for building supplier capabilities (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2001). Evidence of successful 
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collaborative ventures comes from many sectors, including the horticulture industry in Kenya 
(Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; 2004),), auto industry in China, India, Mexico, four countries of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (viz. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and  the 
Philippines), Argentina, Brazil, and countries in Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland) (Humphrey & Memedovic, 2003), the fresh fruit cluster in Brazil (Gomes, 2006), the 
salmon farming cluster in Chile (Campos, 2006) and the horticulture industry in Spain (Aznar-
Sanchez & Galdeano-Gomez, 2011). 
Strong vertical collaboration has been found to enable a combination of technical and 
investment support that characterises highly governed chains, which explains how relatively 
underdeveloped regions become major export producers in a short period of time (Humphrey 
& Schimtz, 2001; Schmitz, 2005); the authors cited the examples of the Brazilian shoe industry 
in the 1970s and the Vietnamese garment industry in the late 1990s.  A similar observation by 
Chivaka (2003) came from his study of the textile and garment supply chain in South Africa. 
He ascertained that companies that had closer collaborations in training and assistance 
achieved a higher diffusion of skills in a shorter time to achieve positive supply chain 
efficiency levels.  
Strong collaboration in horizontal linkages that encourage joint action has also been found to 
play a critical role in cluster formation. Clusters’ joint actions offer opportunities to learn both 
at the level of individual firms/farms and from relationships between them (Navdi, 1999). 
Cluster bodies and/or associations (emerging from joint action) provide platforms for the 
dissemination of know-how, the management of investment funds, and at times the setting up 
of production facilities and the marketing of products for local GVC participants. Studies on 
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clusters recognise that the diffusion of production capabilities are not only limited to GVC 
participants, but there is a skill ‘spill over’ in a geographical area (Maya-Ambia, 2011; Aznar-
Sanchez & Galdeano-Gomez, 2011; Guiliani et al., 2005). This could explain the rise of 
entrepreneurship in various forms - functional upgrading, new entrants in the value chain and 
starting parallel competitive value chains. However, Schmitz (2006) argued that despite the 
fact that highly governed structures contribute to the fast acquisition of production capabilities, 
they also create barriers for functional upgrading especially in areas of acquisition of design 
and marketing capabilities. This is because the lead firms have to protect their core capabilities 
from competition in order to sustain earning higher rents. 
2.6 Summary 
The literature reviewed four complementary theories to the competitiveness analysis using the 
GVC framework, which is rich in governance analysis and covers mainly income distribution, 
private standards for market access, and the development of supplier production capabilities. 
Despite the GVC framework richness, the framework has weaknesses as it hardly recognise the 
regulatory regime and/or environment, and the impact of value chain actors/entrepreneurs 
behavioural practices in the analysis. Failure to address these gaps by the study can render the 
results questionable of little applicability to the wider academic fields. Therefore, these gaps 
were addressed by the application of the new institutional theory with respect to the regulatory 
regime and/or environment and the entrepreneurship behavioural theories addressed the 
entrepreneur’s behavioral practices. The application of complementary frameworks and 
theories was done with a purpose of strengthening the results of the study. Further, the cluster 
theoretical approach assesses the gains of clustering as a result of joint action, while the GVC 
approach explores vertical linkages between firms and external actors.  Although both 
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approaches offer complementary synergies to each other, they do not elaborate on the measures 
applicable in assessing the strength of the inter-firm relationships. This missing link is filled by 
the transactional cost approach which provides analytical measures in the form of investment 
asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency of transactions, and opportunism. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents how the researcher did the research; the chapter specifically outlays how 
the researcher obtained the data and analysed it in order to answer the research questions 
3.2 Study approach 
This research employed a case study approach as the major research strategy. The purpose of 
this research was to contribute towards emerging GVC theory building (Gereffi et al., 2005), 
hence the suitability of a case study (Eisenhardt, 1989). Case study approach was suitable 
because the focus was on emerging issues ‘contemporary’ phenomenon with some real-life 
context (Yin, 1994). Commercial forestry and sugarcane industry are experiencing emerging 
value chain practices ‘contemporary’ phenomenon with a real-life context. Contextualism was 
proposed initially by the Philosopher Stephen Pepper (1942). Pettigrew (1990, pp.269) asserted 
that “an approach that offers both multi-level or vertical and processual, or horizontal analysis 
is said to be contextualist in character”. Therefore, the method of inquiry for this study was 
process – contextual realism, involving both vertical and horizontal analysis in a case study 
setting. 
As suggested by Pettigrew (1990), process-contextual realism entails obtaining data spanning a 
period of time. Therefore, this study obtained data for a period spanning three years, thus 
enabling an analysis of consistence and changes in the process outcomes.  The research also 
used field-based and multiple research methods in gathering empirical data to address the 
research questions. The multiple-method data collection approach involved a questionnaire 
survey, interviews, archives and observations. The use of multiple methods strengthens the 
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quality of research (Eisenhardt (1989) and also offers a synergistic value (Birnberg, Shields, 
&Young, 1990; Atkinson, Balakrishnan, & Booth, 1997; Shields, 1997; Chivaka, 2003) in that 
the research benefits are more than the summation of the advantages of the methods used. The 
study also employed information sources such as the Food and Agricultural Organization’s 
(FAO) statistics and survey data, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey reports, and 
Global Competitiveness Survey reports from the World Economic Forum (WEF), which 
provided comparative industry productivity and competitiveness global rankings across 
countries.  
3.3 Study design 
There are three types of case studies (Yin, 1981). The first one is an exploratory case study – 
aimed at defining the questions and hypothesis of a subsequent study. The second one is a 
descriptive case study – aimed at presenting a complete description of a phenomenon within its 
context. Finally, an explanatory case study – aimed at examining data closely both at a surface 
and deep level in order to explain the phenomena in the data sets. The essence of an 
explanatory case study also is to explore and investigate contemporary real-life phenomenon 
through detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions, and their 
relationships. The analysis helps in explaining how events happen, happened and possible 
interventions which happened to be of similar interest with this study. 
Therefore, among the three case study types cited above; this study adopted an explanatory 
case study which was found suitable for a comparative in-depth analysis of the same issues by 
examining issues in the data sets several times from different points of view. The issues were 
investigated by looking at entrepreneurial behavioral practices that influence competitive 
success or failure of enterprises participating in Uganda’s agri-business value chains.  
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3.4 Research setting 
Empirical data was gathered from Uganda’s commercial agricultural and forestry value chains 
as representative value chains of the agri-business sector. The value chain is broad and based in 
line with the commodity value chains for products such as coffee, maize, cassava, fruits, 
vegetables, sugar cane, and forestry, among others. This study focused on the agri-business 
sector because of its importance to economy of Uganda. The agri-business sector was chosen 
as an appropriate research setting mainly for the following reasons:  
1. The sectors have continued to experience a decline in production and productivity due
to:
 high costs and limited availability of improved farm inputs;
 inadequate production and post-harvest facilities;
 limited extension support and advisory services;
 land fragmentation and operation by small farmers owning one to three hectares
thus inhibiting mechanisation; and
 weak value chain linkages.
2. there is a mismatch between agricultural growth (which averaged 2.2% in 2008) and
the population growth (estimated at 3.5% per annum); the sectors employ more than
70% of the population;
3. a wide fluctuation in commodity prices and erratic weather patterns constrain
investments in agricultural modernization;
4. liberalization of the sectors by transiting from state-owned enterprises to private sector-
led growth presents both challenges and opportunities for value chain competitiveness;
79 
5. investments in agriculture produce a quadruple effect in the economy compared to
other sectors (World Bank, 2010).
An improvement in investment in Uganda’s agricultural value chains could significantly alter 
production and productivity. A structured value chain composed of nucleus farms and/or lead 
farms that support farmers’ clusters is required in order to achieve this level of competitiveness 
through addressing issues of marketing (forward linkages) as well as production (backward 
linkages). 
3.5 Value chain selection and research 
As mentioned in the introduction, the purpose of this research was to contribute to the 
emerging GVC theory. The selection of the value chains relied on theoretical sampling as 
opposed to statistical reasons (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) explained theoretical sampling as a means of selecting cases 
because of their particular suitability for illuminating and extending relationships and logic 
among constructs. This happened to be the interest of this study. 
The following criteria were established for selecting value chains for detailed study: 
 Value chains with observable governance structures so as to provide opportunities to
compare and contrast results.
 The relative importance of the value chain as a source of income and employment to
both farmers and the country at large.
 Value chains that have attracted development partners and/or government support as a
tool of intervention for increased production, productivity and value addition.
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In applying these criteria, the sugarcane and forestry value chains were chosen for detailed 
analysis. The recognized differences in the structuring of these value chains suggest that 
comparisons among them would yield useful insights about entrepreneurial behavioral 
practices and factors that facilitate or inhibit their competitiveness. As an emphasis the interest 
of this study was not for generalized application of results to other sectors. And if the results of 
this study are to be applied to value chains with different characteristics, then this must be done 
with caution. However, these two value chain constitutes great economic values for the country 
of Uganda, or for other economies with similar characteristics. Therefore, taken together, these 
value chains offer interesting possibilities for agri-business development, especially for SMEs, 
through expanded import substitution and/or exports (Johnston & Meyer, 2007).  
3.6 Case study research strategy for selected value chains 
This study applied the systematic case study methodological approach advocated by 
McCormick and Schmitz (2001) for value chain research. The authors stated that “value chain 
research can be enriched by the inclusion of selected case studies of individuals, firms, and 
networks” (McCormick & Schmitz, 2001, pp. 140). A case study approach was applicable to 
this study because of the following: (1) it is considered to be a preferred strategy when 
investigating ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions; (2) it helps to deeply probe the subject matter, thus 
contributing to an in-depth understanding of the relationship between entrepreneurial 
behavioural practices and the competitive success or failure of value chains; and (3) value 
chains are networks linking a defined set of persons, objects, or events. Therefore, value chain 
assessment requires a case study strategy to study the nature of relationships among actors 
either vertically or horizontal, i.e. between actors at different levels (e.g. producers/buyers) or 
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between actors at the same level (e.g. producers/producers). With respect to this study, the case 
approach helped to facilitate the examination of the main research question statement:  
How do entrepreneurs’ behavioural practices determine the competitive performance of 
agri-business enterprises undertaking GVC participation in Uganda?  
The research question was broken down into five major independent variables applied in 
investigating competitive performance; namely critical success factors for value chain 
competitiveness; equitable value chain sharing; entrepreneurial alertness and regulatory 
regime; compliance with standards for market access; and vertical and horizontal collaboration 
for diffusion of supplier production capabilities. In each of these variables the following 
measures were investigated and then answered as elaborated upon below: 
(A) Measures of competitive performance (success or failure) variable:
Competitive performance examines competitiveness as the ability to perform well (Buckley et 
al., 1988). Adam Smith (1776) identified three measures for the wealth of nations, namely; farm 
output; manufactured goods; and labour to produce goods. The measures identified by Adam 
Smith are related to productivity considered as a surrogate measure for competitiveness. This 
study was interested in agri-business competitive performance, and considered farm output as the 
leading measure for farm enterprise productivity. In addition to farm output, this study also 
included time-to-market which is considered to be a global competitiveness indicator as another 
measure for productivity. The study further adopted country specific industry reports published 
by the Uganda Sugar Manufacturers Association (USMA) which consider farm output of 100 
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tons/ha as the baseline productivity measure of cane maturity of 18-20 months (Uganda National 
Sugar Policy, 2010; USMA, 2015). The forestry sector productivity reports were obtained from 
the saw log production grant scheme, assessing performance of growers and providing indicative 
productivity measures (SPGS, 2014). The FAO Stat survey data base 2013- was also a useful 
source of information for providing country comparative productivity data by ranking in terms of 
yields per unit area. The USMA and National Sugar Policy productivity measures reflects the 
true picture in the field as this was validated by cane delivery reports of farmers to the sugar 
mills. The SPGS report is an evaluation conducted in farmer’s fields and generally reflected the 
true picture in the field, although being a donor funded project you may not rule out some 
possibilities of over-stating the data performance for purposes of attracting more development 
partners financing. The FAO report stat data produced for different countries may not entirely be 
reliable as the major source of data capture is mainly from government officials who may 
underreport for purposes of seeking sympathy from development partners to fund priority sectors 
and/or data may be over-stated for purposes of attracting foreign direct investments in the 
country. 
(B) Measures of critical success factors for value chain competitiveness
GVC studies provide key success factors for value chain competitiveness (Schmitz, 2005; 
McCormick and Schmitz, 2001). In their approach, buyers were asked to rate their suppliers’ 
performance using a five-point scale on each of the above criteria. Suppliers were then asked to 
rate their own performance using the same criteria and scale. This self-assessment, when 
compared with the buyers’ assessment, provided a powerful lens for assisting the entrepreneurs 
to identify where they might be failing and where improvement was required. The tool has 
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received wider application in the Dominican Republic garment industry (Bessant and Kaplinsky, 
1995), the furniture industry in South Africa, Indonesia and Brazil (Kaplinsky et al., 2003; 
Ewasechko 2005; Navas-Aleman 2011), and the auto industry in South Africa (Barnes, 2000). 
The above studies applied the criteria below, although with minor deviations on the following 
critical success factors:  
 Quality reliability (clean, high sucrose, straight, pruned)
 Price reliability (stable, rising)
 Time from order to delivery (reliable as per industry standards, speedy)
 Quantity reliability (output above industry standards)
 High quality yielding seeds/seedlings (innovations).
However, during the interview the researcher identified other variables in the Ugandan context as 
critical success factors in addition to above: 
 Personal involvement in business
 Passion or interest in business
 Cash flow
 Community relationships.
The respondents were asked to rate their performance basing on a 5 likert-scale ranging from 1 
(not important) to 5 (very important). 
(C) Measures of equitable value chain sharing of proceeds (millers-growers)
Worldwide the sugar industry payment system is based upon formulae prescribing the division of 
proceeds between millers and growers. The World Association of Beet and Cane Growers 
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(WABCG) undertake a comparative percentage measure of the division of proceeds from cane 
and beet producing countries between growers and factories (WABCG 2015).  Therefore, this 
study analyzed measures for the equitable division of proceeds between millers and growers by 
comparing the percentages offered to Ugandan growers to what other regional countries offer 
their growers with respect to sugar and its by-products-in particular the South African 
Development Community (SADC) countries (South Africa Sugar Industry Agreement, 2000) 
and the Mauritius Cane Industry Authority Act (2011). Although the forestry sector was not 
based on a prescribed formula, a similar approach was applied by examining country reports, 
South Africa ((DFID, 2005) and for Uganda using field data to obtain approximate percentages 
of share proceeds received by growers in the value chain.  
(D) Measures of entrepreneurial alertness and regulatory regime
Measures for entrepreneurial alertness were adopted from the GEM survey report (2014) that 
measures entrepreneurial alertness as the ability to perceive opportunities and capabilities to 
pursue the perceived opportunities. The opportunities measured by this study included alertness 
to availability of; grant incentives, ease of doing business factors e.g., access to farm inputs and 
good infrastructure such as roads, and factor production endowments e.g., favorable climate. 
Other opportunities measured included ability to pursue opportunities such as value chain 
process upgrading (horizontal value chain expansion such as increased yields, machinery 
acquisition), value chain functional upgrading (vertical integration along the value chain by 
investing in value addition/processing plants), business formalization strategy (enabling the 
enterprise to graduate from the informal to the formal economy), and business generation 
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strategy (investing in succession plans through mentoring for business continuity beyond founder 
member).   
Measures for the regulatory regime included assessing property rights ownership and 
governance. Measures for property rights ownership were assessed in terms of monopoly and/or 
anti-monopoly policies which either influences rent-seeking or promote innovation in the 
respective industry (World Bank, 2012). Governance with emphasis on governance power was 
assessed in terms of equitable representation of millers and growers on industry boards for 
consensus decision-making, with lessons from SADC governance models (The South African 
Sugar Act 1978; South African Sugar Industry Agreement 2000). 
(E) Measures of compliance with standards for market access
GVC studies provide measures regarding compliance with standards for market access (Gereffi 
et al., 2005; Schmitz, 2005; McCormick and Schmitz, 2001). What is to be produced? 
assessing availability of formal quality specifications documents. How it is to be produced? 
assessing availability of production/process standards manuals. When it is to be produced? 
examining the timing of production and deliveries. How much to be produced? assessing 
quantities specifications. What price mark to be offered? assessing if set price  is tagged upon a 
grading system, i.e. quality. This study adopted these measures that were assessed in three 
broad variables that is production standards, pricing as per grading system and certification 
initiatives. 
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(F) Measures for vertical and horizontal collaboration for diffusion of supplier production
capabilities
The transactional cost approach provides measures for assessing the strength of the 
coordination mechanism either through hierarchies or spot markets (Williamson 1975). The 
measures include; asset specificity investment costs (physical production inputs, training and 
skills development or ‘positive spill overs’), coordination investment costs (search/screening, 
contracting, monitoring, enforcement), frequency of the transactions, and quality of 
relationships i.e. mutually beneficial or exploitative relationships. This study adopted these 
measures except frequency of transactions in assessing the strength of vertical and horizontal 
collaboration in building supplier production capabilities in the value chains (Dolan and 
Humphrey 2000; Humphrey and Schmitz 2001; and Gereffi et al., 2005). 
3.6.1 Scope of value chain research analysis 
The scope of the study was mainly focused on the vertical relationships between the main 
producers/exporters firm(s) within Uganda and their suppliers/farmers. However, the 
horizontal relationships between farmers and/or development partners were also examined with 
the objective of identifying additional insights about the sectors’ ecosystem, such as joint 
action initiatives. 
3.6.2 Selection of cases for study/production data sample size 
This study used VC analysis, which is mainly about relationships, that is, hearing multiple 
sides of a story. For this reason, the entry point of the study was clusters with lead firms and/or 
major buyers in a GVC. The lead firms in the GVC were considered to be those that either set 
parameters by which others operate or firms undertaking major buying activities, i.e. lead 
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buyers. A list of primary producers was obtained from the cluster development agency and 
lead firms, i.e. Kinyara Sugar Ltd (KSL) for the sugar sector and Saw Log Production Grant 
Scheme (SPGS) for the forestry sector. These lists were also verified through the sector 
associations, i.e. the Masindi (Kinyara) Sugarcane Growers Association Ltd (MSGAL) and the 
Uganda Timber Growers Association (UTGA). However, the researcher found that not all 
commercial forestry growers supported by SPGS belonged to the UTGA. Therefore, the 
researcher maintained the SPGS list to access the respondents. 
Two cluster VCs out of the six were selected for the study. In each of the cluster VCs, the 
presence of a major lead firm(s) linked with a growing number of supply firms and/or 
entrepreneurs was the criterion for selection. In this study, polar opposites of Ugandan 
commercial farmers were selected, namely high and low performing entrepreneurs. However, 
since the study was interested in the systemic improvement of all actors in the primary value 
chain, medium performing entrepreneurs were also included. 
The qualification of performance was based on productivity or performance ratings obtained 
from KSL inventory data base and SPGS inventory data base as per the below: 
(1) Primary producers having achieved contract performances of 90% and above were
classified as high performers in the forestry sector.
(2) Primary producers operating at 50% and below of contract performance were classified
as low performers in the forestry sector; the medium performers were the producers
that attained between 51% and 89% contract rating performance.
(3) Primary producers with approximately 70% of block fields achieving 100 and above
tons per ha were considered to be high performers while those producing below 70 tons
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per ha were considered low performers; the medium performers were the producers that 
attained between 70 and 99 tons per ha.  
(4) Exceptional performers (role model entrepreneurs) were identified by the researcher
through awards received and/or through being recognised by peers in the industry.
These were interviewed for lessons to be learnt.
The approach of selecting players and categorising them into high and low performers is 
consistent with Pettigrew (1990), which used this approach while studying strategic change 
and competitiveness in the United Kingdom. The purpose of choosing polar opposites - one 
successful case and one unsuccessful case - was to build a theory of success and failure 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). This happened to be similar to this study, which was interested in 
investigating how the behaviour of entrepreneurs determines the success or failure of agri-
business value chains. Unlike the study by Pettigrew (1990) which only concentrated on high 
and low performers, this study included medium performers. This was because the purpose of 
this study was to achieve a systematic improvement in the competitiveness of the entire value 
chain. 
Further, the presence of large firms in a cluster has been found to result in investment in 
research and development (Schumpeter, 1934), a key ingredient for the transformation of 
agriculture, which is therefore relevant to this study. This study was interested in entrepreneurs 
practicing agri-business for commercial purposes.  For practical reasons, this study adopted the 
Saw Log Production Grant model that qualifies commercial enterprises with a minimum area 
of 25 hectares. The purpose of selecting commercial entrepreneurs was that they tend to 
manage their enterprises from both an entrepreneurial and a commercial aspect, with the 
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intention of graduating to the formal economy. On the other hand, the majority of small players 
perceive their business as “survival entrepreneurship”, with little incentive for business growth. 
Table 3.1 indicates the population of actors in the sugar and forestry sectors in Uganda. 
Table 3.1: Population sample 
Stakeholders/cases Sugar Industry 
(Kinyara-
Masindi Cluster) 
Forestry Industry (*all six 
clusters taken as one 
Cluster) 
Estimated primary producers 6,000 389 
Commercial Primary Producers 
(registered) 
105 389 
Commercial Primary Producers 
(functional) 
77 298 
Millers and/or Major Buyers 1 04 
Industry associations 1 1 





Source: Kinyara Sugar Ltd. inventory data base, SPGS inventory data base and key 
informants resources. *Note: estimated total commercial forestry plantation is 40,000 ha in 
Uganda, while the Kinyara Sugar area alone has an estimated 15,000 ha (nucleus farm) and 
25,000 ha (out-growers).  
Table 3.2: Sample size and observed data 
Stakeholders/cases Sugar Industry Forestry Industry 
Target Achieved Target Achieved 
Primary Producers (All functional survey) 40 32 60 46 
Primary Producers (All functional 
qualitative) 
6 6 6 6 
Millers and/or Major Buyers 2 2 2 1 
Industry associations 2 2 1 1 
Development Partner Agencies/Private 
Sector Development Agencies 
0 0 1 1 
Total 50 42 70 55 
Site observations (Field) 6 6 
Plants visited (Mills) 1 2 
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Performance data for the forestry sector was obtained from the SPGS performance report. The 
total number of registered producers was 389 of which 298 where functional. Production data 
from field blocks was obtained from Kinyara Sugar Limited. The data obtained was for the 
years 2010/11 to 2012/13 financial years. The production report indicates a block field size, 
yields obtained and actual yield per hectare. The total number of out-growers in Kinyara 
Sugarcane Cluster was approx. 6,000, of which 105 were registered. Approximately 77 
commercial producers were functional. The total number of anticipated cases participating in 
the study was approx. 100 (survey tool) and 20 (qualitative tool or interviews), constituted into 
the two value chains. The response rate was 46 questionnaires and 9 interviews for forestry 
while sugarcane was 32 questionnaires returned and 10 interviews, all representing 81% 
response rate. The researcher kept on following up the respondents in order to reduce non-
response rate within the sample that received the questionnaires. When the researcher achieved 
a response rate of 81%, this was considered good enough to proceed with the study. 
This sample size of received responses was found appropriate for studies of this nature, 
whereby Eisenhardt (1989) recommended a number of cases between 4 and 10 as appropriate. 
Chivaka (2003) studied nine cases of firms (comprising both buyers and manufacturers) 
operating in three supply chains in South Africa, however other studies have utilized above 80 
cases (Hildbrand, 2013). 
3.6.3 Crafting instruments and protocols: data collection  
The study was built on two types of information: quantitative data and qualitative data. The 
combination of data types is highly synergistic (Birnberg et al., 1990; Atkinson et al., 1997; 
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Shields, 1997; Chivaka, 2003). Eisenhardt (1989) argued that quantitative evidence reveals 
relationships that may not be salient to the researcher; however, she also observed that 
quantitative data bolsters qualitative findings because it keeps the researcher focused and not 
“carried away by vivid, but false, impressions in qualitative data” (pp. 538). On the other hand, 
Jick (1979) pointed out that qualitative evidence is useful in understanding the theory 
underlying relationships. This study gathered similar data from different sources (triangulation) 
to strengthen data quality. The following multiple data collection methods were employed: 
3.6.3.1 Questionnaire survey: 
A structured questionnaire was used for capturing mainly quantitative data coupled with some 
qualitative data. The quantitative data collected were both subjective, i.e. the perceptions of the 
respondents, as well as objective, i.e. information related to the yields, revenue, age of firm, 
among others. The questionnaire was divided into different sections, with each section 
representing a specific major variable with its associated sub-themes that helped in answering 
the research questions. 
3.6.3.2 Purpose of survey questionnaire 
The premise of the survey questionnaire technique was to establish the behavioural practices of 
entrepreneurs in stimulating or hindering Uganda’s competiveness in agricultural global value 
chains. The study focused on analysing entrepreneurial practices applied in the primary 
production sector from the perspective of the primary producers. The questionnaire was put to 
selected respondents in these value chains, i.e. commercial farmers. The ‘bias’ arising at this 
stage from this approach was counteracted by in-depth interviews that were administered to 
92 
key informants - miller(s) representatives, association and agency executives, exceptional high 
performers, and the selected medium and low performers. 
3.6.3.3 Questionnaire development 
The questionnaire was divided into different sections according to specific themes. The themes 
were related to a number of value chain practices pursued by entrepreneurs, and at the same 
time helped the author to gain an appreciation and understanding of the value practices and 
behavior. 
Although the questionnaire was divided into different sections, collectively they reflected a 
continuum of inter-linked activities and processes that gave an insight into the value chain 
practices in Uganda’s agricultural industry. While the studies mentioned above were conducted 
mainly in the manufacturing and retail sectors (Bessant & Kaplinsky, 1995; Kaplinsky et al., 
2003; Navas-Aleman, 2004; Ewasechko, 2004; Barnes, 2000) this study was based in the 
primary production sector. Further, this study collected views from primary producers. The 
primary producers were asked to score their own self-assessment which helped to identify gaps 
for the improvement of the value chain (Schmitz, 2005; McCormick & Schmitz, 2001). In 
most of the sections, respondents were asked to rank their responses on a five-point scale of 1 
(not important and/or not agree) to 5 (very important and/or strongly agree) by ticking a 
corresponding box. 
3.6.3.4 Administration of the questionnaire 
The questionnaires for the identified suppliers and/or farmers were physically delivered and 
picked up. The questionnaires were also administered in workshop settings organized by SPGS 
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for the forestry sector, in which the author was allocated time to administer the tools and pick 
them at the end of the days workshops. These strategies have been found to be appropriate in 
developing countries such as Uganda due to low levels of education as well as the variety of 
local languages, which makes it difficult to determine in advance the respondents’ preferred 
language (McCormick & Schmitz, 2001).  
3.6.3.5 Interview protocol 
The survey questionnaire was the main data-collecting tool, which was complemented by the 
interview guide, observations and documentary reviews. The interviews were with key 
informants for an in-depth analysis. The key informants were primary producers and millers 
who included best performing entrepreneurs/farmers, medium performing 
entrepreneurs/farmers and poor performing entrepreneurs/farmers. In addition, interviews were 
also conducted with industry specialists such as chief executives of industry associations, 
programme specialists of development partner agencies, and opinion leaders (who were local 
where applicable), who had a wide knowledge of the industry.  
The choice of which major buyers and/or millers to approach was of a great concern to this 
study because they were considered to be the key entrepreneurs driving the chain. The millers 
wield great power, thanks to their size and position. Therefore millers influence any 
entrepreneurial practices that may impact the value chain positively or negatively. In Uganda 
the sugar industry is dominated by three major estate producers - Kakira Sugar Works Limited 
(KSWL), Kinyara Sugar Limited(KSL), and Sugar Corporation of Uganda Limited (SCOUL), 
commonly known as the ‘big three’ supplied with out-growers’ schemes. The three major 
players constitute more than 80% of the sugar market. The forestry sector is dominated by four 
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private sector players which operate plantations and one public corporation - Uganda 
Electricity Distribution Company Limited (UEDCL), which specialises in transmission poles. 
The sector has received much support from the SPGS. 
The interview tool was unstructured in the sense that the respondent had enough room to 
answer. During the interview, probes (immediate follow-up questions) were used subject to the 
answer that a respondent had given to that particular question. The interviews lasted for 60 to 
90 minutes, and were recorded (where permitted) and transcribed. Two researchers were 
involved in order to minimise interviewer bias (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). 
The instrument collected similar data on the five sub themes (as collected by the survey 
questionnaire) for triangulation and building data quality purposes. While conducting 
interviews the researcher also undertook a document review, which included minutes of 
relevant meetings, sample contracts, company reports, policy documents and secondary 
quantitative material on activity levels. Observation was also carried out at company facilities, 
on field site visits with the help of a camera, at informal and chance meetings, and during 
conversations. Collecting data from different sources helped the researcher to substantiate, 
supplement and cross check information. 
3.7. Data coding, analysis and presentation 
The principal unit of analysis in this research was the entire value chain, which was explored 
and analysed at three levels: Micro (grower’s enterprises), Meso (industry experts, millers and 
association executives in the value chain industry), and Macro (assessment of national policies 
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and the regulatory environment). Principal component analysis was run for the purposes of 
data reduction and to group items. The empirical data was analysed using within case analysis, 
which enabled the researcher to become intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone 
entity, while cross-case pattern analysis enabled constant comparison of the theory and data, 
iterating towards a fit between theory and data. 
3.7.1. Within-case analysis: performance categories and VC sectors 
This analysis involved detailed case study write-ups for each VC. Primary data collected by the 
survey questionnaire were processed, coded and analysed. Quantitative (numeric) data such as 
production capacity and years of establishment were coded immediately. Answers to closed-
ended questions, with an assigned possible list of responses, were treated as quantitative data. 
These were pre-coded on the questionnaire. Using Statistical package for social scientists 
(SPSS) version 20, the data were then analysed using descriptive statistics (means, standard 
deviation and ranking) and correlations. The analysis of data from the responses to the 
questionnaire produced empirical evidence relating to relationships and practices among 
performance categories that is high performance enterprise (HPEs), medium performance 
enterprises (MPEs) and low performance enterprise (LPEs) and between VC sectors, which 
fitted into the major variables being studied. As suggested by Yin (1981), the quantitative data 
were tabulated alone, before triangulation  with the qualitative data. This study presents the 
quantitative data through tabulated formats, t-tests and visualised radar charts – sometimes 
called star diagrams. 
With regard to the descriptive qualitative data, which had a wide spectrum of answers, a 
process of reduction or summarization, classification and interpretation using Nvivo qualitative 
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software was applied. The qualitative data analysis used thematic and content analysis.  Based 
on the five themes and some direct quotations are included in the analysis. The five  themes 
were:  
i.Critical success factors for value chain competitiveness;
ii.Equitable value chain sharing,
iii.Entreprenurial alertness and regulatory regimes, 
iv.Compliance with standards for market access,
v.Collaboration for diffusion of supplier production capabilities (vertical and
horizontal linkages), 
The design of the data collection tools followed the five themes and the data analysis as well.  
This was informed by the theoretical frameworks described in chapter two that is the chapter 
on the literature review.  In order to improve the trust in the results from the collected data, a 
systematic analytical protocol as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) was adopted. The 
procedure was as follows: 
 The data collected were arranged into a condensed, chronological account, with each
data segment being coded according to the major themes in the interview guide. This
was done for the purpose of utilizing all collected data in the analysis, rather than using
selective ‘quotes’, to support anecdotal evidence. The ‘data segments were retained in
the original wording’. Data coding promoted completeness of data analysis and
minimized potential bias while analyzing the data. Further, this enabled the researcher
to search for supporting and contradicting evidence of relations identified, and also
provided an audit trail which enables a reader to trace the source of conclusions back to
original data.
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 After, establishing the chronological account, the data was then arranged for each of
grouped case of the primary VC actors and key informants. Responses were matched
around specific questions. The aim was an attempt to capture the justificatory accounts
of different actors relating to value chain practices and relationships.
As suggested by (Yin 1981), in building an enriching case study, both qualitative and 
quantitative data that address the same theme were assembled together. This entailed 
presenting narrative descriptions. The narratives were coupled with tabular displays, star 
diagrams and figures about each VC case. The idea behind this approach was to enable the 
researcher become familiar with each case as a stand-alone subject matter. This approach 
allowed unique patterns to emerge for each case before generalizing patterns across cases. 
Further, it gave the researcher a rich familiarity with each case, which in turn laid a 
fundamental foundation for cross-case analysis or comparison. 
3.7.2. Cross-case analysis: performance categories and VC sectors 
The cross-case analysis involved a search for patterns to establish comparisons (Yin, 1981; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). The methods used in this study included:   
The first strategy was to group categories or dimensions, and then search for within-group 
similarities coupled with inter-group differences. Cases can be grouped in categories such as: 
founder run vs. professional management; high vs. low performance; first vs. second 
generation product; and large vs. small size. A study by Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) on 
the above group categories found interesting results with high vs. low performance, but no 
clear patterns were found in the other categories. As suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), 
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Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) this study grouped cases into categories such as high 
performing enterprises vs. medium performing enterprises vs. low performing enterprises, and 
the sugarcane sector was considered as a case vs. the forestry sector case. 
The second strategy was to select duo (two) cases and then list the similarities and differences 
between each pair. This was mainly for the sector level analysis. 
The third strategy was to arrange the data by source. This included analysing data based on the 
tool that collected the data, i.e. observational data, interview data and questionnaire data. The 
results emerging from different data sources provided unique insights. Eisenhardt (1989) 
advocated the unique insights by stating that: “When a pattern from one data source is 
corroborated by the evidence from another, the finding is stronger and better grounded. When 
evidence conflicts, the researcher can sometimes reconcile the evidence through deeper 
probing of the meaning of the differences” (pp. 541) 
As advocated by Eisenhardt, this study analyzed data patterns from one data source with 
another data source and were data corroborated by another, the findings were stronger and 
better grounded. When there was contradicting evidence, the researcher reconciled the 
evidence through deeper probing of the meaning of the differences. The researcher employed 
these strategies for the purpose of improving the fit between the data and theory to inform the 
emergent GVC theory.  
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3.8 Validity issues 
3.8.1 Internal validity 
The research was motivated by the need to add to knowledge regarding how entrepreneurial 
behaviour stimulates or hinders the competitiveness of agricultural value chains in a 
globalizing world. The focus of the research can best be described as an explanatory case 
study. The essence of this study was to explore and investigate contemporary real-life 
phenomenon through detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions, 
and their relationships in the commercial sugarcane and forestry value chains in Uganda. The 
results obtained assisted in illuminating entrepreneurial behavioral practices and competitive 
performance relationships of value chain actors, thus explaining how events happened with a 
purpose of contributing to the emerging GVC theory building. The relevance of applying 
internal validity criteria to assess the research results and conclusions was questionable 
(Abernethy et al, 1999, cited by Chivaka, 2003, pp. 98). Borrowing from Chivaka’s (2003) 
work, this study did not apply the internal causal relationship criteria, but rather applied the 
Golden-Biddle “notion of plausibility” to assess whether the data collected supported the 
conclusions reached. The primary checks on validity were thus among and between the 
respondents (Dyer, 1997) and the multiple sources of data collection (Jick, 1979; Yin, 1981). 
Data that were consistent across multiple sources and multiple sites were considered to offer 
the most plausible findings. On the other hand, evidence that enabled the elimination of 
competing explanations was documented. 
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3.8.2 External validity 
This research utilized a case study research strategy, which focused on theoretical 
generalization as opposed to statistical generalization (Eisenhardt, 1989). The purpose was to 
illustrate and support more theoretical arguments and dynamics by locating the specifics of a 
few cases within the emergent GVC theory (Gereffi et al., 2005). Therefore attempting to 
achieve external validity was not considered relevant, because this study did not aim to 
generalize the results across the whole population. 
3.9 Ethical issues, pilot study and field entry 
The study in general and the data collection process specifically were based on a cardinal 
ethical precept - ‘do no harm’. In this context the research was expected to cause no injury- 
physical, psychological, economic or social - to the people being studied. Participation in the 
study was voluntary and consensual. The privacy and confidentiality of respondents was safe-
guarded and this was communicated by the researcher to the respondents. 
The researcher obtained a letter of ethical clearance from the University of Cape Town, as well 
as a letter of introduction from a local institution, Makerere University Business School, to 
reassure the participating firms and individuals that the purpose of the study was for academic 
and not commercial interests. The researcher provided assurances regarding the dissemination 
of relevant publications of the research findings, i.e. research institutes, trade associations, 
academic journals, industry platforms and conferences, relevant public policy institutions.   
During the process of data collection, the researcher initially piloted the study for three months 
to establish a rapport with the relevant stakeholders and to test the instruments. The piloting 
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was initially done in South Africa during investment tours and congresses. This was done to 
enable the researcher to capture salient issues from South Africa since it has a well-developed 
sugar and forestry industry dating back centuries. The issues captured were integrated into the 
research instruments then piloted in Uganda to customize the constructs within the local 
setting.  The South African study and data were also used as lessons for the Ugandan 
experience during the data analysis and documentation. This was then followed up with a full-
scale nine-month data collection process from the identified GVC participants in Uganda. 
3.10. Research validation and dissemination 
The researcher disseminated his research findings through four workshops that were conducted 
in Uganda as a process of achieving validation. Two validation workshops were held in the 
forestry sector and two in the sugarcane sector. In the four workshops the audience was the 
primary producers, the millers’ representatives, government representatives and development 
partners. The researcher also made submissions in policy consultative meetings at Ministerial 
levels and Parliament Select Committee and publicized print media articles in Uganda with 
purposes of informing public policy reforms in Uganda’s agri-business and specifically the 
drafting of the Uganda Sugar Bill 2015.  
In addition, the research findings were also disseminated at international conferences including: 
Research paper presented by Michael Mugabira on topic: Value chain analysis: critical success 
factors for competitiveness in Uganda’s commercial sugarcane industry, at 88th SASTA 
Congress- International Conventional Centre Durban, 18-20th August 2015.  
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Research paper submitted and accepted at the XIV World Forestry Congress, Durban, South 
Africa, 7-11 September 2015 by Mugabira M., Chivaka R., Dickens Sande D B & Kavuma D, 
Key Success Factors For Commercial Forestry & Sugar Value Chains In Uganda: A 
Comparative Study Of Linking Producers To Markets 
Research paper presented by Michael Mugabira on topic: Productive, unproductive and/or 
predatory entrepreneur-ship: a value-chain analysis of institutional reforms in Uganda’s 
sugarcane industry with key insights from South Africa and Kenya , at the 29th ISSCT Congress, 
5-8th December 2016,  International Convention and Exhibition Centre, Changmai, Thailand.
Version of the ISSCT Research paper above due for presentation by Michael Mugabira on topic: 
Institutional reforms and productivity of Uganda’s sugar industry at the forth-coming Council 
Meeting of the World Association of Beet and Cane Growers, 11-15 March 2017, 
Yamoussoukro – Ivory Coast. 
3.11 Summary 
The study examined how the different types of entrepreneurs (high, medium and low 
performers) determine value chain competitiveness, by being productive, unproductive and/or 
having predatory behaviours. Data in relation to what motivates entrepreneurs and the resulting 
entrepreneurial activities were collected. The chain-governance themes examined were critical 
success factors for value chain competiveness, equitability in value chain sharing of proceeds ( 
appropriation of rents and distribution of income), entrepreneurial alertness and regulatory 
regime, compliance with standards for market access, and vertical and horizontal collaboration 
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for diffusion of supplier production capabilities ‘positive spill-over’. The effect of these 
variables on systemic chain improvement was analysed. The results of the study, which 
provided new knowledge and insights on what makes agri-business value chains work in 
global markets, are discussed in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: UGANDA’S COMMERCIAL FORESTRY AND SUGAR INDUSTRY 
VALUE CHAINS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a narrative on the evolution of the commercial forestry and sugar 
industry sectors in Uganda. Industry competitiveness within the existing market governance 
structures and the applicable regulatory regimes and policies of both commercial forestry and 
sugar value chains are also presented. 
4.2 Overview of commercial forestry 
There is a common folk tale in Uganda, which tells the story of a Ugandan lady from the 
Busoga tribe who had married a German husband and brought him for a visit to Uganda. The 
couple was welcomed at the airport and on their way home they passed through the Mabira 
Forest (‘natural forest’).  The foreign visitor inquired how the forest came into being and was 
told “gyamera gyene”, meaning that the trees grew by themselves. The emergence of 
commercial forestry has since changed people’s perceptions in Uganda; the locals have come 
to understand that trees are also grown for business like any other cash crop, thus qualifying 
commercial forestry as an agriculture enterprise. 
Agriculture remains Uganda’s central engine of economic growth and poverty reduction, 
providing 72% of the country’s jobs and 54% of total exports, generating 25.3% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and providing raw materials for the agro-processing industries (NDP 
II, 2015).  Commercial forestry in Uganda has emerged in the form of seven clusters, as shown 
in figure 4.1 below. The rise of commercial forestry is quite important as the country faces 
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alarming rates of natural deforestation estimated at 1.8% annually (National Forest Plan, 
2013). According to the Ugandan Forestry Policy (UFP) of 2001, forestry makes a significant 
contribution to the economy of Uganda in terms of both environmental services and 
biodiversity values. The UFP (2001) acknowledges that although these ecological services and 
values are unquantifiable, they are integral to agricultural productivity, climate mitigation, soil 
and water conservation, nutrient recycling as well as to provide unique genetic resources and 
diverse ecosystems.  
It is against this background that the National Forestry Plan (NFP) of 2013 and the NDP II 
(2015) intended to focus their investments in the following priority areas: planted trees and 
forests; restoration of degraded natural forests; promotion of forest-based industries and trade; 
forest law enforcement and governance; and ICT in forest management.  
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Figure 4.1: Map of Uganda showing commercial forestry clusters 
Source: Uganda Timber Growers Association (nd) 
4.2.1 Global competitiveness and the value chain governance structure of the commercial 
forestry   
The Ugandan commercial forestry industry’s competitiveness is anchored upon the Sawlog 
Production Grant Scheme (SPGS), which has been facilitated by support from the European 
Union, the government of Uganda and the government of Norway since 2004. The government 
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of Uganda leased its forestry land to private investors as an incentive to attract commercial 
forestry investments. The SPGS provides resources for both technical and financial incentives 
to mainly commercial producers (with at least 25 hectares). The grant is a cost–share 
investment arrangement, with the beneficiaries meeting about 70% of the plantation 
establishment costs while the grant covers approximately 30 to 40%, depending on the 
investors’ establishment cost structures1.   
The incentive promotes responsible commercial forestry investments based on meeting 
economic benefits, coupled with social and environmental sustainability. The recipients access 
the financial incentive after they establish plantations and meet specified standards in their 
production contracts. The disbursement is made in three phases: 50: 25: 25% over two years. 
Further, all the grantees and their field staff undergo continuous training in managerial and 
silvi-cultural practices.  While SPGS provides the grant and technical training and ensures the 
maintenance of standards, it quickly realised that owing to its being a government project, 
there were areas of service that it could not offer such as lobbying and advocacy, i.e. there was 
a need for an organisation that could do so, hence the formation of the Uganda Timber 
Growers Association (UTGA).  
Currently forestry is a competitive and booming business, with plantations across the country. 
Its attractiveness and growth has outpaced the traditional commercial plantations of sugarcane 
and tea. It is estimated that 50,000 hectares (SPGS, 2014) of plantations meeting minimum 
standards have been established, with a membership of approximately 400 investors. The 
1 Field interviews 
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investors are considered middle-class. This is in contrast with traditional commercial sugarcane 
and tea enterprises, which have peasant investors forming the backbone of the respective 
industries. Each of these enterprises provide employment and other benefits, but commercial 
forestry is proving to be the most effective government strategy to leverage funds from the 
middle class to create jobs in the countryside. A range of tree species have been planted but 
two are predominant - pine and eucalyptus. The industry has started producing second and 
third thinning pine logs for the emerging plywood industry, with the majority of investors2 
coming from China. Eucalyptus is mainly grown to supply transmission poles for the ever-
increasing demand for electricity distribution in the East African region. Generally, the existing 
market structure of the forestry industry can be described as operating both in a formal and an 
informal economy (see figure 4.2).   
2 Five plywood mills in the country of which three are of Chinese investors 
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Figure 4.2: Showing the value chain governance structure: Uganda’s Forestry industry 
Level 1: Primary production 
Level 2: Secondary production/processing 
Level 3: Distribution/consumers 
Source: Author 
Level 1 - Primary production involves independent growers (large, medium, and small-scale) 
and milling companies that own plantation estates. 
Level 2 - Secondary production/Value addition in the formal economy and informal economy: 
the informal economy is characterised by rudimentary processing methods, with many buyers 
dealing in mainly structural timber and wood for furniture. The formal economy is traditionally 
dominated by milling firms structured in the form of hierarchies (they own plantations and 
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firms, sourcing all their raw materials from growers. The main products from milling firms 
include plywood, poles for power transmission and distribution, construction timber, and 
boards for the furniture market. 
Level 3 – Distribution/consumers: this level is composed of the retail and wholesale timber 
yards that operate mainly in the informal sector/economy. The milling firms operate in the 
formal sector and supply private institutions, schools and government agencies. The above 
market structure suggests that the commercial forestry value chain operates in two extremes of 
governance typologies - hierarchies and arm’s length market transactions. The rise of 
hierarchies can be attributed to forestry being a capital-intensive long-term investment, which 
suggests high asset investment specificity. This necessitates investment milling firms 
undertaking backward value chain integration to produce raw materials that can sustain plant 
production. Forestry, being a capital-intensive long-term investment, thus discourages the rise 
of private growers. This could explain the intervention of the SPGS project with its incentives 
for the establishment of private commercial forests, and thus the existence of arm’s length 
market transactions alongside the hierarchies. However, the challenge facing the arms’ length 
market transactions is the small number of millers/buyers (i.e. an oligopsony) in the formal 
economy who are mainly located in the main cities, i.e. they are far away from plantations with 
increased logistics transactions. According to Porter’s Five Forces Competitive Model (1979; 
2008), buyer concentration or the number of buyers in relation to producers determines power 
leverage in the industry.  
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Applying Porter’s model to the context of Uganda’s formal market economy, it can be 
described as a buyers’ market – they have the power to determine prices. Although the 
informal economy with its many buyers could be an alternative market, most lack the financial 
capabilities and absorption capacity for the raw material. This implies that if the growers do 
not happen to realise a fair competitive return on their capital-intensive long-term investment, 
then they may not re-invest back into the business. The presence of an organised growers’ 
association (UTGA), possibly with external intervention, thus provides a platform for the 
shaping and re-shaping of the governance structure. This implies that the arms’ length market 
transactions may shift to a vertically integrated co-operative typology, possibly through the 
acquisition of own mills or mergers with new mills (that have no own plantations) to ensure a 
fair return on investment and industry competitiveness.  
The competitiveness of Uganda’s commercial forestry industry is attributed to comparative 
advantages, such as trees taking less time to mature than other regional/SADC countries (see 
table 4.1).  
Table 4.1: Comparison of forestry growth within selected SADC countries 
Country Pine Rot Per (yrs) Pine MAG cc/ha Eucalyptus Rot Per (yrs) 
South 
Africa 
23 15 12 
Zimbabwe 21 14 12 
Uganda 16 25 8 
Tanzania 21 14 12 
Source: SPGS (2014); Chamshama (2011) 
Note: MAG - Mean Annual Growth; Rot. Per – Rotation Period; cc – cubic meters. 
Table 4.1 indicates that Uganda also has the comparative advantage of early market 
production, whereby transmission poles are harvested at eight years and pines for sawn logs at 
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16 years, while other countries require 12 years and 21 or more years respectively, meaning a 
market lead time or lag time of four years and five years respectively.  In Uganda, pine trees 
accumulate 25 cubic metres of wood volume annually per hectare compared to 15 and below 
for other countries.  
4.2.2 Applicable regulatory regime and policies in the forestry sector 
The National Forestry and Tree Planting Act 2003 is the law governing the forestry sector in 
Uganda. The Act is also supported by the Uganda Forestry Policy (2001), which provides 
direction for the development of the sector through policy statements. The National Forest Plan 
(2013) provides synergies to the National Development Plan I (NDPI) and National 
Development Plan II (NDPII). Both national development plans placed forestry at the centre of 
Uganda’s development agenda by classifying it as a primary growth sector, with special 
attention paid to the development of forestry related enterprises (NDP I, 2010; NDP II, 2015). 
Uganda’s forestry sector has multiple agencies in charge of administering and regulating the 
use of forestry products. The National Forestry and Tree Planting Act (2003) classified forests 
into five categories: central forest reserves, local forest reserves, community forest reserves, 
private forests, and forests under the wildlife conservation areas. The main regulatory body in 
the forestry sector is the National Forestry Authority (NFA), however the mandate of NFA is 
mainly the administration and regulation of the Central Forest Reserves (CFRs), with little role 
regarding private commercial forestry (National Forestry and Tree Planting Act, 2003). The 
Act mandates local governments (LGs) to oversee the local forestry reserves, as well as to 
provide oversight of private forests. Further, forestry, unlike the sugarcane sector, has a 
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national research institute – the National Forestry Research Institute (NAFORI) - which 
conducts research in order to improve seed varieties, amongst other issues. 
4.2.3 Reforms in the regulatory regime 
The rise of commercial forestry in Uganda is a new phenomenon, thus the current regulatory 
institutional framework is weak. This provides for a multiplicity of oversight agencies with 
varying economic interests overriding sector sustainability, security and growth (NFP, 2013). 
The results from this study have been presented to the commercial forestry sector players, 
including government representatives, outlining key reform areas. This study informed the 
sector players that specifically, the timber industry is characterised by: fraudulent weighing 
systems and measures; an absence of a grading system; the rampant collapse of civil works 
(especially buildings) partly related to timber quality; a lack of a clear policy on the licensing 
regime of mills and dealerships; an absence of a regulatory board for the compliance and 
enforcement of industry rules and regulations; no Forestry Development Fund (FDF) strategy 
for industry sustainability; a lack of price guiding systems to curb exploitative tendencies;  and 
certification of inputs and  traceability of logs remain a challenge. In stakeholder meetings3 it 
was reported that the rise in the number of Chinese plywood mills had attracted illegal logging 
and/or resource poaching in private plantations due to the lack of a traceability (source of 
origin) system in the industry. These findings generated interventionist interest from both 
industry players and development partners’ agencies, for example a letter4 was written by 
UTGA to the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) requesting the formation of a task 
3 Stakeholder’s symposiums, 30th April 2015, 13th August 2015 at City Royale Hotel, Bugolobi. 
4 Setting up a task force for establishment of a timber industry board, UTGA letter dated 22nd October 2015. 
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force to establish a timber industry regulatory board.  Subsequently, the Worldwide Fund 
(WWF), a development partner agency, released the first batch of funds to UTGA to initiate 
consultations for the establishment of an industry regulatory agency. These efforts are also 
being complemented by the piloting initiative of the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC) to 
certify small-scale growers in Uganda under cluster group certification schemes.  
4.3 Overview of Uganda’s sugar industry 
The sugar industry is one of the oldest industries in the country, dating back to the early 1920s. 
The first sugar factory was the Sugar Corporation of Uganda Limited (SCOUL), which was 
established in 1924 by Nanji Kalidas Mehta, the founder of the Mehta Group of Companies, a 
Mumbai-based conglomerate with business interests spanning four continents, namely Asia, 
Africa, Europe and North America. The factory is located in central Uganda in Lugazi, which 
lies between Kampala, the capital city, and Jinja, a municipal council. The second sugar 
factory - Kakira Sugar Works Limited (KSWL) - was started in 1930 by Muljibhai Madhvani, 
an Indian-born Ugandan businessman, entrepreneur, industrialist and philanthropist. The 
factory is located in Eastern Uganda in Kakira, between the Jinja municipal council and the 
Iganga municipal council. The third sugar factory to be established was Kinyara Sugar Limited 
(KSL), which was established by the government in the late 1960s. The factory is located in 
mid-Western Uganda, in Kinyara in the Masindi District. The fourth little known sugar factory 
was built in the 1970s at Sango-bay Sugar Estates (SBEL) also of an Asian origin ownership. 
The factory is located in Central Uganda in the Rakai District, near the border with Tanzania. 
According to the National Sugar Policy (2010), by the 1960s the sector’s annual production 
was approximately 140,000 tonnes, of which 120,000 were for domestic consumption and 
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20,000 for export. However, production declined significantly during the 1970s, due to the 
expulsion of Asians by Idi Amin; the then President of Uganda. This resulted in the 
mismanagement and neglect of the estates and the sugar industry almost collapsed. After 1986, 
the three traditional industries steadily picked up following rehabilitation and divestiture 
programmes undertaken jointly by Government and the private sector. Currently, Kakira Sugar 
Works Limited is fully owned by the Madhvani Group of companies after paying off loans 
guaranteed by the government. SCOUL is owned by the government and the Mehta Group, 
with a ratio of 51:49 shareholdings as at August 2011, while Kinyara Sugar Limited was 
initially rehabilitated under Booker Tate’s management, but after privatisation the Rai Group 
took over management with their current stock of 70 percent, while government maintains 30 
percent. 
Over the last 10 years, the sugar industry has expanded production by nearly 20% per annum, 
culminating in the production of 438,360 tonnes of sugar in 2014 (USMA, 2015). With an 
estimated population of 35 million people (UBOS, 2016), with per capita sugar consumption of 
12 kgs per person per year (National Sugar Policy, 2010), this translates into 420,000 tonnes, 
thus making Uganda able to fully supply the domestic market with a surplus of 20,000 tonnes 
for the export market. The largest sugar producer is Kakira Sugar Works Limited which 
accounts for 41%, followed by Kinyara Sugar Limited at 27%, SCOUL at 17% and other mills 
producing 15% altogether. Uganda’s sugar market industry can thus be described as having 
three big producers. 
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4.3.1 Global competitiveness and the value chain governance structure of the commercial 
sugarcane  
Sugar has a very rich history as a medium of exchange in the West Indies (Smith, 1776), and 
has also been regarded as the number 1 production commodity in the world (FAO, 2012)5. This 
makes sugar a competitive commodity in both local and international markets. Sugar is 
processed mainly from sugarcane and sugar beets, however in Uganda sugarcane is the raw 
material for sugar production.  The competitiveness of Uganda’s commercial sugarcane 
industry is anchored upon contracted out-grower schemes. The out-grower schemes are 
supported by sugar mills through market guarantees for the commodity and provision of inputs 
and extension services, especially for growers within a 35 kilometer radius of the mills.  The 
out-grower schemes supply approximately 70% of the raw materials, while the remaining 30% 
is supplied by nucleus estates owned by the millers (USMA, 2015). Along with the tea 
industry, Uganda’s sugarcane industry is one of the more traditional and well-organised value 
chains. The sugarcane industry operates mainly in the formal economy, with the big three 
producing mills accounting for approximately 85% of production and 15% by the other small 
new sugar mills (USMA, 2015).  Primary production of the out-grower schemes is mainly 
characterized by small-scale growers owning one to three hectares, with little formal education. 
Commercial plantations (owning 25 ha and above) involving medium and large growers are a 
relatively new phenomenon which is still emerging.   
Unlike forestry, where out-growers’ clusters are mainly located far from the mills, in the 
sugarcane industry the existence of mainly contracted out-grower schemes is organised around 
a sugar mill and/or a number of sugar mills within relatively close proximity. This implies that 
5 www.faostat.fao.org/site/339/default.aspx 
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the sugarcane industry operates in a governance structure described as a captive value chain, 
with the out-growers’ schemes having local cluster associations. Unlike the forestry industry 
which has a centralised National Association, the sugar cane industry lacks a centralised 
association for effective lobbying and advocacy. However, the sugar mills are organised under 
a national association known as the Uganda Sugar Manufacturers Association (USMA). 
Generally the sugar industry is organised as displayed in figure 4.3 below: 
Figure 4.3: Showing the value chain governance structure: Uganda’s Sugarcane industry 
Source: Author 
Level 1 Primary Production: involves contracted out-growers (registered supported out-
growers and registered independent out-growers) and nucleus estates owned by milling 
companies. 
Level 1: Primary production 
Level 2: Secondary production/processing 

















Level 2 Secondary Production/Value Addition in the formal economy: all sugarcane is 
supplied to the sugar mills that produce mainly mill sugar, with other cane by-products such as 
molasses, bagasse for power co-generation, ethanol, and mud-fertiliser. 
Level 3 Distribution: this includes retailers, large supermarkets and wholesalers operating in 
the formal economy which directly source from, or are supplied by, the millers. The retail 
shops mainly operate in the informal economy and source sugar from the large supermarkets 
and wholesalers.  
Figure 4.3 above shows the general market governance structure of Uganda’s sugar cane 
industry.  The structure reveals an industry organised in the form of captive value chains, with 
the power asymmetry tilted in favour of the millers. According to Gereffi et al. (2005), captive 
value chains are characterised by low supplier/producer capabilities and dominant buyers.  
Gereffi et al. (2005) and Fredrick and Gereffi (2009) argued that in order for captive value 
chains to be efficient (i.e. competitive), there must be fair treatment of suppliers and equitable 
sharing of the market price, which makes exiting an unattractive option. The implication of the 
current value chain structure reveals that if there is no fair treatment and equitable revenue 
sharing, then the growers may have to consider undertaking a functional value chain upgrading 
strategy (investing in forward linkages such as milling plants). Yet this strategy faces a 
challenge with zoning policies (i.e. one mill per 25 kilometer radius), which creates barriers to 
entry for new mills (Uganda Sugar Policy, 2010). A possible option for growers is to undertake 
value chain process upgrading through strategies such as increased unit productivity, to 
enhance their business competitiveness.   
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However, as Uganda prepares to join the planned integration of the Tripartite Free Trade Area 
composed of EAC, COMESA and SADC (USMA, 2015), this will subject the Ugandan 
commercial sugarcane industry to intense competition, yet the sector does not enjoy a 
comparative advantage. This evidence of comparative advantage factors (see table 4.2 below) 
is analysed in light of competitiveness, through the global ranking of sugarcane producing 
countries in SADC in relation to Uganda. 
Global competitiveness ranking 
To contextualise this research, global rankings using data from the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) set the scene in terms of country competition and 
competitiveness, as shown in Table 4.2 below. Uganda’s commercial sugarcane industry faces 
a big challenge of becoming competitive not only in the country, but also globally. According 
to the global ranking of 108 sugar producing countries for 2013, Uganda was ranked number 
38 in sugar production and number 41 in sugar yields per hectare (FAO STAT, 2013)6. 









(tons 6-month production 
lead time) 
South Africa 15 54   55.38   83.07 
Swaziland 30 14   97.32 145.98 
Zambia 34   7 102.56 153.84 
Uganda 38 41   67.00   67.00 
Malawi 42   6 107.40 161.10 
Source: Fact fish based on FAO STAT Database 
*Adjusted yields based on cane maturity obtained from country-specific industry reports7
(SADC 9-12 months, Uganda 15-12 months). Production lead time factor is 1.5.
6 Fact Fish Website: www.factfish.com/statistic/sugarcane 
7Illovo Sugar (Malawi) Ltd Annual Report 2014, www.illovosugar.org; Uganda Sugar Cane Technologists’ 
Association, 14th Annual Report Calendar Year 2014, www.ugandasugar.org 
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Table 4.2 shows that SADC sugar producing countries have a comparative advantage of early 
market production of 9-12 months, whereas Uganda requires 15-18 months (depending on 
whether the crop is a ratoon or plant cane). This translates into a market lead-time or lag-time 
of six months for Uganda. Cane maturity is a direct function of cane sucrose growth, which is 
influenced by weather conditions. While countries in the SADC region are achieving a growth 
rate of 1 TS/ha/month, Uganda realises only half that (Tyler, n.d.; USCTA, 2012). The extent 
to which the Ugandan sugar industry is not competitive can be highlighted by looking at the 
average yield per ha in the context of cane maturity. When looking at the average yield alone, 
it is easy to erroneously conclude that Uganda is doing well against South Africa, for example, 
at 67 t/ha and 55.38 t/ha respectively. However, in this globalised economic environment, the 
time to market is a key indicator of how competitive a country is against others, with the 
shorter time to market offering first-mover advantages. For this reason, South Africa is able to 
market its cane in nine months, while Uganda needs another six months. This means South 
Africa accumulates 83.07 tons in a similar period of 15-18 months, thus rendering Uganda 
uncompetitive.  This implies that for Uganda’s sugarcane industry to compete and achieve 
competitiveness in the proposed free trade area, the industry has to pursue a strategy of 
productivity gains to compensate for its longer lead time. This would entail introducing faster 
growing cane varieties to replace the poor and low yielding cane varieties (USMA, 2015). 
4.3.2 Applicable regulatory regime and policies in the sugar industry sector 
Uganda’s sugar industry is regulated by the ‘National Sugar Policy, a Framework for the 
enhancement of Competitiveness, Public-Private Partnership and Social Transformation’, 
which was enacted in 2010. The policy overrides the outdated Uganda Sugar (Control) Act of 
1938. The key guiding principles in the policy, among others, are: (1) Market forces shall 
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determine sugarcane as well as its products’ prices; (2) Equitable distribution of productive 
enterprises nationally; (3) Equitable sharing of revenue from sugar and its by-products. 
Further, clause 4.2 (i) states that sugarcane growing areas shall be planned within a radius of 
25 kilometers, and new sugar mills shall not be licensed within a 25 kilometer radius from an 
existing mill. Clause 2.2 states the cane pricing formula as follows: 
“The cane pricing was originally based on the formula- CP = SP X 0.35 X R. 
Subsequently, there were disagreements and questions on rationality of this formula. The 
sugar cane associations have a contention on the percent share of the sugar price.” 
Where 
CP = implies cane price, 
SP = implies average annual market sugar price per ton, 0.35 represents grower’s share, 
and  
R= means average annual rendement obtained by the processing mill, which is 
expressed as recovery of crystal sugar per ton of cane. 
The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Co-operatives (MTIC) is the mandated regulatory agency. 
According to USCTA (2012) and USMA (2015), only two new sugar mills - G.M. Sugar and 
Mayuge Sugar Ltd - were established before the publication of the zoning policy. This implies 
that the probable number of licensed mills before publication of the policy were the big three - 
Sango-bay Sugar Estates Ltd and then G.M Sugar and Mayuge Sugar Ltd, all totaling six in 
number.  Since the introduction of the zoning ‘ring-fencing’ policy in 2010, the number of 
applications for sugar mill licenses has increased dramatically, from 6 to 26, suggesting an 
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astronomical increment of more than 300% within five years (see Figure 4.4 below). 
Surprisingly, to-date less than 50% of the total licensed mills have been established. Further, 
most of the mills have been licensed in the Eastern Uganda region. In the mid-Western region 
(Masindi/Hoima/Kiryandongo Districts) the licenses were allocated to the same proprietor save 
one, which has not been established yet.  This suggests that the zoning policy is being abused 
by curving out large areas of the country for monopolies. 
Figure 4.4: Map showing the location of sugar companies in Uganda 
Source: Ministry of Trade, Industry and Co-operatives (nd) 
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4.3.3: Reforms in the regulatory regime – Draft Uganda Sugar Act 2015 
The big three milling companies have been putting pressure on the government to streamline the 
zoning policy into a law that can be enforced (USCTA, 2012; USMA, 2015). The biggest 
causalities of the weak enforcement of the zoning policy are the bigger two of the three, i.e. 
SCOUL which is located in the Central region and KSWL which is located in the Eastern region. 
The establishment of G.M. Sugar, Mayuge Sugar Ltd, Kaliro Sugar Ltd and Kamuli Sugar Ltd in 
close proximity to the big two has introduced stiff competition for the supply of cane as a raw 
material from out-growers. The competition has further eroded the profits previously enjoyed by 
the big two, as they now have to compete to offer growers better prices for their cane supply. The 
big two8also cite huge losses incurred due to the supply of immature cane contributing to low 
recovery, low yields and low power generation amounting to Ugx 191.85 billion, which is 
equivalent to USD957 million. The other major factor necessitating the enactment of the law is 
cane pricing, especially for growers in the mid-Western region which supply KSL, which still 
enjoys a monopoly. The growers in the mid-Western region receive low prices for their cane 
(Ugx 78,500 per ton) compared to the Eastern region growers (Ugx 105,000 per ton), with a 25% 
price differential. This has caused animosity in the sugar industry, with the affected out-growers 
questioning the relevance of the zoning policy as evidenced by the petition letter10 submitted to 
the President. 
8 USMA letter addressed to Hon. Minister MTIC dated March, 09 2016, Ref: USMA 01/16, hardcopy available with 
author 
9 1 USD = 3,379 UGX exchange rates March 09, 2016 by Bank of Uganda. Available: 
https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/collateral/exchamge_rates.html 
10 Memorandum to the President by sugarcane farmers in Masindi dated 03rd August 2015 and 22nd January 2016 
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Therefore, crafting the Sugar Bill 2015 (currently named the Draft Sugar Act 2015) is meant to 
address the following issues: governance – by creating a regulatory board/council; property 
rights ownership – adhering to zoning for the establishment and expansion of sugar mills; and a 
fair cane pricing formula, which was cited as a contentious issue in the existing policy. 
Governance: in the first Draft Bill of 16th March 2015, the bill proposed a Chairman, five 
government representatives, three miller representatives and two grower representatives. A 
meeting was held afterwards and it was agreed to reduce government representation by two 
and increase the growers’ representation to balance with the millers’ representation. 
Interestingly, the draft of 1st June 2015, which emerged after the meeting, shows that two 
vacant government positions were filled by millers, resulting in five millers and two growers. 
Further, all the members were to be appointed by the Minister after consultation with the 
relevant organisations.  
Property rights ownership: the zoning ‘ring-fencing’ policy of one mill in a 25 kilometer radius 
was being maintained, implying that the location between two mills is 50 kilometers. Cane 
pricing formula: the bill proposed an increase in the sharing ratio for the growers from 35% in 
the current policy to 40%, based on milled sugar alone, i.e., without other by-products.  
Another important area addressed by the bill is the creation of a national sugarcane research 
institute. Currently research is only conducted by the big three. 
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4.4 Summary 
Sugarcane and forestry are two of the organised agriculture sectors that provide jobs, food and 
energy to Uganda’s economy, yet reforms in the sugarcane industry are vital to address the 
equitable distribution of wealth for industry competitiveness. Unfortunately the underhanded 
methods being employed by millers, in collusion with government officials, in the crafting of 
the sugar bill is causing industry tensions, as growers feel that their views are being sidelined. 
This was evidenced by the association growers’ petition11 to the Speaker of Parliament, which 
questioned the credibility of the consultative process in the development of the Sugar Bill.  The 
need to undertake reforms that encourage inclusive growth is the way forward for the 
sustainable competitiveness of the sugar industry. 
11 Petition of the Uganda Sugar Bill 2015 formulation process, letter to Speaker of Parliament, dated 17th July 2015. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: VALUE CHAIN ENTERPRISE ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the demographic and other characteristics of the study population and the 
enterprises participating in the two value chain sectors. It begins with the presentation and 
interpretation of the characteristics of the respondents of the study, after which the findings and 
interpretations are presented according to the research questions. This study specifically deals with the 
commercial sugar and forestry sectors, which in particular includes the primary producers, millers’ 
representatives, association executives, development agency program specialists and opinion leaders.  
5.2 Study geographical area 
The study was conducted mainly in Mid-Western Uganda for the sugarcane value chain cluster. The 
cane growing area in Mid-Western Uganda covers approximately 40,000 hectares, which is 
comparable with the whole forestry growing area in the whole of Uganda.  Therefore, all the forestry 
growing clusters in Uganda were covered by this study with a purpose of matching area scopes of both 
commercial sugarcane and forestry value chains. 
5.3 Demographic characteristics 
The researcher analyzed the various demographic characteristics of the respondents (descriptive 
statistics). The results are presented in Table 5.1 and Figures 5.1 to 5.7. Specifically, the study used 
cross tabulation together with bar charts to help visually explain the differences in the demographic 
characteristics of the respondents by the two sectors.  The respondents’ characteristics included the 
positions of the respondents, their level of education, the gender, firm ownership, period of firm 
establishment, form of land ownership, revenue generated and production capacities. These are 
presented and explained below in the various bar charts. 
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Table 5.1: Percentage distribution of respondents by demographics of the sample firms by 
sector 
Forestry Sugarcane Total 
Gender 
Male 87.0 90.6 88.5 
Female 13.0 9.4 11.5 
Education 
PhD Level 6.5 0.0 3.8 
Graduate (Masters and Degree) 63.0 40.6 53.8 
Professional Level 2.2 0.0 1.3 
Diploma Level 17.4 28.1 21.8 
Certificate level (course Certificate, 
Primary and Secondary levels 8.7 18.8 12.8 
No Response 2.2 12.5 6.4 
Ownership 
Owner (Director, Managing Director, 
Chairman, Owner) 71.7 93.8 80.8 
Manager (Supervisor, Employee, manager) 28.3 6.3 19.2 
Form of 
ownership 
Sole proprietorship or Unregistered 43.5 87.5 61.5 
Corporate Limited 41.3 3.1 25.6 
Partnership 13.0 0.0 7.7 
Not stated 2.2 9.4 5.1 
Land tenure 
system 
Private owned land 45.7 37.5 42.3 
Government or Public leased land 32.6 6.3 21.8 
Government or Public leased land and 
private leased or hired land 0.0 31.3 12.8 
Government or public leased land and 
private owned land 8.7 9.4 9.0 
Private leased or hired land 6.5 9.4 7.7 
Not stated 4.3 6.3 5.1 
Government or Public leased land, Private 
owned land and private leased or hired 
land 2.2 0.0 1.3 
Revenue 
generated 
Stated 8.7 46.9 24.4 
Not stated 91.3 53.1 75.6 
Sector 
Performance 
Low performers 34.8 40.6 37.2 
Medium performers 23.9 37.5 29.5 
High performers 41.3 21.9 33.3 
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Table 5.1: Continued 
Time firm started 
Forestry Sugar Total 
Before 1996 2.2 12.5 6.4 
1996 - 2001 15.2 31.3 21.8 
2002 – 2007 30.4 18.8 25.6 
2008 – 2012 39.1 21.9 32.1 
After 2012 6.5 0 3.8 
Not Stated 6.5 15.6 10.3 
FIRM MATURITY 
LPEs MPEs HPEs 
Time firm started 
Before 1996 10.3 8.7 0.0 
1996 - 2001 17.2 21.7 26.9 
2002 – 2007 31.0 26.1 19.2 
2008 – 2012 31.0 26.1 38.5 
After 2012 6.9 0.0 3.8 
Not Stated 3.4 17.4 11.5 
5.3.1 Positions of the respondents 
Figure 5.1 displays data on the respondents’ positions in the firm. These results indicate that the 
majority of the respondents in both the sugar and forestry sectors were owners (80.8%) and while 
those who were managers accounted for just one in five. The sugarcane sector had more owners 
interviewed (93.7%) than the forestry sector (71.7%). This difference may be explained by the 
difference in the risk perception. The sugarcane cane almost requires daily supervision than the 
forestry sector and more risk especially during the dry season. 
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Figure 5.1: Percentage distribution of respondent by positions 
5.3.2 Level of education of the respondents 
Figure 5.2: Percentage distribution of respondents by level of education 
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Its worthy noting in a country like Uganda were those with higher education, that is from 
ordinary diploma to PhD are less than 10 percent, those involved in the forestry and sugarcane 
sector by this study are highly educated.  Overall 57.6% have at least one degree with 3.8% 
having PhD.  The implication is that this is becoming a good business for which the skilled 
people are getting attracted.  Their differences in education level by sector, for example whereas 
6.5% of the respondents in the forestry sector had PhD, it was zero for the Sugarcane sector. Not 
indicated in this graph was that most of those who had the PhD, they had either done agriculture 
or forestry while in the sugarcane sector, there was no dominant profession. The bar chart above 
shows the level of education of the respondents in the study. In addition, in both sectors, those 
respondents who did not indicate any level of education were in the minority. 
5.3.3 Gender of the respondents 
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of respondents by gender. The results seen in the chart indicate 
that in both sectors, the majority of the respondents were male. Overall, only about one in ten of 
the respondents were women.  This is not surprising in that  historically, women because of not 
owning land were not supposed to use it for long-term investment commercial crops like coffee, 
sugarcane and forestry that last for long time save for ‘Matooke’ banana plantations that provide 
food for home consumption and the surplus for market.  
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Figure 5.3: Percentage distribution of respondents by gender 
5.3.4 Land ownership 
There are major differences in land ownership by the two sectors.  Whereas the majority of 
business were on privately owned land (42.3%/), when it came to public leased land this was the 
second highest form of ownership for the forestry sector.  For the sugarcane sector, the second 
highest was the private leased or hired land.  There was no forest on any private leased or hired 
land.  This may be due to the fact that forestry takes a minimum of 7-10 years and no individual 
is willing to hire or lease out land to someone else for that long which is the case for the 
sugarcane sector as it takes an average of 15-18 months to mature and usually the land is leased 
for an average of 5 years. The results indicate that the majority of the respondents for both 
sectors privately own their land. This was followed by the respondents who lease public land. 
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Figure 5.4: Percentage distribution of respondents by land ownerships 
5.3.5 Revenue generated by the respondents 
Figure 5.5 displays results of the respondents’ willingness to provide their revenues. The results 
indicate that the majority of the respondents in both sectors were not willing to provide their 
revenues, however more respondents in the sugarcane sector were willing to state their revenues 
than the forestry sector.  
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Figure 5.5: Percentage distribution of respondents by shared revenue generated 
5.3.6 Firm ownership 
Figure 5.6: Percentage distribution of respondents by firm ownership 
The results in Figure 5.6 indicate the ownership of the different respondents in the sugar and 
forestry sectors. The findings show that the majority of the respondents have firms that are sole 
proprietorships or are unregistered. However, looking at forestry alone, there were more 
134 
formalised businesses under the categories of partnership and corporates than the sugarcane 
sector, which had few corporate firms.  
5.3.7.Industrial performance and productivity levels 
Figure 5.7a: Percentage performance categories for the forestry and sugarcane sector 
The results in figure 5.7 indicate performance categories with respect to achieving desired 
industry performance and/or productivity levels. The results indicate that 41.3 % of the 
respondents achieved industry performance levels in the forestry sector and only 21.9 % were 
able to do so in the sugarcane sector. Overall, in both sectors only 33.3 % were able to achieve 
desired industry performance levels. 
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Figure 5.7b: Percentage performance categories for the firm maturity 
Figure 5.7b shows the distribution of the different performance categories and firm maturity.  
Irrespective of the performance category, the highest proportion of firms by maturity where those 
that started between 2008 – 2012 followed by those that started between 2002-2007.   The 
implication for this finding that maturity does not explain business success in the context of this 
study.  
5.4 Results of research themes at micro level VC enterprise comparative analysis  
The results below indicate the within-case and cross-case analysis of performance categories in 
the two sectors of commercial sugarcane farming and forestry. The categories are classified as 
high performing entrepreneurs/enterprises, medium performing entrepreneurs/enterprises and 
low performing entrepreneurs/enterprises. The survey instrument had positive statements that 
respondents were required to respond to using a Likert scale ranging from not important (1) to 
very important (5), or not agree (1) to highly agree (5).  The results are presented using 
quantitative data, however these were validated by qualitative data results where applicable. The 
results of the five sub-research themes are shown in Table 5.2 below: 
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Table 5.2: Within case and cross case analysis at enterprise level 
High Acceptance (%) Low Acceptance (%) 
LPE MPE HPE LPE MPE HPE 
VALUE CHAIN COMPETITIVENESS 
KEY SUCCESS FACTORS 
Supplier-entre traits 100 95.7 96.2 0 4.4 3.9 
Productivity indicators 100 91.3 92.3 0 8.7 7.7 
Financial indicators 96.6 95.7 96.2 3.5 4.4 3.9 
MILLERS’ EXPECTATIONS 
Productivity indicator 75.9 73.9 92.3 24.1 26.1 7.7 
Buyer exp prod-entre traits 51.7 43.5 50.0 48.3 56.5 50.0 
DISTRIBUTION OF GAINS 
FACTOR INPUTS 
Factor inputs 24.1 39.1 38.5 75.9 60.9 61.5 
LOCATIONAL DIMENSIONS 
Exploitative sharing/(Price formula) 37.9/(69) 21.7/(60.9) 30.7/(65.4) 62.0/(31) 78.3/(39.1) 69.2/(34.6) 
Equitable sharing 24.1 26.1 19.2 75.9 73.9 80.8 
VALUE ADDITION 
Value addition 27.6 21.7 30.8 72.4 78.3 69.2 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND REGULATORY REGIME 
PULL FACTORS 
Grant incentives 37.9 13.0 30.8 62.1 87.0 69.2 
Ease of doing business 41.4 52.2 42.3 58.6 47.8 57.7 
Factor production endowment 44.8 65.2 57.7 55.2 34.8 42.3 
INVESTMENT CONSTRAINTS & OPPORTUNITIES 
Generational strategy 41.4 65.2 65.4 58.6 34.8 34.6 
Functional VC upgrading 20.7 13.0 19.2 79.3 87.0 80.8 
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Table 5.2 continued 
High Acceptance (%) Low Acceptance (%) 
LPE MPE HPE LPE MPE HPE 
Process VC upgrading 55.2 65.2 65.4 44.8 34.8 34.6 
Formalization strategy 34.5 21.7 26.9 65.5 78.3 73.1 
REGULATORY REGIME 
Entry regulation 69.0 78.3 73.1 31.0 21.7 26.9 
Governance institutions 89.7 73.9 76.9 10.3 26.1 23.1 
STANDARDS FOR MARKET ACCESS 
Certification initiatives 27.6 26.1 26.9 72.4 73.9 73.1 
Production standards 58.6 43.5 57.7 41.4 56.5 42.3 
Pricing per grading system 27.6 39.1 42.3 72.4 60.9 57.7 
COLLABORATION FOR PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES 
STRENGTH OF VERTICAL LINKAGES 
Vertical asset specificity 31.0 39.1 34.6 69.0 60.9 65.4 
Vertical transactional costs 20.7 13.0 0.0 79.3 87.0 100.0 
Vertical opportunism 27.6 34.8 34.6 72.4 65.2 65.4 
STRENGTH OF HORIZONTAL LINKAGES 
Horizontal asset specificity 31.0 13.0 15.4 69.0 87.0 84.6 
Horizontal transactional costs 31.0 30.4 26.9 69.0 69.6 73.1 
Horizontal opportunism 55.2 47.8 34.6 44.8 52.2 65.4 
Technical and financial support 24.1 30.4 11.5 75.9 69.6 88.5 
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5.4.1 Sub-theme 1: Critical success factors (CSFs) for value chain competitiveness 
Research question 1: Why and how do perceptions of CSFs for competitiveness determine 
performance differences amongst high, medium and low producers and between VC 
sectors? 
Research question 2: How are producers’ competitiveness expectations compatible with 
market expectations amongst high, medium and low producers and between VC sectors? 
The results from Table 5.2 under the value chain competitiveness theme indicate that among the 
key success factors, supplier-entrepreneur traits, productivity practices and financial practices 
were generally regarded as being very important for business competitiveness. There were no 
significant differences in perceptions among the high, medium and low performing enterprises. 
The findings from the results show the following: supplier-entrepreneur traits LPEs (100%), 
MPEs (95.7%) and HPEs (96.2%), productivity practices LPEs (100%), MPEs (91.3%) and 
HPEs (92.3%), and financial practices LPEs (96.6%), MPEs (95.7%) and HPEs (96.2%). 
With regards to producers meeting millers’/market expectations, the respondents’ perceptions 
indicate that the productivity practices were highly agreed upon in all the performance 
categories. However, the high performers (92.3%) attached great importance to meeting market 
requirements compared to the medium (73.9%) and lower performers (75.9%). On the other 
hand, the perceptions of the buyer expectations of supplier entrepreneur traits were ranked 
average across all performance categories - HPEs (50.0%), MPEs (43.5%) and LPEs (51.7%). 
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To further explain the differences in the respondents’ perceptions of value chain 
competitiveness, the researcher also ran the performance radar charts of the detailed key success 
factors and millers’ expectations, the results of which are shown below in figures 5.8 and 5.9. 
Figure 5.8: Ugandan producers’ self-assessment perceptions of critical success factors for 
competitiveness  
Figure 5.8 above indicates the detailed items of key success factors under the grouped constructs. 
These include supplier-entrepreneur traits (personal involvement, passionate, access to technical 
knowledge, timely silvi-culture practices and prompt payment of workers), productivity practices 
(reliability in quality, reliability in quantity, guaranteed market price and quality seeds) and 
financial practices (reliability of cash flow and goodwill by communities). 
The results from the chart above show that there is generally a fit in the perceptions of 
respondents in all the performance categories with regard to the key success factors. This implied 
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that the respondents in all the three performance categories in this study had the same 
perceptions of the importance of key success factors for their business competitiveness. 
Figure 5.9: Ugandan producers’ self-assessment perceptions for meeting millers’ expectations 
Figure 5.9 indicates the detailed items of millers’ expectations from the perspective of the 
producers under the grouped constructs. These include productivity practices (reliable quality, 
reliable supply quantities, producers to abide by directives, well-maintained plantations and 
timely delivery) and buyers’ expectations of producer-entrepreneur traits as being passionate and 
low priced with personal involvement in the business. 
The results from figure 5.9 above show that there are deviations in the respondents’ perceptions 
regarding meeting millers’ expectations. Under the productivity practices, the high performers, 
unlike the medium and low performers, considered quality and abiding by the millers’ directives 
as important factors in achieving their business competitiveness. Looking at the buyers’ 
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expectations of producer-entrepreneurs’ traits, the high performers responded well to the 
importance of being personally involved in their businesses to meet the millers’ expectations.  
Quantitative findings above generally revealed a fit in the perceptions of respondents among all 
the performance categories (HPEs, MPEs and LPEs) with regard to the three key success factors 
that is; supplier-entrepreneur traits (personal involvement, passionate, access to technical 
knowledge, timely silvi-culture practices and prompt payment of workers), productivity practices 
(reliability in quality, reliability in quantity, guaranteed market price and quality seeds) and 
financial practices (reliability of cash flow and goodwill by communities), as being important to 
their business competitiveness. 
However, a nuanced view of the qualitative data revealed contrasting results between HPEs and 
both MPEs and LPEs. The results by HPEs revealed a consistency of findings in both 
quantitative and qualitative data stressed personality traits factors which are within their control 
as being key success factors for their business success, as evidenced in the quotation below: 
“Commitment, love for the project, following advice from extension staff, co-operation 
with extension staff, politeness to extension staff, prompt payment of workers, friendliness 
with workers for good work output, good site selection, timely weeding and timely 
application of fertilisers” (Respondent HPE 1 Sugar). 
This finding was also validated with observable field productivity findings as evidenced in 
figures 5.10 and 5.11 below.  
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Figure 5.10: Ugandan productivity practices (straight trees without weeds competition) of 
growing forestry field by high performing entrepreneurs 
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Figure 5.11: Ugandan productivity practices (healthy crop without weeds competition) of 
growing cane field by high performing entrepreneurs 
The personal involvement of HPEs in their businesses was evidenced by residential built site 
houses in Figures 5.12 and 5.13 below, enabled them to closely monitor their businesses and thus 
attain better productivity observed in Figures 5.10 and 5.11 above.  
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Figure 5.12: A Ugandan residential site house depicting personal involvement behaviour by 
high performing entrepreneurs in the forestry business 
Figure 5.13: A Ugandan residential site house depicting personal involvement behaviour by 
high performing entrepreneurs in the cane business 
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On the other hand, the low and medium performers generally stressed environmental related 
factors which were beyond their control as a source of their business success, as per quotations 
below: 
Public relations with the miller, recently with good performance, I was allocated a new 
tractor by miller on loan. Harvest quickly attended to when submits request to miller; 
prompt payment; prompt service delivery, e.g. plough, seed delivery, road maintenance. 
(respondent MPE 1). 
“Availability of land, availability of market, availability of machinery, distance to market, 
availability of labour, security of crop/investment (e.g. against fire) and proper 
management” (Respondent LPE 2 sugar). 
Evidence of quantitative of findings for MPEs and LPEs was found to be in contrast with 
qualitative who were found not to have any residential site houses, implying minimum personal 
involvement in their respective businesses, possibly contributing to the low observed field 
productivity validated in Figures 5.14 and 5.15 below: 
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Figure 5.14: Ugandan productivity practices (crooked trees with weeds competition) of 
growing forestry field by low performing entrepreneurs  
Figure 5.15: Ugandan productivity practices (unhealthy crop with weeds competition) of 
growing sugarcane field by low performing entrepreneurs 
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This section analyzed critical success factors for value chain competitiveness and alignment of 
producer expectations with market expectations in explaining enterprise performance differences 
and similarities amongst HPEs, MPEs and LPEs. Findings of the study revealed that: 
HPEs attributed their business success to internal environmental factors such as personal 
involvement, passion, and commitment; factors that are within own control, thus contributing to 
high productivity gains. On the other hand, MPEs and LPEs attributed their business success to 
external environmental factors such as quick response by miller, good roads; factors that are 
outside own control, thus contributing to low fields productivity. 
The HPEs were more responsive in meeting market requirements compared to both MPEs and 
LPEs. This finding strengthened the above finding on perceptions of internal environmental 
factors as being source of business success and achieving desired productivity gains. The next 
section presents equitable value chain sharing or distribution of gains between millers and 
growers. 
5.4.2 Sub-theme 2: Equitable value chain sharing (miller – producer) 
Research question 3: How is equitable value chain sharing of proceeds perceived as a 
challenge for competitive success amongst VC participants and between VC sectors, thus 
creating winners and losers? 
The results from Table 5.2 indicated that on the theme of distribution of gains, the cost of 
factor inputs for production were perceived to be less of a challenge to their business 
competitiveness as they were scored below average by LPEs (24.1%), MPEs and HPEs (39.1% 
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and 38.5%). Regarding the sharing of revenues between millers and producers, the results 
revealed that exploitative tendencies were perceived by respondents not being much of a 
challenge to competitiveness of the value chain. However, considering only price as a sub-
component of exploitative tendencies, exploitation turned out to be a major challenge to value 
chain competitiveness among the HPEs (30.7/(65.4)), MPEs (21.7/(60.9)) and LPEs 
(37.9/(69)).  Similarly, the perceptions of the respondents regarding the revenue sharing 
between millers and growers were generally perceived to be inequitable as indicated by the 
HPEs (80.8%), MPEs (73.9 %) and LPEs (75.9%). These results were also confirmed by low 
acceptance in sharing of value chain by-products and inefficient plant mills by the HPEs (69.2 
%), MPEs (78.3%) and LPEs (72.4%). This implied that farmers perceived the sugar milling 
machines to be inefficient in extracting sucrose from sugarcane supplied to produce sugar, i.e., 
sugar is a key product where both millers and growers share a percentage of proceeds based on 
an agreed formula. Therefore high extraction of sugar implies more revenue and less extraction 
of sugar less revenue for both parties. Further, the farmers perceived that the   millers 
appropriated the benefits from the value addition sugarcane by-products such as molasses, 
bagasse for power co-generation and mud-fertilizer. 
The results from the qualitative analysis are in tandem with the quantitative results which 
indicated a major challenge in the distribution of gains between the millers and producers, as 
evidenced in the quotation  
“The miller pays a price based on market sugar price as determined by the formula. The 
formula does not cater for the by-products such as molasses, bagasse for power 
production (which generates revenue for the miller) and mud-fertiliser which millers 
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apply as a fertiliser for the improvement of quality cane of the miller’s estate farms” 
(Respondent HPE 1 Sugar). 
“Millers set the price in the market” (All respondents in both sectors).  
“Miller … is the one harvesting the plantation, they process roofing tiles, poles and ply 
wood; because we are private individuals, how do you tell if he (producer) is getting 
value for money in his investments? Therefore, price determination will be the millers… 
of this world, unless we cooperate and speak with one voice” (Respondent HPE 1 
Forestry). 
The analysis is this section provides the understanding of the enterprise performance differences 
and similarities as a result of perceptions regarding challenges associated with equitable value 
sharing between millers and growers. Findings of this study indicated that all respondents HPEs, 
MPEs and LPEs perceived unfair distribution of gains between millers and growers. Therefore, 
distribution of gains implication does not offer plausible explanations for performance 
differences between successful firms and unsuccessful firms, suggesting that it is an external 
environmental factor impacting all participating entrepreneur’s businesses in the value chains. 
The next section presents results of perceptions on entrepreneurial alertness for business start-ups 
and growth and regulatory regime. 
 5.4.3 Sub-theme 3: Entrepreneurial alertness and regulatory regime 
Research question 4: How does entrepreneurial alertness explain enterprise and VC sector 
performance differences, with possibilities for the shaping and re-shaping of governance 
structures? 
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Research question 5: How does institutional quality explain the emergence of productive, 
unproductive and/or predatory behaviours reflected in the competitive success or failure of 
enterprises and VC sectors? 
From Table 5.2, the results indicate that the pull factors associated with entrepreneurial alertness 
for business start-ups and growth were factor production endowment, followed by ease of doing 
business and lastly grant incentives. For factor production endowment the HPEs and MPEs 
scored slightly above average (57.7% and 65.2%) than the LPEs, who scored it below average 
(44.8%). With regards to ease of doing business, the MPEs scored this averagely (52.2%) 
compared to the LPEs and HPEs, who scored it slightly below average at 41.4% and 42.3% 
respectively. However, grant incentives were not highly regarded as pull factors for business 
investments in this study. All the respondents in the three performance categories scored it below 
average - HPEs (30.8%), MPEs (13%) and LPEs (37.9%).  
The results further (Table 5.2) also revealed that under the heading of investment constraints and 
opportunities, the leading investment opportunity was process VC upgrading such as investing in 
farm machinery and increasing yields per unit area, followed by generational strategy such as 
having in place a succession plan. However, functional VC upgrading, such as investing in 
value-addition plants and formalisation strategies such as formalizing business registration were 
generally considered to be investment constraints. 
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Process VC upgrading was highly considered to be an investment opportunity by the HPEs 
(65.4%), MPEs (65.2%) and LPEs (55.2%). This implied that the HPEs and MPEs slightly 
anticipated investing in process VC upgrading as an opportunity compared to LPEs. A 
generational strategy, which is synonymous with business succession, was likely to be pursued 
as an investment opportunity for business sustainability by HPEs (65.4%) and MPEs (65.2%), 
rather than LPEs (41.4%) who still viewed it as a constraint to their businesses. The qualitative 
finding validated the quantitative finding above suggesting that succession planning was a 
priority for HPEs and MPEs but not a priority for LPEs, as per quotations below: 
“I have it as a dream, today I see myself ‘eating’ two rotations. I have only two kids (girl 
13 years and boy 9 years), I bring them to the plantation, thinking they would pick 
interest, though they complain of dry weather etc. I want my kids to be successful, but 
hope that one of them will recognise the value of land. For instance, the boy planted part 
of a line of trees and once it is time for harvest he will receive all the proceeds so that he 
realises the sweetness of the land. I plan to make a will and put a caveat forbidding sale 
or subdivision of the land for the next 200 years, and within that time period the gene can 
rise up and rejuvenate the business. Our culture is different from the Indians/Asians who 
have generational business succession” (Respondent HPE 1 Forestry).  
With respect to cultural differences in this quote, the respondent is trying to imply that the 
African way of managing businesses is characterized with low participation of children and/or 
spouses who could be mentored to take-over once the founder member has departed to be with 
his/her creator. In contrast, the Indians/Asians business management culture so far observed 
reveals the involvement of family members i.e., children from an early stage and spouse who are 
mentored to take-over the business and thus business continuity. 
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“I plan to register my business formally, after registration I will encourage few 
shareholders from outside family so that I stop the children from selling the business in 
future” (Respondent HPE1 Sugar). 
“Currently am a registered investor by UIA, we have family members as directors, we 
hope in future to opt outside knowledgeable people with expertise in value addition either 
as partners or directors to advance the business” (Respondent MPE 1 Forestry). 
“The plan is clearly documented and put in the agreement that was submitted to SPGS to 
access the production cost share grant, but in reality implementation of the succession 
plan is at ground zero” (Respondent LPE1 Forestry) 
Investment in functional VC upgrading was considered to be a major constraint by all the 
respondents, with HPEs at 80.8%, MPEs at 87.0% and LPEs at 79.3%. This implied that the VC 
primary producers were unable to capture higher rents emanating from processing/milling 
activities in the value chain, which may keep them being exploited by the millers.  
In addition, the respondents in the three performance categories, viewed formalisation strategies 
as a constraint and scored it as follows, HPEs (73.1%), MPEs (78.3-%) and LPEs (65.5%),. The 
implication here was that most of these businesses did not consider registering their businesses as 
an important strategy for possible transition from the informal to the formal economy. This 
finding was validated by the quotation below: 
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“I could not formalize the business because taxation issues would eat investment capital at 
the start” (Respondent HPE1 Sugar). 
Under the current regulatory regime, the existence of sound quality institutions (e.g. regulatory 
agencies) was perceived to be necessary for promoting productive entrepreneurial behaviours 
and/or deterring predatory entrepreneurial behaviours. The LPEs scored it higher (89.7%) than 
both the HPEs (76.9%) and the MPEs (73.9%). In addition, the creation of an enabling 
investment climate, such as the removal of ring fencing policies for millers to operate single-
handedly in a cluster and policies guaranteeing property rights ownership, was generally 
regarded as being important for promoting fair trade practices in the industry. All the 
performance categories ranked it highly above average as follows: HPEs (73.1%), MPEs 
(78.3%) and LPEs (69.0%). The implication of these results is that the VC producers were 
agitating for establishment of a sound and strong regulatory regime by the government. This 
finding contradicts the liberalisation architects’ school of thought that markets are self-
regulating.  
The findings in this section have been able to examine and explain enterprise performance 
differences and similarities associated with entrepreneurial alertness such as pull-factors and/or 
motivating factors for business start-ups and growth and identification of investment 
opportunities and constraints that may possibilities for shaping and re-shaping enterprise 
participation in the value chains. The findings of study were as follows: 
Findings of the study revealed that pull-factors and/or motivating factors for business start-up 
and growth such as factor production endowments, ease of doing business and grant incentives 
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did not explain performance differences between successful and unsuccessful entrepreneur’s 
businesses. This finding suggests that most entrepreneurs’ posses entrepreneurial alertness 
instincts with respect to availability of favorable environmental factors enabling business start-
ups and growth. Further, perceptions regarding identification investment opportunities and 
constraints such as process VC upgrading, generation strategy, functional VC upgrading and 
business formalization strategy that may shape and re-shape the value chains, findings revealed 
as follows: 
 Process VC upgrading such as investing in farm machinery and increasing yields per unit
area, was generally considered to be an investment opportunity by the HPEs, MPEs and
LPEs.
 Generational strategy such as having in place a succession plan was perceived as an
investment opportunity by HPEs and MPEs while LPEs considered it as an investment
constraint.
 Functional VC upgrading, such as investing in value-addition plants was perceived as an
investment constraint by HPEs, MPEs and LPEs. This finding suggested that most of
these businesses could not capture higher rents associated with value adding activities.
 Business formalization such as business registration was generally considered to be an
investment constraint by HPEs, MPEs and LPEs. Taxation was identified as the main
factor hindering the process of entrepreneurial businesses to graduate from the informal
to the formal economy.
A finding regarding perception on institutional quality in explaining enterprise performance 
differences, the results is that generally all VC producers were agitating for establishment of a 
sound and strong regulatory regime by the government. This finding contradicts the liberalisation 
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architects’ school of thought that markets are self-regulating.  The next section presents 
perceptions of compliance with standards for market access. 
5.4.4 Sub-theme 4: Compliance with standards for market access 
Research question 6: How do perceptions of compliance with standards for market access 
explain performance differences amongst high, medium and low producers and between 
VC sectors?  
Table 5.2 above indicates the results for compliance to standards for market access. Here there 
were positive statements that respondents were required to respond to using a Likert scale 
ranging from not agree (1) to highly agree (5). The results from table 5.2 indicate compliance 
with standards for market access, which is composed of application of certification initiatives, 
access to production standards, and use of a pricing per grading system. Compliance with the 
application of certification initiatives and the use of pricing per grading system were perceived as 
major challenges in comparison to the availability of production standards in the value chains. 
The results revealed low application of certification initiatives and there were no major 
differences in perception rankings between the LPEs (72.4%), MPEs (73.9%) and HPEs 
(73.1%). In addition, the results from the use of a pricing per grading system shows a similar 
pattern, whereby the LPEs scored 72.4%, the MPEs scored 60.9% and the HPEs scored 57.7%. 
Regarding compliance with access to production standards, there was a moderate level of 
acceptance by LPEs (58.6%) and HPEs (57.7%), save for the MPEs (43.5%), who scored slightly 
below average. 
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The findings imply that there was some level of acceptable compliance with access to production 
standards among all performance categories that is HPEs, MPEs and LPEs while compliance 
with the application of certification initiatives and the use of pricing per grading system among 
the performance categories were generally perceived as major challenges in the value chains. 
The qualitative findings below renders support to quantitative findings above suggesting that 
generally a pricing per grading system posed challenges for productivity gains. 
“the miller is applying uniform/average rendement whereby the good farmers are not 
reaping good pay from their efforts. In addition, the miller is also losing by applying this 
uniformity” (Respondent HPE1 Sugar).     
“Price is determined by the miller. There is no grading system” (Respondent LPE 1 
Sugar). 
This section has been able to reveal performance differences and similarities amongst HPEs, 
MPEs and LPEs associated with perceptions on compliance with standards for market access for 
participating in value chains. The findings of the study revealed that there was a general 
acceptance of access to production standards by HPEs, MPEs and LPEs. This finding implied 
that information regarding production standards was accessible to all business enterprises and 
therefore it does not explain performance differences amongst successful and unsuccessful 
enterprises. Further, findings indicated that industry failure to apply a pricing per grading system 
and implementation of certification initiatives were perceived as major challenges for all 
business enterprises participating in the value chains. The next section presents results of vertical 
and horizontal collaboration for building supplier production capabilities in order to enhance 
enterprise competitiveness in value chains. 
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5.4.5 Sub-theme 5: Vertical and horizontal collaboration for the diffusion of supplier 
production capabilities 
Research Question 7: How does vertical and horizontal collaboration for the diffusion of 
supplier production capabilities explain the performance differences amongst VC 
participants and between VC sectors? 
The results from Table 5.2 above indicated vertical and horizontal collaboration for building 
suppliers/grower production capabilities. The strength of vertical and horizontal linkages were 
explained by investment asset specificity, vulnerability of transactional costs and opportunistic 
behavior vulnerability. Technical and financial support by development agencies was also 
included in the assessment of the strength of horizontal linkages. 
5.4.5.1  Vertical collaboration 
The results under the strength of the vertical linkages show that asset specificity measured in 
terms of investments in inputs support, knowledge and skills transfer from millers to 
suppliers/growers in the business was perceived as not being significant for their business 
competitiveness. The results revealed low acceptance among all performance categories and 
there was no significant difference in the perceptions between HPEs (65.4%), MPEs (60.9%) and 
LPEs (69.0%). This finding was validated by qualitative data findings suggesting low transfer of 
knowledge, skills and inputs support from millers directly to growers as per the quotations 
below: 
“Under the previous miller, harvesting, loading and transporting were done by the 
farmers’ company – which was the business arm of the association. When current 
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management came on board, this was abolished and they preferred to use contractors. 
With the previous miller knowledge was gained; we used to have courses in Kampala 
which was helpful, however, with the current miller not much has been gained” 
(Respondent HPE 2 Sugar). 
“Lessons were learnt the hard way; the buyer rejected first thinning products by approx. 
60 percent, second thinning products by approx. 10 percent. The reasons for rejection 
were over crooked ‘not straight’, tiny or small, i.e. below preferred diameter, broken and 
below required length especially ‘fox tail’ trees. As a result we have improved by proper 
maintenance of plantation when still young, spot slashing to minimise climbers, i.e. this 
reduces crookedness, timely beating-up to reduce the tiny trees, and timely weeding to 
reduce stunted growth” (Respondent MPE 2 forestry). 
Regarding vulnerability to transactional costs, the findings from table 5.1 show similar low 
acceptance levels of transactional costs across the board, with minor deviances for HPEs who 
considered them as negligible for their business competitiveness. The ratings were HPEs (100%), 
MPEs (87.0%), and LPEs (79.3%). In addition, the findings regarding vulnerability to 
opportunism show that there were no significant difference in the perceptions between HPEs 
(65.4%), MPEs (65.2%) and LPEs (72.4%), thus suggesting low levels opportunistic behaviors 
in vertical linkages. These findings were confirmed by the statement in the quotation below: 
“Trust exists, though there are demerits but the merits outweigh the demerits” 
(Respondent HPE 1 Sugar). 
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The statement by the respondent implies that although the relationship between growers and 
millers has a number of observed disadvantages, the growers are willing to down play the 
disadvantages and focus on the advantages enjoyed in the commercial relationships. 
5.4.5.2 Horizontal collaboration 
The results under the strength of the horizontal linkages revealed no differences in perception 
and low acceptance levels that asset investments specificity such as inputs support, skills and 
knowledge transfer, translated into building production capabilities, as evidenced with following 
scores  HPEs (84.6%), MPEs (87.0%) and LPEs (69.0%). In addition, the results also indicated 
existence of low transactional costs across the board - LPEs (69.0%), MPEs (69.6%) and HPEs 
(73.1%). Furthermore, the findings regarding vulnerability to opportunism results show that there 
was no significant difference in the perceptions between LPEs (55.2%) and MPEs (47.8%), 
which were on average and higher than the HPEs (34.6%). This finding implied that the LPEs 
and MPEs experienced some level of opportunistic behaviors in their business dealings 
compared to the HPEs, as validated by qualitative data findings in the quotations below: 
“Not optimal, participation in UTGA affairs is at low levels. For instance, out of the 
approximately 500 investors in forestry, only 60-70 investors are active with UTGA 
affairs” (Respondent LPE 1 Forestry). 
“The level of trust is not strong among the farmers. The association has some divisions 
because some farmers are close to the millers, thus being favoured and this creates 
suspicion” (Respondent LPE 1 Sugar). 
The above statements confirmed low levels of trust and/or poor quality relationships suggesting 
opportunistic behaviors in business dealings among LPEs and MPEs as evidenced with the 
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quantitative findings. On the other hand, the statements below confirmed perceptions of mutual 
amicable relationships for business dealings by HPEs. 
“I think we trust each other because we have same common ground. I have not seen much 
conflicts in client meetings, except one time a farmer accused his neighbours of stealing 
his workers. Compliance in annual membership subscriptions could be a good measure if 
you can cross-check with UTGA” (Respondent HPE 1 Forestry) 
“Farmers trust each other” (Respondent HPE 2 Sugar). 
The next sub-section presents perceptions of technical and financial support in horizontal 
collaborative relationships for building production capabilities.  Results of technical and 
financial support indicated that all the respondents in the three performance categories perceived 
receiving minimum technical and financial support. The findings from the study were: HPEs 
(88.5.%), MPEs (69.6.%) and LPEs (75.9%). This finding implied that technical and financial 
support did neither account for a big proportion of the farmers’ investments, nor for performance 
differences between HPEs, MPEs and LPEs. 
This section investigated the strength of collaborative relationships in vertical and horizontal 
linkages in explaining performance differences and similarities amongst HPEs, MPEs and LPEs 
participating in value chains. The findings of the study revealed the following: 
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In vertical collaborative relationships; findings of the study generally revealed weaker 
collaborative relationships along vertical linkages for diffusion of knowledge, skills and inputs 
support for building production capabilities among primary producers. The millers were found to 
prefer either use of contractors or only to purchase final quality commodities. This finding 
suggested that the achieved productivity gains that distinguished HPEs from both MPEs and 
LPEs  as found out in results under sub-theme 1 above, could have been attributed to own 
entrepreneur’s learning or acquiring from other sources. 
Further, findings of the study also revealed that vulnerability to transactional costs and 
opportunistic behaviors were perceived to be generally at low levels between millers and primary 
producers, and did not account for performance differences between HPEs, MPEs and LPEs. 
With respect to horizontal collaborative relationships; findings of the study revealed no 
performance differences between HPEs, MPEs and LPEs as a result of access to investment asset 
specificity such as knowledge, skills and inputs support transfer for building production 
capabilities. 
The findings also revealed low levels of transactional costs in business dealings, suggesting that 
they could not account for performance differences among HPEs, MPEs and LPEs. However, 
some level of vulnerability to opportunistic behaviors manifested among LPEs and MPEs 
business dealings, therefore rendering support in explaining performance differences between 
HPEs and both MPEs and LPEs. The sub-chapter above presented results of micro level VC 
enterprise comparative analysis. The next sub-chapter presents results of both meso and macro 
level VC sector comparative analysis. 
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5.5 Summary 
This chapter investigated entrepreneurial behavioral practices that explain performance 
differences between HPEs, MPEs and LPEs participating in sugarcane and forestry value chains. 
Main findings of the study revealed that HPEs attributed their business success to internal 
environmental factors such as personal involvement, passion, and commitment; factors that are 
within own control, thus contributing to high productivity gains. On the other hand, MPEs and 
LPEs attributed their business success to external environmental factors such as quick response 
by miller, good roads; factors that are outside own control, thus contributing to low productivity. 
Further, the HPEs were more responsive in meeting market requirements compared to both 
MPEs and LPEs. The HPE finding versus the MPE and LPE finding strengthened the 
perceptions of internal environmental factors as being source of business success and achieving 
desired productivity gains. 
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CHAPTER SIX; VALUE CHAIN SECTOR ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
This section presents the results of the within case analysis and cross-case analysis of the two VC 
sectors - commercial sugarcane and commercial forestry. The survey instrument had positive 
statements that respondents were required to respond to using a Likert scale, ranging from not 
important to very important, or not agree (1) to highly agree (5).  The results are presented using 
quantitative data; however, these were validated by qualitative data results where applicable. 
6.2 Results of research themes at meso and macro level VC sector comparative analysis 
The results of the five major research themes are shown in Table 6.1: 
Table 6.1: Within case and cross-case VC sector analysis 
High Acceptance (%) Low Acceptance (%) 
VARIABLES Forestry Sugarcane Forestry Sugarcane 
KEY SUCCESS FACTORS 
Supplier-entre traits 95.7 100 4.4 0 
Productivity indicator 91.3 100 8.7 0 
Financial indicator 93.5 100 6.5 0 
MILLER'S EXPECTATIONS 
Productivity indicator 76.1 87.5 23.9 12.5 
Buyer exp prod -entre traits 50.0 46.9 50.0 53.1 
FACTOR INPUTS 
Factor inputs 30.4 37.5 69.6 62.5 
LOCATIONAL DIMENSIONS 
Exploitative sharing/ (Price 
formula) 
34.78/(50) 25/(87.5) 65.2/(50) 75/(12.5) 
Equitable sharing 26.1 18.8 73.9 81.3 
VALUE ADDITION 
Value addition 34.8 15.6 65.2 84.4 
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Table 6.1 Continued 
High Acceptance (%) Low Acceptance (%) 
VARIABLES Forestry Sugarcane Forestry Sugarcane 
PULL FACTORS 
Grant incentives 39.1 12.5 60.9 87.5 
Easy of doing business 19.6 81.3 80.4 18.8 
Factor production endowment 56.5 53.1 43.5 46.9 
INVESTMENT CONSTRAITS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Generational strategy 54.4 59.4 45.7 40.6 
Functional VC upgrading 19.6 15.6 80.4 84.4 
Process VC upgrading 54.4 71.9 45.7 28.1 
Formalisation strategy 43.5 6.3 56.5 93.8 
REGULATORY REGIME 
Entry regulation 69.6 78.1 30.4 21.9 
Governance institutions 78.3 84.4 21.7 15.6 
Certification initiatives 37.0 12.5 63.0 87.5 
Production standards 67.4 34.4 32.6 65.6 
Pricing per grading system 52.2 12.5 47.8 87.5 
STRENGTH OF VERTICAL LINKAGES 
Vertical asset specificity 30.4 40.6 69.6 59.4 
Vertical transactional costs 10.9 12.5 89.1 87.5 
Vertical opportunism 34.8 28.1 65.2 71.9 
STRENGTH OF HORIZONTAL LINKAGES 
Horizontal asset specificity 28.3 9.4 71.7 90.6 
Horizontal transactional costs 32.6 25.0 67.4 75.0 
Horizontal opportunism 50.0 40.6 50.0 59.4 
Technical and financial support 32.6 6.3 67.4 93.8 
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6.2.1 Sub-theme 1: Critical success factors (CSFs) for value chain competitiveness 
Research question 1: Why and how do the perceptions of the CSFs of competitiveness 
determine performance differences amongst high, medium and low producers and between 
VC sectors? 
Research question 2: How are producers’ competitiveness expectations compatible with 
market expectations amongst high, medium and low producers and between VC sectors? 
The results from Table 6.1 under the value chain competitiveness theme indicate that among the 
key success factors, supplier-entrepreneur traits, productivity practices and financial practices 
were generally regarded as being very important for business competitiveness. There were no 
major differences in perceptions between the sectors of sugar and forestry. The findings from the 
results show the following: supplier-entrepreneur traits sugar (100%)/forestry (95.7%), 
productivity practices sugar (100%)/ forestry (91.3%) and financial practices sugar 
(100.0%)/forestry (93.5%).  A two-sample t-test with equal variances was run to establish 
whether there were differences or similarities between the two VC sectors. The results are shown 
in Tables 6.2 to 6.3: 
Table 6.2: Two-sample t-test with equal variances (producer entrepreneur-traits) 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 4.609 0.126 0.856 4.355 4.863 
Sugarcane 32 4.750 0.078 0.440 4.591 4.909 
combined 78 4.667 0.081 0.715 4.506 4.828 
Diff 0.141 0.165 0.470 0.187 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t=0.8574 
Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.1970       Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3939          Pr(T > t) = 0.8030 
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A comparison of the mean value for the supplier entrepreneur-traits showed that there was no 
difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T < t) = 0.1970.  This implies 
that there was a general agreement in perceptions among the respondents in both sectors, i.e. the 
respondents held similar views regarding entrepreneurial traits as key success factors for their 
business competitiveness.  The next table presents tested results of productivity practices that 
lead to productivity gains in the value chain. 
Table 6.3.: Two-sample t-test with equal variances (productivity practices) 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 4.457 0.167 1.130 4.121 4.792 
Sugarcane 32 4.813 0.070 0.397 4.670 4.955 
combined 78 4.603 0.104 0.917 4.396 4.809 
diff -0.356 0.208 -0.771 0.059 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -1.7082
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0458 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0917 Pr(T > t) = 0.9542
A comparison of the mean value for the productivity practices showed that there was a moderate 
difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr(T < t) = 0.0458. This means 
that in the sugarcane sector, productivity practices were considered more as a key success factor 
for business competitiveness than for the forestry sector. 
The next table presents tested results of financial practices that complement both productivity 
practices and entrepreneurial traits in achieving business competitiveness. 
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Table 6.4: Two-sample t-test with equal variances (financial practices) 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 4.674 0.099 0.668 4.475 4.872 
Sugarcane 32 4.906 0.052 0.296 4.799 5.013 
combined 78 4.769 0.063 0.556 4.644 4.895 
diff -0.232 0.126 -0.484 0.019 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -1.8416
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0347 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0694 Pr(T > t) = 0.9653 
A perception of the respondents regarding the financial practices of their businesses showed that 
the mean rating for those in the forestry sector wass smaller than that of the sugarcane sector, 
with the difference being statistically significant: p (T<t)=0.0347. This implied that cash flow 
was more crucial for the success of the sugarcane sector than the forestry sector. This possibly 
could be attributed to the sugarcane crop as being more sensitive to weeds and susceptible to 
perishability, thus requiring regular cash flow in comparison to the forestry crop. 
With regards to producers meeting millers’/market expectations, the respondents’ perceptions 
indicate that the productivity practices are more highly agreed upon by the sugarcane famers 
(87.5%) than the forestry (76.1%) farmers. However, both sectors indicated the importance of 
buyer expectations on producer-entrepreneur traits with the following findings; sugar (46.9%) 
and forestry (50.0%). The findings imply that meeting the productivity practices expected by the 
miller is very important for the primary producer’s business competitiveness in both sectors.  
A two-sample t-test with equal variances was run to establish whether there were differences or 
similarities between the two VC sectors. The results are shown in Tables 6.5 to 6.6 below: 
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Table 6.5: Two-sample t-test with equal variances compatibility of producer-buyer on 
productivity practices 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.717 0.236 1.601 3.242 4.193 
Sugarcane 32 4.219 0.117 0.659 3.981 4.456 
combined 78 3.923 0.149 1.317 3.626 4.220 
diff -0.501 0.300 -1.098 0.095 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -1.6731
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0492 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0984 Pr(T > t) = 0.9508 
Views of the respondents regarding meeting the millers’ expectations when it comes to 
productivity practices showed that the mean values for those in the forestry sector were smaller 
than those of the sugarcane sector and the difference is statistically significant, pr (T<t)= 
0.0492. This implied that in the sugarcane sector, producers strive more to meet the millers’ 
productivity expectations than they do in the forestry sector. 
To validate the quantitative finding above millers were asked to mention the expectations they 
regarded as critical success factors from the commercial farmers. Findings below revealed a 
general consistency among the three performance categories of growers being in alignment with 
meeting expectations of the miller, and which mainly where found to be productivity related 
practices. The quotations below provide evidence in support of the quantitative findings in the 
sugarcane sector: 
“Sustainable cane supply to the factory to run the mill for 10 months without cane 
shortages….Quality of sugar at the market…...A lot of interest being generated by out-
grower farmers”  (Out-grower Manager, Sugar Mill). 
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The response from the miller was then contrasted with growers responses, when the question was 
then posed to the producers:, i.e., what does the miller expect from you as a commercial farmer? 
“Quality cane and good recovery. Good quality cane gives a recovery of 9-12% 
rendement”. (Respondent HPE 1, Sugarcane). 
“Good yields, cooperation, farmer to follow advice” (Respondent MPE 1, Sugarcane). 
“Mature cane (18 months and above); distance of farm/field (not more than 30 km); 
security of cane, prompt weeding; application of fertilizers” (Respondent LPE 1, 
Sugarcane). 
A similar approach was applied to assess the responses with respect to the forestry sector and the 
following were the results as per quotations below: 
“Correct material that meets customer expectations…..; right species’ and physical 
properties (form-straightness of the pole/log, material strength, etc)…Correct quantities 
required….Timely delivery” (Plant Manager, Forestry Mill). 
The miller’s response was then contrasted with the grower’s responses as per quotations below: 
“Constant supply, quality woodlots, cheap prices” (Respondent HPE2, Forestry) 
“Profit maximization…. lessons learnt in hard way; the buyer rejected first thinning products 
by approx. 60% , second thinning products by approx. 10%. The reasons for rejection were 
‘not straight’, tiny or small trees. As a result we have improved maintenance of plantation 
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when still young, spot slashing to minimise climbers, timely weeding to reduce stunted 
growth” (Respondent MPE 2, Forestry). 
The results of the forestry sector suggests some inconsistency between miller’s expectations and 
growers expectations as growers mainly seem to have been on a learning curve to understand the 
market expectations. Industry maturity is likely to be one the major factor that could offer 
plausible explanations for the statistical difference contributing to producers in striving more to 
meet the millers’ productivity expectations in the sugarcane sector than the forestry sector. This 
is because sugarcane takes shorter time to maturity i.e., 18-20 months to market thus increasing 
exposure of cane growers to market requirements compared to forestry that requires 8 years as 
maturity period to market.  The next table presents tested results of buyer expectations on 
producer-entrepreneurial traits that complement productivity practices to achieve business 
competitiveness. 
Table 6.6: Two-sample t-test with equal variances buyer expectations on producer-
entrepreneur traits 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.196 0.230 1.558 2.733 3.658 
Sugarcane 32 3.281 0.192 1.085 2.890 3.672 
Combined 78 3.231 0.156 1.376 2.920 3.541 
Diff -0.086 0.319 -0.720 0.549 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -0.2686
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.3945   Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7890 Pr(T > t) = 0.6055 
Perception of the respondents regarding meeting the millers’ expectations of producers’ 
entrepreneurial traits showed that the mean values for those in the forestry and sugarcane sectors 
were not significantly different: Pr (T<t)= 0.3945. This means that the respondents attached 
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similar importance to the entrepreneurial traits as a key success factor to their business value 
chain competitiveness. These results are in conformity with the descriptive findings in Table 6.1 
above. 
This section examined the critical success factors for value chain competitiveness and the 
alignment of producer expectations and market expectations in explaining performance 
differences and similarities between the VC sectors. Findings of the study were as follows: 
There was a general agreement in perceptions amongst the respondents in both sectors, whereby 
respondents held similar views regarding entrepreneurial traits and productivity practices as key 
success factors for their business competitiveness. Cash flow was more crucial for the success of 
the sugarcane sector than the forestry sector. This possibly could be attributed to the sugarcane 
crop as being more sensitive to weeds and susceptible to perishability, thus requiring regular 
cash flow in comparison to the forestry crop. 
Findings of this study revealed a statistical difference for sugarcane producers in striving more to 
meet the millers’ productivity expectations compared to the forestry sector producers. Industry 
maturity was likely to be one of the major factors that could offer plausible explanations for this 
performance difference. This was because sugarcane took a shorter time to maturity i.e., 18-20 
months to market, thus increasing exposure of cane growers to market requirements compared to 
forestry that required 8 years as maturity period to enter the market. The next section examined 
the equitable value chain sharing of proceeds between millers and growers. 
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6.2.2 Sub-theme 2: Equitable value chain sharing (millers - producers) 
Research question 3: How is the equitable value chain sharing of proceeds perceived as a 
challenge for competitiveness amongst VC participants and between VC sectors, thus 
creating winners and losers? 
The results from Table 6.1 above indicate that on the theme of distribution of gains, the cost of 
factor inputs for production were perceived as less of a challenge to value chain 
competitiveness by both sugar (37.5%) and forestry (30.4%). 
Regarding the sharing of revenue (between millers and producers), the results reveal that 
exploitative tendencies are not much of a challenge to value chain competitiveness for either 
sector. However, considering only price as a leading sub-component of exploitative tendencies, 
exploitation turns out to be a major challenge for value chain competitiveness in sugar 
(25/(87.5) compared to forestry (34.8/(50).  Similarly, the perception of respondents on 
equitable sharing generally revealed that there is no equitability in the sharing of value chain 
benefits or gains as indicated by both sectors - sugar (81.2%) and forestry (73.9%). 
In addition, the results also reveal that the value addition component is generally perceived as 
being more of a challenge to value chain competitiveness in sugar (84.4%) than forestry 
(65.2%). This implies that the milling machines were considered inefficient and the value 
addition by-product benefits were appropriated by the millers. 
A two-sample t-test with equal variances was run to establish whether there were differences or 
similarities between the two VC sectors. The results are shown in tables 6.7 to 6.8 below: 
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Table 6.7: Two-sample t-test with equal variances factor inputs 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 2.913 0.167 1.132 2.577 3.249 
Sugarcane 32 3.031 0.208 1.177 2.607 3.456 
Combined 78 2.962 0.130 1.145 2.703 3.220 
Diff -0.118 0.265 -0.646 0.409 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -0.4463
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.3283 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6567 Pr(T > t) = 0.6717 
A comparison of the mean value for the factor production inputs showed that there was no 
difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry - sugarcane): Pr (T < t) = 04438. This means that 
in the sugarcane and forestry sectors, the factor production input costs were considered similar.  
The next table presents tested results on exploitative practices that could impact on grower’s 
revenue for business competitiveness. 
Table 6.8: Two-sample t-test with equal variances exploitative practices 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 2.870 0.191 1.293 2.486 3.253 
Sugarcane 32 2.906 0.145 0.818 2.612 3.201 
Combined 78 2.885 0.126 1.116 2.633 3.136 
Diff -0.037 0.259 -0.552 0.478 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -0.1418 
Ho: diff = 0  degrees of freedom =       76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4438 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8876 Pr(T > t) = 0.5562 
Views on comparison of the mean value for the exploitative practices showed that there was no 
difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T < t) = 0.443858. A similar 
finding was obtained with regards to equitable sharing of revenue between millers and growers 
the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane), Pr (T < t) = 0.8218, as per tested results in 
Table 6.9. 
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Table 6.9: Two-sample t-test with equal variances equitable sharing 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 2.652 0.197 1.337 2.255 3.049 
Sugarcane 32 2.375 0.219 1.238 1.929 2.821 
Combined 78 2.538 0.147 1.296 2.246 2.831 
Diff 0.277 0.299 -0.318 0.872 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =   0.9281 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8218 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3563 Pr(T > t) = 0.1782 
However, taking price formulae (a sub-item for exploitative practices) as a leading indicator, 
there was a very strong significance difference in the mean rating: Pr (T < t) = 0.0001 (see Table 
6.10 below). This means that in the sugarcane sector, producers felt that there was a high level of 
exploitation by the millers compared to the forestry sector as seen in Table 6.10 below. 
Table 6.10: Two-sample t-test with equal variances (price formulae) 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.043 0.271 1.837 2.498 3.589 
Sugarcane 32 4.406 0.173 0.979 4.053 4.759 
Combined 78 3.603 0.190 1.678 3.224 3.981 
Diff -1.363 0.356 -2.072 -0.654
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0001 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0003 Pr(T > t) = 0.9999 
 Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0001 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0003 Pr(T > t) = 0.9999 
Evidence of inequitable sharing of revenue between millers and growers in the sugarcane sector 
complementing the quantitative data findings in Table 6.10 above was revealed in the quotation 
below: 
“The worst paid cane farmer in Africa is in Uganda. Farmers are supposed to get 50 % 
of sugar crystal price. If you put together inputs for sugar production, farmers put in 55-
60 %. Currently, farmers earn as follows: Kenya – 52 %, Mauritius – 62 %t, Tanzania – 
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52 to 55 %, while Uganda is 35 % and recently after a struggle increased to 37 %. 
Hardly, no cane farmer in Uganda is getting 40 %. Kakira tried to raise 40 % but he gets 
it back by deducting 5 % on trash. The price formula is international, for instance, 
farmers in Australia get approximately 67 %” (Member Association Executive and 
Opinion Leader – Sugarcane Sector). 
The quotation from the growers association members perceive inequality in revenue sharing was 
due to low percentage share in Uganda’s sugar price formulae in comparison to other countries. 
However, documented evidence from miller’s representatives suggests that the inequality in 
revenue sharing is due to dependency suggesting a captive value chain governance structure and 
also the use of contractors, as per quotations below: 
“Dependency syndrome ‘everything must be done by the company’, this causes losses for 
those not serious. i.e. all the activities are charged an interest because it is a loan. But if 
farmers were doing themselves instead of contractors, all this profit would go to their 
pockets” (Out-grower Manager, Sugar Mill). 
“All our farmers depend on the miller loans…; they are not on stand-alone.  Farmers are 
not aware that miller gets loans from commercial banks at an interest, which they have to 
pay back. Despite taking loans, they hardly treat cane growing as a business so that they 
become self-reliant. Farmers do not know business economics. Contractors contracted by 
the miller to serve farmers consume part of the farmer’s revenue” (Agricultural 
Engineering Manager – Sugar Mill). 
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Qualitative data findings suggest that in the sugarcane sector, farmers are heavily dependent 
upon the millers, suggesting quasi-hierarchies or captive value chain governance structures.  On 
the other hand, in the forestry sector farmers are independent of the millers, thus suggesting an 
arm’s length market relationship governance structure, as per quotation below:   
“We have approx. 2000 registered out-growers; they are supplied with subsidized 
seedlings. The programme is more of a corporate social responsibility; The growers are 
not mandated to sell their harvest to our company but they have an open market to supply 
our company” (Plant Manager, Forestry Mill). 
Therefore, study can also argue that the type of value chain governance structure partly explains 
the inequitable value chain sharing of revenue between millers and growers in the sugarcane 
sector compared to the forestry sector. Further, the millers employment of contractors by miller’s 
to work on the out-growers’ fields does not only reduce the profit margins earned by the 
growers, but also results in low diffusion of knowledge and skills directly to sugarcane growers, 
thus contributing to low production capabilities. On the contrary, in the forestry sector, the 
independence of the growers enabled them to directly manage the development of their 
plantations, resulting into higher knowledge and skills acquisition for building production 
capabilities.  Table 6.11 presents tested results on value addition plant inefficiency and 
appropriation of byproducts in the value chain. 
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Table 6.11: Two-sample t-test with equal variances value addition 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 2.717 0.221 1.501 2.272 3.163 
Sugarcane 32 2.813 0.158 0.896 2.490 3.135 
Combined 78 2.756 0.145 1.281 2.468 3.045 
Diff -0.095 0.297 -0.686 0.496 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -0.3206
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.3747 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7494 Pr(T > t) = 0.6253 
A comparison of the mean value for value addition showed that there was no difference in the 
mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane), Pr (T < t) = 0.3747. This means that in both the 
sugarcane and forestry sectors, the producers held similar views that the millers’ processing 
machinery were perceived as being inefficient and that the millers benefited from the value 
addition by-products at the expense of producers.  This section examined VC sector performance 
differences and similarities associated with perceptions on equitable value sharing of benefits 
between milers and growers. The findings of the study are as follows: 
Inequitable revenue sharing of benefits was prevalent more in the sugarcane sector compared to 
the forestry sector. The primary producers perceived inequitable sharing of revenue between 
millers and growers as due to low percentage share in the price formula in Uganda compared to 
other sugarcane producing countries. The type of value chain governance structure also partly 
explained the inequitable value chain sharing of revenue between millers and growers in the 
sugarcane sector compared to the forestry sector. The employment of contractors by miller’s to 
work on the out-growers’ fields did not only reduce the profit margins earned by the growers, but 
also contributed to the low diffusion of knowledge and skills directly to sugarcane growers, 
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which resulted into low production capabilities, investigated under sub-theme 5, in the last 
section in this study. On the contrary, in the forestry sector, the independence of the growers 
suggests that it enabled them to have leverage negotiation market powers for better price offers.  
6.2.3 Sub-theme 3: Entrepreneurial alertness and regulatory regime 
Research question 4: How does entrepreneurial alertness explain enterprise and VC 
sector performance differences with possibilities for shaping and re-shaping the 
governance structures? 
Research question 5: How does institutional quality explain the emergence of productive, 
unproductive and/or predatory behaviours reflected in the competitiveness success or 
failure of enterprises and VC sectors?  
The findings from Table 6.1 indicate that grant incentives have been slightly more of a pull-
factor for investment in the forestry sector (39.1%) than for the sugarcane sector (12.5%). On the 
other hand, the regarding ease of doing business was found to be a major pull-factor for 
investment in the sugarcane sector (81.3%) as opposed to the forestry sector (19.6%). With 
regards to factor production endowments as a pull-factor, no major differences were identified in 
either sector, with forestry at 56.5% and sugarcane at 53.1%. A two-sample t-test with equal 
variances was run to establish whether there are differences or similarities between the two VC 
sectors. The results are shown in Tables 6.12 and 6.13. 
179 
Table 6.12: Two-sample t-test with equal variances grant incentives 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.217 0.161 1.094 2.893 3.542 
Sugarcane 32 1.875 0.205 1.157 1.458 2.292 
Combined 78 2.667 0.147 1.296 2.374 2.959 
Diff 1.342 0.258 0.829 1.856 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =   5.2070 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom =       76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
A comparison of the mean value for grant incentives shows that there is a major statistical 
significant difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T > t) = 0.0000. 
This implies that incentives in the form of production cost share grants account for higher 
entrepreneurial activity and a greater level of commercial investments in the forestry sector. This 
finding was confirmed by the qualitative data quotation cited below: 
“Without access to grants. growers would never have managed. The access to grants 
has also attracted competition from countries like Kenya, who are investing in Uganda 
because of SPGS model. Therefore, we are looking at ways in great lakes region so that 
the model can be replicated to their own countries” (Program Manager SPGS 
Forestry).  
The SPGS grant incentives in form of cost share production grants access was found to not 
only having been a pull-factor for local entrepreneurs but also attracted entrepreneurs from 
neighboring countries. The SPGS success model for attracting investments was found to have 
been designed on a reimbursement system based on meeting performance targets by 
participating investors.  This finding suggested that having in  place institutionalized rules for 
grant incentives access explained successful programs such as SPGS and failed programs such 
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as; National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), Farm Income Enhancement, Self-
startup venture capital ‘Entandikwa’ in Uganda. The qualitative statements confirmed this 
finding as per quotations below: 
“NAADS should have adopted the SPGS model. This issue of scattering resources is 
political and does not look at viability. You do not force an industry to develop where 
there is no comparative advantage. The retrospective payment system is good 
compared to earlier schemes such as ‘entandikwa’ i.e. start-up venture capital, that 
failed. Therefore, SPGS it is a good model for developing countries” (Program 
Manager SPGS Forestry). 
“SPGS programme initially well managed with clear objectives and goals linked to 
private sector investment such as contract signing, inspection of the crop, certification 
of seed nurseries and contractors accompanied with a very strong clear 
implementation. When you qualify the funds are disbursed directly to the producer and 
when this happens becomes an incentive to plant next season… success because of 
donor support and public land through NFA as incentives” (Association General 
Manager – UTGA/Forestry). 
“If you compare NFA plantations with SPGS supported plantations, you see the 
difference. You can also compare Farm Income Enhancement and Forestry Conservation 
with SPGS supported plantations, then you can see a contrast in these woodlots. The 
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example is Kayole estates in Rukungiri District that received support from both 
projects… (Program Manager – SPGS/Forestry). 
The above quotations were confirmed by a grower as documented in the quotation below: 
“With SPGS most of the grantees are not small people. A requirement of planting 75 
acres, this is significant meaning they are not dealing with small people. The grant is 
conditioned that the investor must invest first (perform to expected standards) before 
being paid. No politics involved (politically neutral). i.e. the other programs are political 
and people receive money as thank you. Technical support from programme every season 
they check/inspect, they produce a report before releasing the second installment. i.e. the 
installments are phased in 3 phases. Therefore, SPGS is a good model for developing 
countries like Uganda” (Respondent HPE 1 Forestry). 
The next table presents tested results on ease of doing business. 
Table 6.13: Two-sample t-test with equal variances on ease of doing business
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 2.435 0.157 1.068 2.118 2.752 
Sugarcane 32 3.938 0.142 0.801 3.649 4.226 
Combined 78 3.051 0.138 1.216 2.777 3.325 
Diff -1.503 0.223 -1.946 -1.059
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -6.7455
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
A comparison of the mean value for ease of doing business shows that there is a significant 
difference in the mean ratings by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T < t) = 0.0000. This implies 
that incentives in the form of guaranteed markets, affordable investment land, access to loans in 
the form of inputs and good infrastructure, account for the greater entrepreneurial activities and 
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the higher level of commercial investments in the sugarcane sector. A finding that is supported 
by qualitative data as per quotation below: 
“Assured market, land availability, miller supplements through improving road 
network, contracted price to growers being determined at start of season… favourable 
climate as crops depend on natural fed rain negating irrigation (Agricultural 
Engineering Manager – Sugar Mill). 
Both the quantitative and qualitative findings in the quotations above regarding ease of doing as 
a pull-factor for business growth in the sugarcane sector compared to the forestry sector were 
validated with observed field findings documented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 below. 
Figure 6.1: Fairly good and wide road network in Uganda’s sugarcane sector 
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Figure 6.1 demonstrates the quality of the infrastructure of Uganda’s road network, which 
facilitates doing business in the sugarcane sector. The sugarcane sector’s road network is wider 
and better than the forestry road network, which is narrow and overgrown (see Figure 6.2).  
Figure 6.2: Poor and narrow road in Uganda’s forestry sector 
The next table presents tested results on factor production endowments. 
Table 6.14: Two-sample t-test with equal variances factor production endowment
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.609 0.200 1.358 3.205 4.012 
Sugarcane 32 3.719 0.163 0.924 3.386 4.052 
Combined 78 3.654 0.135 1.193 3.385 3.923 
Diff -0.110 0.276 -0.660 0.440 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -0.3984 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom =       76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.3457 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6914 Pr(T > t) = 0.6543 
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A comparison of the mean value for factor production endowments shows that there was no 
significant difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T < t) = 0.3457. 
This means Uganda’s favorable climate attracts investments in agriculture and agri-business. 
This finding was validated by a CEO who runs a multi-national corporation and has worked in a 
number of countries as per quotation below: 
“Business growth in Uganda has enormous potential as turn-around is shorter than 
neighboring regional countries. For instance, in Uganda we start harvesting by 7.5 
years and 15 years for eucalyptus poles and pine respectively visa vi 10-12 years and 
20 years for eucalyptus and pine respectively in South Africa” (CEO New Forestry Co. 
Ltd).  
With respect to the identification of investment constraints and opportunities that may shape 
and re-shape the value chains (see Table 6.1) above, pursuing a generational strategy was 
similarly identified as being crucial in both the forestry (54.4%) and the sugarcane (59.4%) 
sectors. On the other hand, pursuing functional value chain upgrading was identified as a major 
constraint in both sectors - forestry (80.4%) and sugarcane (84.4%). However, process value 
chain upgrading presented itself more as an opportunity in the sugarcane sector (71.9%) than 
the forestry sector (54.4%). Finally, while the formalization strategy is on average perceived as 
an opportunity in the forestry sector (56.5%), the sugarcane industry perceived it to be a major 
constraint (93.7%). 
A two-sample t-test with equal variances was run to establish whether there were differences or 
similarities between the two VC sectors. The results are shown in tables 6.15 and 6.16: 
185 
Table 6.15: Two-sample t-test with equal variances generational strategy 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.435 0.196 1.328 3.041 3.829 
Sugarcane 32 3.719 0.202 1.143 3.307 4.131 
Combined 78 3.551 0.142 1.255 3.268 3.834 
Diff -0.284 0.289 -0.860 0.292 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -0.9827
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1644 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3289 Pr(T > t) = 0.8356 
A comparison of the mean value for the generational strategy revealed that there was no 
significant difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T < t) = 0.1644. 
This meant that respondents held similar views on pursuing a generational strategy, such as 
succession planning, as an investment opportunity in both sectors. The next table presents 
tested results on functional VC upgrading, i.e., investing in value addition activities. 
Table 6.16: Two-sample t-test with equal variances functional VC upgrading 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 2.370 0.200 1.356 1.967 2.772 
Sugarcane 32 2.375 0.223 1.264 1.919 2.831 
Combined 78 2.372 0.148 1.310 2.076 2.667 
Diff -0.005 0.304 -0.610 0.599 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -0.0179
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4929 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9858 Pr(T > t) = 0.5071 
A comparison of the mean value for functional value chain upgrading shows that there was no 
significant difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T < t) = 0.4929. 
This means that the respondents held similar views on functional value chain upgrading as an 
investment constraint in both sectors. This finding was validated by qualitative data as per the 
quotation below: 
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“Processing may not be a priority now as majority of the growers are still embroiled in 
planting and when it comes to marketing majority plans to sell standing stock i.e. they 
cannot afford investing in milling plants” (Program Manager SPGS Forestry). 
“Development partners going to help in capacity building for harvesting, processing & 
utilization” (Association General Manager UTGA/Forestry) 
Although the primary producers view functional VC upgrading as a challenge possibly due to 
the initial investment capital requirements, millers and development partners had plans in place 
to expand processing capacities and entering new markets.  The expansion plans presents 
opportunities for absorbing raw materials produced by the primary producers. The quotations 
below augment this finding; 
“Business growth has much potential in Uganda, look at challenges of the country… 
you realize a need for power in the country. i.e. what percentage of Uganda is 
electrified? People use charcoal because no power availability… for instance our pole 
treatment plant is only 65km from the capital city, but power is not widely distributed 
beyond our establishment. This gives an indicator of a potential market not only in 
Uganda but East Africa.  Rain pattern in Uganda is good for forestry business with a 
quick turn-round compared to other countries, by 8 yrs transmission poles are ready. 
At this time 9-10m are majority while 12m may be between 15-20 percent per hectare. 
If plantation left for 11-12 years then the 12m become the majority thus enabling 
growers to increase their income”( Plant Manager – Forestry Mill). 
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“Expansion in out-grower farms… increasing sugar exports though currently at small 
scale, increasing plant crushing capacity to 4,500 tons per day…, exporting power to 
national grid” (Agricultural Engineering Manager – Sugar Mill). 
The next table presents process VC upgrading, i.e., investing in farm machinery. 
Table 6.17: Two-sample t-test with equal variances process VC upgrading 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.478 0.158 1.070 3.161 3.796 
Sugarcane 32 3.938 0.168 0.948 3.596 4.279 
Combined 78 3.667 0.118 1.040 3.432 3.901 
Diff -0.459 0.235 -0.928 0.009 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -1.9524
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0   Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0273 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0546 Pr(T > t) = 0.9727 
A comparison of the mean value for process value chain upgrading shows that there is a 
moderate difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T < t) = 0.0273. 
This means that the respondents in the sugarcane sector view process value chain upgrading 
(e.g. acquiring machinery and increasing production capacity) as an investment opportunity, 
unlike the forestry sector respondents who viewed it as an investment constraint.  This finding 
further validates the quotation above by the Agricultural Engineering Manager citing 
expansion plans on out-grower’s farms. 
The next table presented tested results of the formalization strategy that could enable business 
transit from operating in an informal to a formal economy, as they pursue business growth 
strategies. 
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Table 6.18: Two-sample t-test with equal variances business formalization strategy 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.196 0.191 1.293 2.812 3.580 
Sugarcane 32 1.938 0.174 0.982 1.584 2.291 
Combined 78 2.679 0.150 1.324 2.381 2.978 
Diff 1.258 0.271 0.719 1.797 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =   4.6475 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
A comparison of the mean value for the formalization strategy shows that there was a significant 
difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T >t) = 0.0000. This means 
that the respondents in the forestry sector perceived transforming their businesses from the 
informal to the formal economy to be an investment opportunity, contrary to the sugarcane sector 
where it was viewed as a major investment constraint. Results of figure 5.6 Bar chart showing 
firm ownership of the respondents supports this finding whereby majority firms in forestry sector 
operated as corporates and partnerships compared to sugarcane sector which had sole-
proprietorship as majority firms.  
The last item under investigation was regulatory regime in determining the emergence of 
productive, unproductive and/or at times predatory entrepreneurship. The findings from Table 
6.1 indicate that entry regulations and/or anti-entry regulations into the Uganda sugar and 
forestry sectors (tariff barriers, open access and property rights ownership) were considered to 
be almost equally important in both sectors, with sugarcane at 78.1% and forestry at 69.6%. 
This implies that high taxes on imports provide job protection for both industries. On the other 
hand, open access or competitive policies were favoured by respondents against restrictive 
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policies such as only one miller per 25-kilometer radius production cluster. Further, the issue 
of property rights is crucial as a measure for protecting ownership of investments.  
With respect to governance institutions (see Table 6.1), the respondents generally agreed that 
sound institutions (industry regulatory agencies) are vital for promoting a vibrant sector, with 
sugarcane sector at 84.4% and forestry sector at 78.3%. This implies that regulatory agencies 
are expected to set standards and enforce rules that promote the business interests of all value 
chain sector players.  
A two-sample t-test with equal variances was run to establish whether there are differences or 
similarities between the two VC sectors regarding the variables discussed above. The results are 
shown in Tables 6.19 and 6.20: 
Table 6.19: Two-sample t-test with equal variances entry regulation 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.935 0.174 1.181 3.584 4.286 
Sugarcane 32 4.094 0.158 0.893 3.772 4.416 
Combined 78 4.000 0.121 1.069 3.759 4.241 
Diff -0.159 0.247 -0.651 0.333 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -0.6435 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.2609 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5218 Pr(T > t) = 0.7391 
A comparison of the mean value for entry regulation shows that there was no significant 
difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T < t) = 0.2609. This means 
that the respondents for both sectors held similar views on the need for having high tariffs on 
imports, open access and clear ownership of property rights. The next table presents tested 
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results of the governance institutions for enforcing regulatory rules such as entry, tariffs and 
property rights. 
Table 6.20: Two-sample t-test with equal variances governance institutions 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 4.283 0.127 0.861 4.027 4.538 
Sugarcane 32 4.156 0.163 0.920 3.825 4.488 
Combined 78 4.231 0.100 0.882 4.032 4.430 
Diff 0.126 0.204 -0.279 0.532 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =   0.6201 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.7315 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5370 Pr(T > t) = 0.2685
The respondents in both the sugar cane and forestry sectors held similar views on the need to 
have sound industry agencies to regulate the behaviour of all players in both sectors. This is 
evident in the outcome of the comparison of the mean value for the establishment of 
governance institutions, as the mean rating of Pr (T > t) = 0.2685 shows that there was no 
significant difference. This finding was augmented by qualitative data findings as per 
quotations below: 
“a need for sound sugar policy to come on board, this will be a good venture… 
COMESA policy on sugar importation is a source of competitive advantage to the local 
sugar industry because of the high tariffs on imported sugar, otherwise, if it was 
liberalised, Uganda would not be competitive due to high production costs compared to 
the neighbouring producing countries. BUT the Federation is trying to push for 
relaxation on importing sugar, implying that local industry should strategise to lower 
the production costs” (Agricultural Engineering Manager – Sugar Mill). 
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“Lack of policy and standards is hindering commercial forestry industry development and 
competitiveness” (Association General Manager UTGA/Forestry) 
“Currently, sugar policy is in place but as farmers we are petitioning for a sugar 
board, the roles of the board are: 
1) Research; today millers are doing own research. For instance, in cotton
research you mind four stakeholders:
 Farmer – yields
 Miller – fibre content
 Textile – strength of thread
 Oil miller – recovery per kg
The sugar seed cane available is favourable to the miller with high sugar content but 
giving less tonnage per hectare,i.e. farmer wants cane with high moisture to give 
weight. Farmer wants long cane because every ratoon gives less output. Further, all 
stakeholders must have a say before a variety of seed is produced. This should apply to 
pests, diseases and climate resistance. 2) Security of miller and farmer. i.e. farmer 
wants good price, miller wants profit and marketing (retail and wholesale) also needs a 
profit. Therefore, price of sugar crystal must remain comfortable to the miller. In same 
way cost of producing a kg of sugar crystal from farm to miller, should be low. i.e. cost 
of sugar production is low in Brazil and Mauritius.3) The board will regulate sugar 
importation because Uganda will not be competitive. 
4) Undertake control export of excess sugar
5) Undertake quality control, i.e. excess white sugar means all molasses
‘needed by body’ has been removed
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6) Registration of sugar mills in the country
7) Coordinate with research bodies regarding importation of varieties and
breeding
8) Undertake annual inspections” (Association Executive Member and
Opinion Leader – Sugar).
This section investigated VC sector performance differences and similarities associated with 
both entrepreneurial alertness such as pull-factors/motivations for business start-up and growth 
and identification of investment opportunities and constraints that may explain the possibilities 
for shaping and re-shaping of the value chains. Findings under entrepreneurial alertness and 
regulatory environment regimes revealed as follows: 
Pull-factors and/or motivations for business entrepreneurial start-ups and growth; Grant 
incentives in form of cost share production grants were found to be the major pull-factors for 
business start-ups and growth in the forestry sector. The availability of a well designed grant 
incentives model based upon meeting performance targets was found to not only having attracted 
local investments but also investments from neighboring countries.  This finding suggested that 
developing countries could develop agriculture and agri-business value chains through well 
designed cost share production grants based upon a reimbursement system. 
 While grant incentives explained entrepreneurial activity in the forestry sector, ease of doing 
business such guaranteed price and market was the major pull-factor explaining business start-
ups and growth in the sugarcane sector.  
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In both sectors, that is sugarcane and forestry value chains respondents perceived factor 
production endowments similar in attracting entrepreneurial activities. This meant that factor 
production endowments in geographical areas or clusters such as availability of favourable 
climate such as rainfall, and a free flow of market information based on ‘hearsay’ that there are 
high returns on investment, were found to be the key drivers for entrepreneurial activities in both 
the sugarcane and forestry sectors. 
With respect to investment opportunities and constraints that may shape and re-shape value chain 
governance structures;  Functional VC upgrading such as investing in value adding activities was 
identified as a major constraint by respondents in both sugarcane and forestry value chain 
sectors, possibly due to high investment costs involved. Miller’s in the sugarcane value chain had 
investment plans of by-products upgrading such as utilizing sugarcane bagasse for power 
production. The quest for power in the country for industrialization presented an investment 
opportunity as it may shift the VC from sugar mills (sugar as core business) to power generation 
plants (power from baggase as core business) resulting into chain up-grading. 
Although the growers in the forestry sector also considered functional VC upgrading as a 
constraint, the development partners had plans for rolling out SPGS III phase that could avail 
cost share production grants for functional VC upgrading either through individual access or 
through joint action ownership of the facilities. Process VC upgrading such as investment in 
farm machinery was identified as an opportunity by sugarcane sector respondents and as a 
constraint by forestry sector respondents. The difference in this finding could be attributed to 
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turn-around investment time with sugarcane enjoying a short-time of 18-12 months while 
forestry requiring at least 8 years. 
Process VC upgrading strategy by sugarcane growers offered an opportunity for the growers to 
re-shape the value chains from captive to possibly modular or relational value chains. The 
strategy of modular or relational value chains offers sugarcane growers a possibility of being 
more independent of the millers and thus increasing their negotiation powers to address the 
income inequality identified in sub-theme 2 above results. Generational strategy such as business 
succession was identified as important for business competitiveness by respondents in both 
sugarcane and forestry value chain sectors. Lastly, business formalization strategy was identified 
as an investment opportunity by the forestry respondents and as an investment constraint by the 
sugarcane sector respondents. This finding suggested that formalization strategy was important 
in the forestry sector possibly for access to institutions for support of long-term forestry 
activities.  
With respect to institutional quality and/or regulatory regime; findings indicated that respondents 
preferred a sound regulatory environment that promotes property rights ownership and 
establishment of regulatory boards to regulate the behaviors of value chain actors. The next 
section presents comparative findings on the sub-theme of compliance with standards for market 
access. 
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6.2.4 Sub-theme 4: Compliance with standards for market access 
Research question 6: How do perceptions of compliance with standards for market access 
explain the performance differences amongst high, medium and low producers and 
between VC sectors? 
Table 6.1 shows the results of compliance with standards for market access. Compliance with 
production standards was scored higher in the forestry sector (67.4%) than the sugarcane sector 
(34.4%). The respondents also compared pricing per grading system averages in the forestry 
sector (52.2%) to the sugarcane sector (12.5%), where it was considered a major challenge. 
Regarding compliance with certification initiatives, there were not many observed differences 
between the scores of the respondents, as both sectors received a below average score with 
forestry at 37% and sugarcane at 12.5%. A two-sample t-test with equal variances was run to 
establish whether there were differences or similarities between the two VC sectors. The 
results are shown in tables 6.21 to 6.23.  
Table 6.21: Two-sample t-test with equal variances certification initiatives 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 2.891 0.209 1.418 2.470 3.312 
Sugarcane 32 2.500 0.215 1.218 2.061 2.939 
Combined 78 2.731 0.152 1.345 2.427 3.034 
Diff 0.391 0.308 -0.223 1.006 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =   1.2686 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8958 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2084 Pr(T > t) = 0.1042 
A comparison of the mean value for the certification initiatives shows that there is little 
suggestive difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T > t) = 0.1042. 
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This means that respondents generally hold similar views regarding compliance with 
certification initiatives; traceability, post-harvest and haulage waste were considered to be 
challenges in both sectors. The next table presents tested results on production standards. 
Table 6.22: Two-sample t-test with equal variances production standards 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.739 0.223 1.512 3.290 4.188 
Sugarcane 32 2.969 0.244 1.379 2.471 3.466 
Combined 78 3.423 0.170 1.499 3.085 3.761 
Diff 0.770 0.336 0.101 1.439 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =   2.2934 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9877 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0246 Pr(T > t) = 0.0123 
A comparison of the mean value for production standards shows that there is a significant 
difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T > t) = 0.0123. This means 
that the respondents in the forestry sector had clearly laid down production standards and 
guidelines compared to the sugarcane sector. The next table presents tested results on pricing 
per grading system. 
Table 6.23: Two-sample t-test with equal variances on pricing per grading system 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.435 0.236 1.601 2.959 3.910 
Sugarcane 32 2.531 0.224 1.270 2.074 2.989 
Combined 78 3.064 0.173 1.532 2.719 3.409 
Diff 0.904 0.339 0.227 1.580 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =   2.6617 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9953 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0095 Pr(T > t) = 0.0047 
A comparison of the mean value on pricing per grading system shows that there is a significant 
difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T >t) = 0.0047. This means 
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that the pricing per grading system was being practiced in the forestry sector compared to 
sugarcane sector.  The study sought qualitative evidence with respect to access to production 
standards, pricing per grading system and certification initiatives, as per the responses. The 
results show that in the forestry sector standards were clearly documented and availed to 
primary producers, unlike in the sugarcane sector where standards were not properly 
documented but were communicated through seminars, as evidenced in quotations :   
“SPGS avails standards…, previously they were more of words ‘word of mouth’, now 
they are documented. When I came, we were working as policing (i.e. write contract, 
wait time of expected planting, inspect area planted, then qualify or disqualify), but 
now we are applying a pro-active approach. Under pro-active, farmers know source of 
certified quality seeds, we monitor seed survival, land preparation through targeted 
inspections. We now follow through the chain on performance indicators”. (Program 
Manager – SPGS/Forestry). 
“Seminars is one of the avenues for communicating the specifications” (Out-grower 
Manager Sugar Mill). 
The next question investigated whether payment was based on grading system and the kind of 
incentives available to stimulate better performance in the industry. Findings of the study 
revealed that in the forestry sector payment was tagged according to the sizes of poles/logs, 
suggesting that there was some form of elementary grading, unlike the sugarcane sector where 
the payment system was based only on weight, suggesting that there was no grading system. 
Further, in the forestry industry the incentivised payment system was based on poles size 
(diameter and length) which contributes ‘to high mill recovery’ and/or surpassing order 
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deliveries. This was found to be a motivater for good performance, unlike in the sugarcane 
industry where there was no incentivised payment system. The quotations below augmented 
the above findings: 
“In Uganda, prices are always different because negotiations are different. In outside 
countries, price is per cubic metre and it is set by the industry. ….at our plant, each 
product has its standard which is documented. We have a uniform standard that we use 
to accept or reject the poles.  The poles are then priced according to size. We 
introduced an incentivised system whereby if a supplier delivers within a certain 
agreed period and surpasses the order, a bonus of ugx 5000/= is given for each pole 
delivered. (Plant Manager Forestry Mill). 
Company buys on tonne basis, grading system based on rendement requires manpower, 
this would mean taking field samples before harvesting. Staff also grows cane, this 
would create a conflict of interest regarding grading themselves. Payment on tonnage 
basis is not necessarily a demotivator to good farmers, because we grow cane on rain 
fed agriculture, during the dry season all cane gains renderment. (Out-grower Manager 
Sugar Mill). 
However, the Out-grower’s Manager statement that payment on tonnage basis was not a 
demotivator for good performance was found to be in contradiction with views from growers 
who considered price per grading system as a motivator for better performance as evidenced in 
the quotation below:  
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“the miller is applying uniform/ average rendement whereby the good farmers are not 
reaping good pay from their efforts. In addition, the miller is also loosing by applying 
this uniformity”.  (Respondent, HPE 1 Sugarcane sector) 
Certification initiatives which is synonymous with pricing per grading system, was the next 
issue investigated using proxy variables such as training in order to reduce on waste and 
improve compliance to standards.  Findings of the study revealed that in forestry sector 
training was conducted in order to address gaps in performance, while in the sugarcane sector 
sensitisation coupled with maintenance loans were advanced to growers with threats of Cane 
Production Contract (CPC) termination if there was no improvement. This signified a stick and 
carrot approach in the sugarcane sector, with the stick being the possibility of contract 
termination and the carrot being more sensitisation and financial support in order to foster 
improvement. These findings are validated by the quotations below: 
“Approx. 10 percent rejected at delivery mainly due to form ‘straightness of the pole’. 
Before a supplier is pre-qualified, an induction course is conducted and refresher 
courses are also done and the identified weaknesses are addressed” (Plant Manager 
Forestry Mill). 
“Less than 5 % is rejected due to not properly maintained to required standards, 
abandoned fields and/or immature cane burnt fields. …we undertake sensitisation 
programs through village meetings, radio etc. Advance weeding loans and termination of 
Cane Production Contract (CPC) is done sometimes” (Out-grower Manager Sugar Mill)” 
200 
The qualitative findings above were found to be generally in agreement with the quantitative 
findings. The observatory field findings documented below in figures 6.3 and 6.4, provided 
support to both qualitative quotations and quantitative data findings.  
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 below revealed pricing based on grading of logs/poles at mills. The prices 
offered differed from miller to miller and depended on the rule of supply and demand on a 
particular day. This finding suggested lack of a uniform standardized price per grading system 
in the forestry industry as observed by the plant manager in the quotation above. Therefore, 
this caused price uncertainty in the forestry sector, unlike the sugarcane sector, which had an 
annual price guarantee.  
Figure 6.3: Grading logs based on size (diameter and length) at a plywood mill 
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Figure 6.4: Pricing of logs based on size (diameter and length) at a plywood mill 
This section examined VC sector performance differences and similarities as a result of 
compliance with standards for market access. The findings of the study were as follows: 
The forestry sector had clearly well documented production standards availed to growers 
through standards manuals which acted as a communication tool to facilitate improved 
productivity and ultimately farm level competitiveness. On the other hand, the sugarcane sector 
had no documented production standards availed to the growers and the mechanisms of 
production were mainly communicated through seminars to growers.  
The forestry sector had pricing per grading system which was found to be a motivator for 
better performance despite being rudimentary in application. On the other hand, the sugarcane 
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sector had no pricing per grading system which was found as a demotivating factor for better 
performance.  
The forestry sector was found to be laying a foundation for certification initiatives as it 
practiced training programs coupled with an incentivized bonus payment system that enhances 
traceability and also improves compliance to standards. This was contrary to the sugarcane 
sector that relied on stick and carrot approach, i.e., threats for contract termination and soft 
loan advances.  
The next section presents findings of vertical and horizontal collaboration for the diffusion of 
knowledge, skills and appropriate technologies through inputs support for building 
suppliers/growers production capabilities. The section also assessed issues of transactional 
coordination costs and opportunistic behaviors among the value chain actors. 
6.2.5 Sub-theme 5: Vertical and horizontal collaboration for the diffusion of supply base 
production capabilities  
Research question 7: How does vertical and horizontal collaboration for the diffusion of 
production capabilities explain performance differences amongst high, medium and low 
producers and between VC sectors? 
Table 6.1 shows the results of vertical and horizontal collaboration for building supply 
production capabilities. The respondents scored all vertical collaboration items below average 
in both sectors. Vertical asset specificity was scored by the forestry sector at 30.4% compared 
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to the sugarcane sector at 40.6%. In addition, vertical opportunism was scored by the forestry 
industry at 34.8% compared to the sugarcane industry at 28.1%, while the least scored was 
vertical transactional costs with forestry respondents at 10.9% compared to sugarcane at 
12.5%.  The results paint a picture on the strength of integration of miller-grower relationships 
for enhanced value chain performance. 
Regarding horizontal collaboration for building supplier base production capabilities, all items 
were scored below average in both sectors, save horizontal opportunism in the forestry sector. 
Horizontal opportunism was scored by the forestry sector at 50% compared to sugarcane at 
40.6%, while horizontal transactional costs were rated by the forestry sector at 32.6% 
compared to sugarcane at 25%. On the other hand, technical and financial support was scored 
by forestry at 32.6% compared to sugarcane at 6.3%, while horizontal asset specificity was 
rated by forestry at 28.3%, compared to sugarcane at 9.4%.  The sub-section below presents 
tested results that revealed differences and similarities in forestry and sugarcane value chain 
sectors. 
Table 6.24: Two-sample t-test with equal variances vertical asset specificity 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 2.130 0.230 1.558 1.668 2.593 
Sugarcane 32 3.281 0.163 0.924 2.948 3.614 
Combined 78 2.603 0.164 1.445 2.277 2.928 
Diff -1.151 0.308 -1.763 -0.538
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -3.7415
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0002 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0004 Pr(T > t) = 0.9998 
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A comparison of the mean value for asset specificity in vertical relationships shows that there 
is a significant difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T <t) = 
0.0002. This means that there was a stronger collaborative relationship between millers and 
producers for inputs support, knowledge and skills transfer in the sugarcane sector compared to 
the forestry sector. However, a nuanced view by qualitative data revealed that transfer of 
knowledge, skills and inputs support was through contractors and not directly to primary 
sugarcane producers as evidenced by the quotations:  
“Planning is one of the biggest problems. The basic thing which a farmer gives is 
land... since farmers get inputs and using contractors for land preparation, harvesting 
and transporting, this creates sluggishness.. i.e. some farmers think cane is for kinyara, 
but now we are telling them to take it as a business so that they can plan, and save. 
Further, many farmers have no records…we hope that if farmers take up operations, 
they will develop capacity and protect their investments” (Out-grower Manager Sugar 
Mill).  
The Out-grower manager’s statement was also validated by a primary sugarcane producer as 
stated in the quotation: 
“Under the previous miller, harvesting, loading and transporting were done by the 
farmers’ company – which was the business arm of the association. When current 
management came on board, this was abolished and they preferred to use contractors. 
With the previous miller knowledge was gained; we used to have courses in Kampala 
which was helpful, however, with the current miller not much has been gained” 
(Respondent HPE 2 Sugar). 
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Therefore, the findings suggest weaker collaborative relationships for building production 
capabilities between millers and growers in the sugarcane sector. Further, the quotation below 
validates the quantitative findings of weak collaborative relationships for building production 
capabilities between millers and growers in the forestry sector. 
“No miller is supporting growers, Nile Ply just buys from growers but without 
supporting them” (Program Manager – SPGS/Forestry). 
The next table presents tested results on vertical transactional costs which also can have an 
impact on millers and growers relationship for achieving business competitiveness along the 
value chains. 
Table 6.25: Two-sample t-test with equal variances vertical transactional costs 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 1.957 0.201 1.366 1.551 2.362 
Sugarcane 32 2.500 0.162 0.916 2.170 2.830 
Combined 78 2.179 0.139 1.225 1.903 2.456 
Diff -0.543 0.277 -1.095 0.008 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -1.9632
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
   Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0266 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0533 Pr(T > t) = 0.9734 
A comparison of the mean value for transactional costs in vertical relationships shows that 
there is a moderate difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T <t) = 
0.0266. This means that transactional costs such as delayed payments from millers to 
producers and information search for production costs were perceived to have been more of a 
challenge in the sugarcane sector than the forestry sector. This finding was supported by 
qualitative data suggesting weaker collaborative relationships between millers and growers in 
the sugarcane sector, as per quotations below: 
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“Enough money and/or cyclic revenue is needed to run the business but KSL has a tendency of 
late payments going between 60-90 days. The delayed payment causes unnecessary interest 
accruals resulting into marginal profits” (Respondent HPE 2, Sugarcane sector).   
“Initially we used to give cash advances to purchase plantations, and provided 
transport. However, the system was abused whereby some suppliers diverted the funds 
into other businesses… currently, we pay them within five working days after delivery 
to enhance their cash flow and introduced suppliers to Eco-bank for loan access.  Right 
now the suppliers are self-sufficient, they can support themselves” (Plant Manager 
Forestry Mill). 
“The main challenge is the continuous reshuffle of ministers; before a minister gets 
acquainted with the industry another one is appointed. Even now the permanent 
secretaries are being transferred. At one time we broke down the costs to Minister 
Mukwaya. The minister requested the miller to give her the breakdown, but the miller 
refused. Recently, another meeting was organised with the Ministry of Trade, Industry 
and Cooperatives (MTIC) involving both out-growers and millers. The out-growers gave 
their cost breakdown of approx. 60 percent but the miller declined to give a cost 
breakdown” (Respondent - Association Executive Member and Opinion Leader (Sugar). 
The quotation above revealed that cost of searching for production costs of the value chain did 
not only impact upon transactional costs but also the reluctance by millers to reveal their 
production costs suggested possibility of opportunistic behaviors. The next table presents 
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tested results on vertical opportunism behaviors that can impact on the quality of relationships 
between millers and growers in building production capabilities. 
Table 6.26: Two-sample t-test with equal variances on vertical opportunism 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 2.652 0.225 1.523 2.200 3.105 
Sugarcane 32 3.125 0.205 1.157 2.708 3.542 
Combined 78 2.846 0.158 1.396 2.531 3.161 
Diff -0.473 0.319 -1.108 0.162 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =  -1.4823
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0712 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1424 Pr(T > t) = 0.9288 
A comparison of the mean opportunism in vertical relationships shows that there is a slight 
difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T <t) = 0.0712. This means 
that there was suggestive evidence of opportunism causing mistrust between millers and 
producers in the sugarcane sector than the forestry sector. This finding was validated by 
qualitative data findings below: 
“Fairly good trust… however there is lack of transparency on the weigh bridge” 
(Association Chairman – Sugarcane sector). 
This above quotation is supported by the miller’s representative quotation below suggesting 
some level of opportunistic behaviors along the sugarcane value chain. 
“Small farmers are mainly the problem because at times they sell the fertilisers, but 
with commercial farmers, this is not quite rampart” (Agricultural Engineering Manager 
– Sugar Mill).
Generally, the finding of suspicious opportunistic behaviors between growers and millers 
validates the existence of weak collaborative relationships for building supplier production 
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capabilities. The next sub-section presents results for building production capabilities along 
horizontal collaborative relationships. Table 6.27 below presents tested results of horizontal 
investment asset specificity. 
Table 6.27: Two-sample t-test with equal variances on horizontal asset specificity 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 2.848 0.161 1.095 2.523 3.173 
Sugarcane 32 2.125 0.184 1.040 1.750 2.500 
Combined 78 2.551 0.127 1.124 2.298 2.805 
Diff 0.723 0.247 0.231 1.215 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =   2.9276 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9977 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0045 Pr(T > t) = 0.0023 
A comparison of the mean value for asset investment specificity in horizontal relationships 
shows that there is a significant difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): 
Pr (T >t) = 0.0023. This means that there was a stronger collaborative relationship among 
producers and/or producer support agencies for inputs support, knowledge and skills transfer in 
the forestry sector than the sugarcane sector.  This finding was validated by qualitative data 
findings below: 
“SPGS support has enabled at least 30 % to improve production planning skills…. The 
change is more than significant. availability of forest valuation guidelines also gives 
growers  basics on what price they cannot go below (reserve price) during negotiations 
in order to realize a return on their investments” (Program Manager – SPGS/Forestry). 
The quotation above suggests that transfer of knowledge, skills and inputs support occurred 
directly to forestry producers from development agencies. This finding suggested strong 
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horizontal collaborative relationships for building production capabilities. This finding was 
also complemented with the evidenced adduced in the following quotation: 
“Growers have acquired technical competency in plantation establishment, maintenance such as 
thinning, pruning, marking and harvesting. Good relationships exist, especially those under 
UTGA. When we call cluster meetings, we see the will to share, cooperate, and avail 
their plantations for study” (Association General Manager – UTGA/Forestry). 
The statement by one of the growers below did not discount the above statements as it rendered 
support to the findings. 
“Yes, knowledge through newsletters, client meetings… You access information on 
prices, even if someone (buyer/miller) comes with a monopoly, but he realises that you 
are able to chip in from an informed position” (Respondent MPE 1 Forestry). 
With respect to sugarcane sector, qualitative data further supported quantitative data that there 
were no gains in building production capabilities from horizontal collaborative linkages as 
evidenced with the quotation below:  
“Percentage wise in knowledge and skills transfer is still low, … the previous 
association (KSGL) incurred liabilities, hence farmers lost the trust but now picking up 
slowly” (Association Chairman – Sugarcane sector). 
The next table presents tested results of transactional costs and their impact on horizontal 
collaborative relationships. 
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Table 6.28: Two-sample t-test with equal variances on horizontal transactional costs 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 2.804 0.210 1.424 2.381 3.227 
Sugarcane 32 2.281 0.243 1.373 1.786 2.776 
Combined 78 2.590 0.161 1.418 2.270 2.910 
Diff 0.523 0.323 -0.120 1.167 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =   1.6191 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9452 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1096 Pr(T > t) = 0.0548
A comparison of the mean value for transactional costs in horizontal relationships shows that 
there is a slight difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T >t) = 
0.0548. This means that there was suggestive evidence of minimum occurrence of transactional 
costs among producers in the forestry sector than the sugarcane sector. This quantitative 
finding was validated by the qualitative data finding below, which suggested occurrence of 
transactional costs as a result of replacing labor force taken by another grower without the 
consent of the labor force owner.   
“I think we trust each other because we have same common ground. I have not seen many 
conflicts in client meetings, except one time a farmer accused his neighbours of stealing 
his workers.” (Respondent HPE 1 Forestry). 
The next table presents tested results of opportunistic behaviors which also causes emergence of 
transactional costs among producer’s relationships. 
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Table 6.29: Two-sample t-test with equal variances on horizontal opportunism 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.370 0.221 1.496 2.925 3.814 
Sugarcane 32 3.000 0.250 1.414 2.490 3.510 
Combined 78 3.218 0.166 1.465 2.888 3.548 
Diff 0.370 0.337 -0.301 1.040 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =   1.0972 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom =       76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8620 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2760 Pr(T > t) = 0.1380 
A comparison of the mean value for opportunism in the horizontal relationships shows that 
there was no significant difference in the mean rating by sector (forestry – sugarcane): Pr (T 
>t) = 0.1380. This meant that manifestations of opportunistic behaviours were not quite
rampart among producers in both the forestry and sugarcane sectors. This finding further 
supports both qualitative and quantitative data results regarding existence of minimum 
transactional costs cited in Table 6.29 above. The next table presents tested results regarding 
access to technical and financial support within horizontal collaborative relationships.  
Table 6.30: Two-sample t-test with equal variances technical and financial support 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Forestry 46 3.152 0.173 1.173 2.804 3.501 
Sugarcane 32 1.813 0.158 0.896 1.490 2.135 
Combined 78 2.603 0.142 1.252 2.320 2.885 
Diff 1.340 0.246 0.850 1.830 
diff = mean(Forestry) - mean(Sugarcane) t =   5.4454 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom =       76 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
A comparison of the mean value for the technical and financial support showed that those in 
the forestry sector rated this item very highly in comparison to those in the sugarcane sector.  
The difference in the means was very high and revealed that the mean rating for forestry was 
higher than the mean rating for sugarcane: pr (T>t) = 0.0000. This difference was highly 
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statistically significant, revealing a very strong collaborative relationship between producers 
and producer support agencies in the forestry sector, as compared to the sugarcane sector. This 
finding supported results for transfer of knowledge, skills and inputs support from 
development agencies to growers in the forestry sector as evidenced by results in Table 6.30 
above. This section examined VC sector performance differences and similarities as a result of 
collaborative vertical and horizontal relationships for building supplier production capabilities. 
The findings were as follows: 
Collaborative vertical relationships; quantitative data findings suggested that there was a 
stronger collaborative relationship between millers and producers for inputs support, 
knowledge and skills transfer in the sugarcane sector compared to the forestry sector. 
However, a nuanced view by qualitative data revealed that transfer of knowledge, skills and 
inputs support was through contractors and not directly to primary sugarcane producers. This 
finding contributed to existence of weaker collaborative relationships in vertical relationships 
for building production capabilities for enhancement of productivity gains along the value 
chain. This finding renders support to the finding of inequitable sharing of revenue between 
millers and growers and low production capabilities in the sugarcane sector compared to 
forestry sector, as a result of type of value chain governance structures, see sub-theme 2 above 
in this study. 
Both qualitative and quantitative findings suggested moderate evidence of transactional costs 
such as delayed payments from millers to producers were more of a challenge in the sugarcane 
sector than the forestry sector. This finding supported existence of weaker collaborative 
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relationships between millers and growers for building production capabilities in the sugarcane 
sector. 
Quantitative data revealed suggestive evidence of opportunistic behaviors causing mistrust 
between millers and producers in the sugarcane sector than the forestry sector. This finding 
was validated by qualitative data that suggested source of mistrust being due to lack of 
transparency of the miller’s weighbridge and possibility of diverting inputs by growers to other 
farm activities rather than sugarcane growing. 
Regarding collaborative horizontal relationships; quantitative data revealed a stronger 
collaborative relationship among producers and/or producer support agencies for inputs 
support, knowledge and skills transfer in the forestry sector than the sugarcane sector.  This 
finding was validated by qualitative data which confirmed that the transfer of knowledge, skills 
and inputs support occurred directly to forestry primary producers, thus resulting into building 
production capabilities. 
Quantitative data also revealed suggestive evidence of minimum occurrence of transactional 
costs among producers in the forestry sector than the sugarcane sector. This quantitative 
finding was validated by the qualitative data finding which suggested occurrence of 
transactional costs as a result of replacing labor force taken by another grower without the 
consent of the labor force owner.   
Further, findings of the study revealed that manifestations of opportunistic behaviours were not 
quite rampart among producers in both the forestry and sugarcane sectors. Finally, results of 
the study revealed a high statistically significant very strong collaborative relationship between 
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producers and producer support agencies in the forestry sector, as compared to the sugarcane 
sector. This finding suggested that the transfer of knowledge, skills and inputs support that 
occurred directly to forestry growers was a result of intervention by development partner 
agencies participation.  
6.3 Summary 
This chapter presented findings of the study with respect to entrepreneurial behavioral 
practices explaining performance differences between sugarcane and forestry VC sectors. The 
main findings of the study indicated the following: inequitable revenue sharing of benefits was 
prevalent more in the sugarcane sector compared to the forestry sector;  grant incentives 
explained entrepreneurial activity in the forestry sector, while ease of doing business such 
guaranteed price and market was the major pull-factor explaining business start-ups and 
growth in the sugarcane sector;  functional VC upgrading such as investing in value adding 
activities was identified as a major constraint by respondents in both sugarcane and forestry 
value chain sectors, possibly due to high investment costs involved; process VC upgrading 
such as investment in farm machinery was identified as an opportunity by sugarcane sector 
respondents and as a constraint by forestry sector respondents; generational strategy such as 
business succession was identified as important for business competitiveness by respondents in 
both sugarcane and forestry value chain sectors; and business formalization strategy was 
identified as an investment opportunity by the forestry respondents and as an investment 
constraint by the sugarcane sector respondents; the forestry sector had a pricing per grading 
system in place and clearly well documented production standards availed to growers through 
standards manuals which acted as a communication tool to facilitate improved productivity and 
ultimately farm level competitiveness. On the other hand, the sugarcane sector had no 
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documented production standards manuals and no price per grading system in place; 
production capabilities existed in vertical collaborative relationship in the sugarcane sector 
through use of contractors while in the forestry sector production capabilities existed among 
the primary producers. The next chapter presents discussion of results. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a discussion of the case study findings presented in chapters five and six 
and also answers research questions 1 to 7. The discussion applies within case analysis and a 
cross-case analysis to search for patterns in the theory, literature and data. The chapter is 
arranged in such a way that the first part of each research question covers performance 
categories that are: High Performing Enterprises (HPEs), Medium Performing Enterprises 
(MPEs) and Low Performing Enterprises (LPEs), while the second part of the research 
question covers a VC sector comparative analysis. In the analysis of the case studies carried 
out, the principal unit of analysis was the entire value chain, which was explored and analysed 
at three levels: Micro (growers enterprises), Meso (industry experts, millers and association 
executives in value chain industry), and Macro (national policies and the regulatory 
environment). At a micro-level analysis this involved primary producers’ firms and/or sole-
proprietors who were grouped into three performance categories - high performers, medium 
performers and low performers. At the meso-level of analysis this involved investigating the 
relationships between primary producers and millers/processors, while at the macro-level of 
analysis this involved examining the impact of the existing investment climate and business 
environment policies upon the competitiveness of commercial sugarcane and forestry value 
chains. 
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7.2 Competitiveness performance  
Competitive performance was the dependent study variable. This study investigated the 
dependent variable using objective assessment. Competitiveness performance was measured 
using farm output (yields) and time to market indicators. The study adopted country specific 
industry reports published by the Uganda Sugar Manufacturers Association (USMA) which 
consider farm output of 100 tons/ha as the baseline productivity measure of cane maturity of 
18-20 months (Uganda National Sugar Policy, 2010; USMA, 2015). The forestry sector
productivity reports were obtained from the saw log production grant scheme, assessing 
performance of growers and providing indicative productivity measures (SPGS, 2014).  
Although this statistical sampling was not the aim of this study, the results from the theoretical 
sampling indicated that 41.3% achieved 90% project performance while 58.7% performed 
below 90% in the forestry sector. In the sugarcane sector, only 21.9% achieved the desired 
industry competitive output of at least 100 tons/ha from 70 percent of their fields, while 82 
percent of the growers were producing below expected industry productivity output. Generally 
both sectors combined, only 33.3% of the respondents achieved the desired competitive 
performance levels, implying that the majority 66.7% was performing below desired industry 
performance levels.  
The next sections offered plausible explanations on how the independent variables, that is; (1) 
management process that examines competitiveness as the process of managing decisions and 
processes in the ‘right way’ (in this study this is described as critical success factors for 
competitiveness); and (2) competitive potential that examines competiveness as comprising 
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the generation and maintenance of competitive advantage, (in this study this comprises of; 
equitable value sharing, entrepreneurial alertness and regulatory environment, compliance with 
standards for market access, and vertical and horizontal collaboration for the diffusion of 
suppliers production capabilities). Subjective measures using perceptions was applied in 
measuring the influence of the independent variables to the dependent variable, that is, 
competitive performance that examines competitiveness as the ability to perform well. 
7.3 Sub-theme 1: Critical success factors (CSFS) for value chain competitiveness 
Research question 1: Why and how do perceptions of the critical success factors for 
competitiveness determine performance differences amongst high, medium and low 
producers and between VC sectors?  
The quantitative results indicated that there was a fit in perceptions regarding critical success 
factors among high, medium and low performing enterprises. Qualitative results, on the other 
hand, offered both corroborating and contrasting views. The HPEs attributed their success to 
internal environmental factors.  The CSFs identified by HPEs were mainly entrepreneurial 
traits, such as personal involvement, being passionate, technical knowledge, timely application 
of agronomical practices, prompt payment of workers, and entrepreneur commitment. These 
are internal factors under an entrepreneur’s control, which can be developed and nurtured as a 
business culture, thus resulting in a firm’s competencies and capabilities for business 
competitiveness. On the other hand, the MPEs and LPEs associated their success with external 
environmental factors. They emphasised CSFs such as rainfall, good climate, timely access to 
inputs and/or payment as source of their competitiveness. These are factors outside an 
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entrepreneur’s control, which cannot be developed and nurtured for business success. This 
finding renders support to the available literature and theory on internality and externality.  
According to Rotter (1966), who conducted experiments on internality-externality in relation to 
reward or reinforcement, participants perceived their rewards to be based either on their own 
behaviours or to external influences. This finding related to the internal-external locus of 
control behavioral theory. The theory suggests that people with an internal locus of control of 
reinforcements believe that personal effort is the primary determinant of outcomes, while those 
with an external locus of control of reinforcements believe that external events are a 
determinant of outcomes. As a result of Rotter’s study, internality gained a lot of interest in 
entrepreneurship research. Venkatapathy (1984) contended that internality is one of the most 
entrepreneurial traits, while recent studies have hardly contrasted this finding, and attest to a 
relationship between internality and business success (Sebora et al., 2009; Ahmad, 2010). 
Building upon this theory, this study deduced that the observed contrast between quantitative 
and qualitative data for MPEs & LPEs suggests that when a quantitative tool with critical 
success factors is given to respondents, they are subconsciously aware of the CSFs that account 
for business competitiveness, and therefore they tend to tick the items positively regardless of 
whether they have an internal or external locus of control of reinforcements. 
Using a two sample t-test at VC sector level comparative analysis, quantitative findings 
revealed no significant difference in entrepreneurial traits between producers of sugarcane and 
forestry sectors, however significant differences were observed in productivity practices 
indicators (Forestry –Sugarcane), Pr(T <t) = 0.0458 and financial practices indicators (Forestry 
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–Sugarcane), Pr(T <t) = 0.0347 respectively. The results suggested that sugarcane producers
compared to forestry producers prioritized critical success factors related to both productivity 
gains and business financing to enhance their competitiveness. 
Research question 2: How are producers’ competitiveness expectations compatible with 
market expectations amongst high, medium and low producers and between VC sectors? 
The quantitative findings suggested that HPEs had a slight competitive edge in meeting market 
expectations with regards to productivity indicators (i.e. quality, supply quantities and 
compliance with millers’ directives) and personal involvement (an entrepreneurial trait), as 
compared to MPEs and LPEs. Further, all respondents agreed that the millers expect low 
priced raw material supplies from the growers. Surprisingly, qualitative findings generally 
corroborated with quantitative findings. In particular, the qualitative findings revealed that the 
HPEs were aware of the critical success factors that meet market/miller expectations. These 
factors are mainly productivity-related to the satisfaction of market requirements; therefore the 
HPEs strived to enhance quality to achieve high recovery at the milling plants.  
In addition, HPEs understood the relationship between good quality and weight as sources of 
better revenue in their businesses, as compared to MPEs and LPEs. This finding was supported 
by the quotation below and validated by both theory and observable field data in figures 7.1, 
7.2 and 7.3 below respectively: 
“The secret for success for better payment is: rendement and weight of the crop is the 
basis of real achievement in sugarcane growing, this is the area where most farmers are 
ignorant. E.g. if you do not apply proper weeding, each stem might weigh 0.5 kg. For my 
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case each stem weighs 1.5-2 kg, because there was no competition with weeds. However, 
the miller is applying uniform/average rendement whereby the good farmers are not 
reaping good pay from their efforts. In addition, the miller is also losing by applying this 
uniformity” (Respondent HPE1 Sugar). 
Using an example of the cane business for illustration purposes, Mengistu (2013) and Yadav 
(1991) asserted that a high population density of 150 000 stalks per ha is possible, however 
Yadav argued that at present, an average of 100 000 stalks per ha is achievable under different 
growing conditions. This implied that HPEs in Uganda with cane stalks weighing 1.5-2.0 Kgs 
each, as found out in the HPEs fields, suggested a productivity of 150 to 200 tons per ha. This 
finding is supported by measured results of Figures 7.1 and 7.2 below that confirmed the 
quotation cited by the HPE sugarcane producer above. 
Figure 7.1 Ugandan cane producer with cane stems weighing 1.5 – 2.0 kg (HPE1) 
Field results from Figure 7.1 above verified by measurements in Figure 7.2 below. 
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Figure 7.2: Five cane stems weighing 12kg on a high producing farmer’s field (harvest 
January 2015) 
Conversely, the MPEs and LPEs with cane stalks weighing 0.5-0.8 kg suggests that they were 
able to achieve productivity of 50 to 80 tons per ha. This finding was supported by results in 
Figure 7.3 below. 
223 
Figure 7.3: Approximately 10 cane stems weighing less than 10kg from a low producing 
farmer’s field (harvest January 2015) 
This finding also augmented the theory of internality-externality, in the sense that the critical 
success factors that account for performance differences between high, medium and low 
performing producers were perceived to be either within or outside entrepreneurs’ control, as 
evidenced in research question 1.   
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Using a two sample t-test at VC sector comparative analysis, the quantitative findings revealed 
no significant difference in buyer expectations of producer-entrepreneurial traits between 
sugarcane and forestry sector producers. Significant differences were observed in productivity 
practices indicators (Forestry –Sugarcane), Pr (T <t) = 0.0492, between sugarcane and forestry 
sector producers. However, this finding is consistent with the findings of research question 1 
above on VC sector comparisons. The performance difference can possibly be attributed to 
cane being a perishable commodity, i.e. it is subject to rapid quality deterioration and thus 
requires close collaboration between producers and millers to meet tight delivery schedules. 
This finding is validated by the Cane Production Contract (CPC)12 that is signed between 
millers and out-growers, which requires cane delivery within 36 hours of a harvest. Similar 
studies exist to support the finding of rapid cane quality perishability after a harvest 
(Eggleston, Legendre & Richard, 2001; Higgins, Antony, Sandell, Davies, Prestwidge & 
Andrew, 2004; Eggleston, Du Boil & Walford, 2008; Sibomana, Bezuidenhout & Lyne, 2011; 
Fair Trade Foundation 2013; Ducasse 2013).  
Therefore, at the level of micro VC enterprise comparative analysis, the question of 
performance differences between high, medium and low performing entrepreneurs is explained 
by perceptions related to internality-externality behavioural theory.  The finding of internality-
externality is unique to this study in the sense that it has generally corroborated the data 
patterns from the quantitative data, as evidenced by the qualitative data and validated by 
observatory field data. Further, a close fit between theory and data makes this finding stronger 
and better grounded in the theory of entrepreneurial behaviour (Gartner, 1989). This ultimately 
12 Kinyara Sugar Ltd – Cane Production Contract (hard copy available by researcher). 
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enables the understanding of entrepreneurs’ behaviour in the discipline of GVCs (Gereffi et al., 
2005), and in designing intervention strategies to enhance competitiveness using the global 
value chain framework. 
Further, the HPEs were also found to be more responsive in meeting market requirements 
compared to both MPEs and LPEs. This finding strengthened the above finding on perceptions 
of internal-external environmental factors as being source of business success and achieving 
desired productivity gains. On the other hand, at the level of meso and macro VC sector 
comparative analysis, productivity practices’ indicators and financial practices’ indicators 
account for the performance differences between sugarcane and forestry value chains. The 
context accounting for the performance difference is due to sugarcane being a perishable 
commodity, thus requiring tight delivery schedules to the sugar mill.  
With respect to entrepreneurial traits, the finding suggests that entrepreneurs in both value 
chains (sugarcane and forestry) displayed similar entrepreneurial behavioral traits for business 
competitiveness.  This section illuminated the critical success factors accounting for 
performance differences between entrepreneurs and VCs. The next section examines whether 
entrepreneurs’ efforts are fairly rewarded in the value chain to enhance competitiveness. 
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7.4.  Sub theme 2: Equitable value chain sharing (miller-producer equitability) 
Research question 3: How is equitable value chain sharing of proceeds perceived as a 
challenge for competitiveness amongst VC participants and between VC sectors; thus 
creating winners and losers? 
The quantitative findings of the study were corroborated by the qualitative findings. These 
findings indicated that all the entrepreneurs (HPEs, MPEs and LPEs) in the value chain 
perceived that there was no equitable sharing of value chain proceeds between the millers and 
producers. This finding is in line with similar agro-value chain studies that show inequitable 
revenue sharing among chain participants, especially the upstream players (Fitter & Kaplinsky, 
2001a; Laven, 2005; Vorley & Fox, 2004; Howard,  Matikinca,  Mitchell,  Brown,  Lewis, 
Mahlangu,  Msimang, Nixon, & Radebe, 2005; Robinson, 2009; Tijaja, 2010; Terheggen, 
2010; Lee, Gereffi & Barrientos, 2011; Barrientos & Visser, 2012; Lee  Gereffi & Beauvais, 
2012). 
At the level of value chain sector comparison, significant differences emerged between 
sugarcane producers and forestry producers. Using a two sample t-test, the quantitative finding 
indicated a high statistical significant difference (Forestry –Sugarcane), Pr (T <t) = 0.0001, 
implying that sugarcane producers perceived high levels of price exploitation in comparison to 
forestry producers.  The qualitative findings corroborated the quantitative findings, suggesting 
that the difference between the VC sectors was attributed to cane producers’ heavy reliance on 
miller’s loan facilities, which attract interest, coupled with a reliance on contractors, which 
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exposes cane producers to exploitation.  This finding suggests that the perceived difference in 
levels of exploitation between the two VC sectors is due to existing governance structures. The 
dependency of cane producers on millers suggests that it is a captive value chain, meaning that 
producers are locked-up in the chain with powers concentrated in the hands of millers (Gereffi 
et al., 2005). This is in contrast with the forestry sector, in which the producers are not 
operating in a captive value chain and therefore exercise some leverage. This was confirmed 
with a comparison of earnings for a fairly competitive eucalyptus pole market between Uganda 
and South Africa. In South Africa growers earn approximately 25% with millers obtaining a 
mark-up profit of 15-20% (DFID, 2005), while in Uganda growers earn approximately 20% 
with millers obtaining a mark-up profit of 20-25%. This was calculated using price field data13 
obtained from UTGA, the association of forestry growers and UEDCL - the main buyer of the 
utility poles.   
On the other hand, the sugarcane sector portrays a dire exploitative situation.  An analysis of 
the revenue sharing formula in Uganda reveals that producers and/or farmers earn 35% and 
millers 65% as per the existing cane production contracts. A comparison with other sugar 
producing countries, with revenue sharing based on both mill sugar and molasses, shows: 
South Africa - 64% farmers: 36% millers (South Africa Sugar Industry Agreement, 2000); 
13 UEDCL buying price of 12M  pole USD 233 VAT inclusive, Millers/UTGA price paid to grower for 
same pole Ugx 145,000/=, 1 USD=3,523.7 Ugx as per Bank of Uganda off-loaded October 28, 2015 
see http://www.bou.or.ug/bou/home.html). Operational costs were assumed similar between Ugandan 
and South African Pole Treatment Plants. 
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Mauritius - 78% farmers: 22% millers (The Mauritius Cane Industry Authority Act 2011); 
Swaziland - 68% farmers: 32% millers (The Sugar Act 1967;); Tanzania - 60% farmers: 40% 
millers; Zambia - 59% farmers: 41% millers; Malawi - 60% farmers: 40% millers (Chisanga et 
al., 2014).  
Therefore, at the level VC enterprise comparative analysis, distribution of gains implication did 
not offer plausible explanations for performance differences between successful firms and 
unsuccessful firms. This finding suggested that fair distribution of gains between millers and 
growers was an external environmental factor beyond entrepreneur’s own control, thus 
reinforcing the results of internality-externality behavioral theory in sub-theme 1 above.  
While at the level of meso and macro level VC sector comparative analysis, the comparison 
reveals that Ugandan sugarcane farmers are one of the most highly exploited in the region and 
possibly worldwide, as the literature shows that most farmers in the world earn in a range of 
60-65% while millers earn 35-40% of the sugar industry proceeds. This high level of
exploitation may explain why vertically integrated millers (backward integration) into the 
farmer part of the value chain can afford to produce their cane hundreds of kilometres away 
from their mills as they can ‘subsidise’ the potential loss of their farms from the huge margins 
they earn as millers. However, for cane farmers in Uganda, who depend entirely on 
outsourcing the milling of their cane, even a short distance from the miller can render their 
businesses unprofitable, as they are currently not on the ‘sweet side’ of the cane payment 
system. 
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Evidence from both data findings and the literature suggests that an equitable distribution of 
benefits among chain participants as evidenced in the forestry value chain sector can be 
determined by either (1) the form of governance structures with their power dynamics 
(explained by the GVC framework); or (2) the industry regulatory mechanisms (explained by 
the new institutional theory) that set the rules of the game. In summary, the GVC framework 
by Gereffi et al. (2005) contends that shifting the governance structures re-aligns power 
relationships amongst value chain participants, resulting in equitable wealth distribution.  
Unfortunately, the GVC framework is unable to offer plausible explanations for industry 
legislative mechanisms as an alternative to addressing inequitable wealth distribution. This 
lacuna found in the GVC framework is well articulated by the new institutional theory (North 
1990; Williamson 1998). The next section explores these two theories in detail by examining 
opportunity alertness or entrepreneurial alertness that can explain the shaping and re-shaping of 
the existing value chain governance structures. The issue of the regulatory regime and market 
institutions for competitiveness is examined in detail. 
7.5.  Sub-theme 3: Entrepreneurial alertness and regulatory regime 
Research question 4: How does entrepreneurial alertness explain enterprise and VC sector 
performance differences and the possibility for the shaping and re-shaping of the 
governance structures? 
The GVC framework (Gereffi et al., 2005) assists in mapping the value chain to identify 
available investment opportunities and incentives. Entrepreneurial alertness enables 
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entrepreneurs to perceive and exploit available investment opportunities (Kirzner, 1979;; 1997; 
Bygrave, 1993; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) in the value chain. When the entrepreneurs 
pursue these opportunities they are able to redress their earning potential and reduce 
exploitation. Opportunities that cannot be pursued by entrepreneurs in the value chain are 
considered to be investment constraints and therefore possible interventions can be proposed.  
The quantitative findings of this study indicated that factor production endowments are the 
driving force or motivation for business start-ups and growth for both HPEs and MPEs in 
comparison with LPEs. Regarding intentions to pursue existing investment opportunities in the 
value chain, the HPEs and MPEs had a slight competitive edge over the LPEs on pursuing 
process value chain upgrading. Further, the HPEs and MPEs had intentions of pursuing a 
generation succession strategy for their businesses. Interestingly, all the respondents (HPEs, 
MPEs and LPEs) considered functional value chain upgrading and business formalisation 
strategies as investment constraints. 
The findings do not reveal a clear comparative performance cutting edge between HPEs, MPEs 
and LPEs with respect to entrepreneurial alertness. This finding sheds light on the GEM Report 
(2014), which ranked Uganda (28.1%) as the top most entrepreneurial country in the world, 
followed by Thailand (16.7%) and Brazil (13.8%). Interestingly, the USA was found to be 
lagging far behind with a score of 4.3%, even though the USA is perceived in everybody’s 
mind as being the most entrepreneurial in the world. The GEM Report also rated Uganda’s 
entrepreneurs as top in the world for perceived opportunities (76.9%), perceived capabilities 
(84.9%) and fear of failure (12.6%). This finding suggests that Uganda’s entrepreneurs are 
alert to finding business opportunities in their environment, and they also believe that they 
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have the skills to exploit available opportunities coupled with low fear of failure. This study 
thus deduced that in the context of Uganda which has a high level of entrepreneurial talent, 
entrepreneurial alertness does not clearly explain the distinction between high performing 
entrepreneurs and low performing entrepreneurs. This confirms what other studies have 
attested, which is that what distinguishes high performing entrepreneurs from low performing 
entrepreneurs is their willingness to be personally accountable or responsible for their own 
work and/or behaviour (Rotter, 1966; Bonnstetter, 2012). 
At the level of value chain sector comparison, significant differences emerged between 
sugarcane producers and forestry producers with respect to entrepreneurial alertness. Using a two 
sample t-test, the quantitative findings indicated a high statistical significant difference (Forestry 
–Sugarcane), Pr(T >t) = 0.0000 for grant incentives, and (Forestry –Sugarcane), Pr(T <t) =
0.0000 regarding ease of doing business. The results suggested that grant incentives are a major 
pull factor for entrepreneurial activities in the forestry sector, while ease of doing business 
factors such as provision of inputs and guaranteed market by the miller/buyer was the major pull 
factor in the sugarcane sector.  The findings from the study suggest that Ugandan entrepreneurs 
are alert to seizing and exploiting opportunities in the environment, i.e. they can be classified as 
opportunity-driven entrepreneurs. This finding was confirmed by annual GEM Reports, which 
rank countries based on their stage of economic development, i.e. factor-driven, efficiency-
driven or innovation-driven. According to the 2014 GEM Report, using measures of necessity-
driven entrepreneurship vs. opportunity-driven entrepreneurship revealed the following results 
with respect to opportunity-driven entrepreneurship measures.  Uganda, which is classified as a 
factor-driven economy, was ranked top (80.8%) in this category, competing favourably with the 
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top efficiency-driven economies of Malaysia (82.5%) and Thailand (80.9%), as well as 
innovation-driven economies such as the USA (81.5%), UK (83.5%), Sweden (84.2%) and 
France (82%).  
The quantitative t-test results also revealed a high statistical significant difference (Forestry –
Sugarcane), Pr(T >t) = 0.0000 for business formalisation strategy and (Forestry –Sugarcane), 
Pr(T <t) = 0.0273 for VC process upgrading. The results suggest that the quest for VC upgrading 
in the sugarcane sector can be attributed to the need to address buyer-producer exploitation, 
which occurs in captive governance structures and/or contracted out-grower schemes (Vorley & 
Fox, 2004; Robinson, 2009) and contractors’ exploitation of out-growers (Hurly, Sibiya, 
Nicholson & King, 2015). Meanwhile in the forestry sector, business formalisation strategies 
could have been appropriate at the time of this research as most of the plantations were 
progressing to maturity.  
This implies that a business formalisation strategy is preferred by the growers to access credit 
from commercial banking institutions to fund maintenance costs. This is confirmed as per the 
results in the figure 5. 6, which indicated that the forestry sector had more formalised businesses 
under the categories of partnerships and corporates than the sugar sector, which had few 
corporate firms. It can thus be deduced that the differences in pursuing varied investment 
strategies can be attributed to the sector stage of development. In this case, the commercial 
sugarcane sector can be considered at growth-mature stage, since it has existed since the early 
1920s, collapsed in the civil wars and was then rejuvenated in the mid-1990s. In addition it also 
takes a short time to market, i.e. approximately two years. On the other hand, commercial 
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forestry started in the early 2000s and most of the planters are selling intermediate forestry by-
products as they progress towards full maturity, since trees take a long-time to market - almost 
16 years for pine and 8-10 years for eucalyptus. Generally, this implies that the commercial 
forestry sector is transiting from infancy to growth stage, which confirms that the stage of 
industry development is a contributing factor in determining the investment opportunities that 
shape the governance structures. This assertion can be validated with the qualitative statement 
below: 
“The majority are still embroiled in planting … the majority plans to sell standing stock 
i.e. they cannot afford milling” (Program Manager SPGS – Forestry).
“The maintenance of forestry is current priority… more planting is not on the table, but if 
gets cheap land with good soil, it may consider planting eucalyptus clones… If gets good 
proceeds from the second tree thinning, this will help to gauge business viability and 
possibly venture into own milling”  (Respondent HPE 1 Forestry). 
The statement by the SPGS respondent suggests that the growers were still planting to meet their 
signed contractual obligations in terms of contracted area. The HPE respondent had completed 
his contracted area with a focus on maintenance. The statement of possible expansion could only 
be implemented for eucalyptus clones which is a fast growing tree, signifying that time to market 
(i.e. a global competitiveness indicator) to attract early revenue is going to be critical in 
investment decision-making. Pursuing VC functional upgrading was to be determined by 
business viability after selling the tree thinning.   
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Given the above forestry scenario, then the sugarcane sector which is at growth-maturity stage 
with a short-time to market relative to forestry should be able to pursue the VC upgrading 
strategy. According to Gereffi et al. (2005), the GVC framework proposes five governance 
typologies that oscillate between two extremes - hierarchies and arms’ length market 
transactions (Williamson, 1975). The intermediate typologies are relational value chains, 
modular value chains and captive value chains. According to the GVC framework, captive 
value chains are characterised by less power among producers (i.e. growers) due to high 
dependency on buyers (i.e. millers). Therefore, the GVC framework suggests that in order for 
the producers to be able to leverage power relations and increase earnings from rents, they 
have to identify opportunities in the value chain and take up some of the value-adding 
activities. The opportunities taken up can be in the form of process upgrading (e.g. investing in 
machinery and efficient production) to increase earnings and thus decrease dependency on 
millers.  This strategy enables structural shifting of the value chain from a captive to a 
relational or modular value chain, thus increasing the relationship power of the producers. 
Alternatively, producers can take up the more rewarding investment opportunity known as 
functional upgrading, which entails deeper vertical integration or setting up a mini or fully 
processing plant. The resulting investment set-up immensely increases earning potential, thus 
leading to competitive rivalry in an industry (Porter, 1979; 2008). The resulting competition 
spurs new waves of industry innovations, which may lead to inefficient firms being liquidated 
or undergoing mergers through Schumpeterian destructive creative entrepreneurship 
(Schumpeter, 1934).  
235 
Therefore, at the level of micro VC enterprise comparative analysis, in answering the research 
question of performance differences between high, medium and low performing entrepreneurs, 
results indicated that entrepreneurial alertness does not offer a satisfactory explanation between 
successful and unsuccessful enterprises. The finding suggests that all entrepreneurs have 
similar abilities in perceiving and exploiting investment opportunities, for business start-ups 
and/or growth in the context of Uganda’s environment. This implies that all entrepreneurs can 
start a business and/or grow a business, even though the business may not necessarily be 
competitive or successful. The study confirmed that perceptions of own responsibility or own 
behaviour for business competitiveness explain performance differences between high, 
medium and low performing entrepreneurs. This finding is related to the internality-externality 
behavioral theory discussed in sub-theme 1 above.   
While at the level of meso and macro VC sector comparative analysis, in answering the 
question of performance differences between VC sectors, generally the findings reveal that the 
VC process-upgrading was being pursued by the sugarcane sector, while the forestry sector 
pursued business formalization strategies. The context accounting for the performance 
difference is due to the business phase of the sectors, with sugarcane being at growth-maturity 
stage while forestry was at an infancy-growth stage. 
 Interestingly, none of the sectors had intentions of pursuing the lucrative VC functional 
upgrading strategy that increases earnings and thus reduces exploitative tendencies, especially 
in the sugarcane sector as evidenced in sub-theme 2 above. This could possibly be attributed to 
the high capital investment financing requirements for setting up processing plant(s). The GVC 
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framework proposes possible interventionist mechanisms to address this form of lacuna, one of 
which would be for joint action investment by producers. Another possible option is through 
grant incentives intervention mechanisms either by external donors as was being proposed 
Uganda’s forestry sector under SPGS phase III or by government providing financing for 
machinery.  
Lastly, where the earlier two options are not applicable, then legislative mechanisms to 
regulate the industry can be applied. This is best explained by the new institutional theory 
discussed in the next sub-section. 
Research question 5: How does institutional quality explain the emergence of productive, 
unproductive and/or predatory behaviors reflected in competitiveness success or failure of 
both enterprises and VC sectors?  
The previous sections revealed exploitative tendencies by the millers upon growers as well as 
the inability by primary producers to undertake the more rewarding VC functional upgrading 
to address their exploitation. This sub-section intends to address the issue by examining the 
existing regulatory regime through the lens of both the institutional environment and 
governance institutions (North 1992; Williamson 1998). Business, like sports is a game. In 
sports, there are clear set rules governing the game, and for the game to be attractive to fans, 
the play of the game is reflected in the quality of the referee who enforces fair play and the 
rules. Likewise, a competitive business industry must have both a quality set of rules and 
quality regulatory agencies governing fair play. This study analysed the existing formal set of 
237 
rules of the game, i.e. policies, and the relevant industry regulatory agencies. The quantitative 
findings on entry regulation revealed that all the respondents (HPEs, MPEs and LPEs) 
preferred a regulatory environment that promotes fair competition and the protection of 
property rights. In addition, all the respondents advocated for the establishment of sound 
regulatory agencies to regulate the industry players. This finding suggests that the regulatory 
environment exerts almost the same effect upon the entrepreneurs and their business 
competitiveness. Surprisingly, similar results were obtained when the t-test was run at the 
sector level to evaluate perceptions on entry regulation and the need for the establishment of 
regulatory bodies. There was no significant difference between the forestry and sugarcane 
sectors.   
The finding above shows a general agreement between the two sectors with respect to 
regulations. However, this agreement presents conflicting results, because it was only the 
sugarcane sector that experienced high levels of exploitation. Further, only the sugar industry 
is regulated by the sugar zoning ‘ring-fencing’ policy, which requires the establishment of one 
mill per 25 kilometer radius (Uganda National Sugar Policy, 2010).  The effects of this policy 
are evidenced by mill(s) inefficiency associated with frequent shutdowns, and low cane 
productivity due to harvesting overgrown cane14.  It would seem that it would thus mainly be 
the sugarcane sector advocating for regulation. This study asserts that the forestry sector’s 
identified need for regulation is likely to be attributed to the value chain practices evidenced in 
the plywood pine market. Observatory data in the field, which was also verified in the national 
14Petition Memo to Government (hard copy available) and part of the issues published in print media as ‘farmers 
dare to slit from Kinyara Sugar’  see The Observer of 24/08/2015 website: observer.ug/business/38-
business/39431-farmers-dare-to-split-from-kinyara-sugar  
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commercial forestry validation data workshop, revealed that although the pine market is 
operating in the formal economy, its practices are similar to the informal economy. For 
instance, some of the milling firms manipulate the weighing systems in their favour, there were 
no contractual documents governing the transactions, and abrupt price fluctuations are the 
norm (see Fig 7.4 below). 
Figure 7.4: Price fluctuations in the plywood pine market 
The scenario of the plywood industry relative to the pole market presents internal 
contradictions within the forestry sector. The main factor that explains this contradiction is the 
business philosophy espoused by the buying firms. The lead firms in the pole market are 
mainly Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) which are certified by an international body 
known as the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC). These firms tend to uphold best practices in 
the marketplace in compliance with periodic audits and inspections by the FSC. This explains 
the findings of this study, which show comparatively competitive prices offered for poles to 
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both growers in South Africa and Uganda. Interestingly, Chinese firms that do not subscribe to 
the FSC’s regulatory compliance requirements dominate the plywood industry. This implies 
that competitiveness in the pole market is attributed to the FSC’s set rules of the game, coupled 
with their governance power to revoke certifications in cases of non-compliance. Examination 
of the FSC’s governance power is beyond the scope of this study because of its global 
operations. This means that the South African forestry governance will not be examined 
because it is mainly regulated by FSC legislative mechanisms. The focus of this study was 
centered on the play of the game of the sugar industry which is regulated by national bodies, 
with particular reference to South Africa in relation to Uganda. The examination focused on 
governance power exercised through representation of the key value chain actors on the 
industry regulatory body. This was a departure from the GVC framework (see Gereffi et al., 
2005), which analyses governance power with respect to lead firms in the value chains. 
Section 7.3 sub-theme 2 above revealed that the equitable distribution of wealth in the sugar 
industry is associated with sound statutory institutional formal rules governing the industry 
players. A deeper analysis of the statutory instruments also revealed that industry regulatory 
boards have the governance mandate to ensure fair play by the industry players.  The South 
African Sugar Act 1978 & Sugar Industry Agreement 2000 give the mandate to the South 
African Sugar Industry Administration Board. This Board is composed of one representative 
appointed by the South African Sugar Association (SASA), two representatives appointed by 
millers, and two representatives appointed by growers. The Sugar Industry Administration 
Board reports to the SASA Council which is composed of two major bodies, namely the South 
African Cane Growers Association (SACGA) and the South African Sugar Millers Association 
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(SASMA). Both SACGA and SASMA each elect 11 members to form the SASA Council. The 
positions of Chairman and vice Chairman rotate every two years between growers and millers. 
Contrasting the South African governance model with the proposed Uganda Sugar Bill 2015, 
the following is cited in the first Draft Bill of 16 March 2015. The Uganda draft sugar bill 
proposed a Chairman, five government representatives, three miller representatives and two 
grower representatives. A meeting was held afterwards and it was agreed to reduce government 
representation by two and increase the growers’ representation to balance with the millers’ 
representation. Interestingly, the draft of 1st June 2015 which emerged after the meeting shows 
that two vacant government positions had been replaced by millers, meaning five millers and 
two growers. Further, all the members are appointed by the Minister after consultation with the 
relevant organisations. 
This kind of institutional arrangement in South Africa informs this study; that: 
(1) In South Africa millers and growers are treated as equal partners in business, while
in Uganda millers are seen as superior to growers, hence the master/modernised slave 
relationship. 
(2) In South Africa decision-making is by consensus due to a balance of power
distribution as reflected by equality in numerical representations, while in Uganda the 
balance of power is tilted in favour of the millers. 
(3) In South Africa representation is through a democratic election process by the
responsible constituent bodies, while in Uganda the process is autocratic through 
appointments by the Minister.  
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(4) In South Africa the government is not involved in the management of the industry
affairs, while in Uganda high handedness of government involvement in industry 
affairs is at play, as evidenced by the methods used to craft the sugar bill with a purpose 
of serving powerful millers’ interests.  
A comparison of the institutions in South Africa and Uganda reveals that institutional quality 
matters for wealth distribution and ultimately industry competitiveness. This finding is 
supported by studies which show that institutional quality strongly influences wealth 
distribution (De Soto 2000; Alonso & Garcimartin 2004), competitiveness and growth 
(Easterly & Levine 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2001; 2002; Rodrik et al., 2002; Sala-i-Martin & 
Subramanian, 2003). A recent study in South Africa concurred with these studies and 
emphasised that sound institutional arrangements and good governance influences good 
performance (Chibanda et al., 2009). 
In relation to this study, all the SADC countries were found to have an equitable distribution of 
wealth in the sugar industry, ranging from 60 to 80% based on both sugar mills and molasses, 
due to presence of sound institutions. On the other hand, Uganda was found to be highly 
exploitative with no sound institutions.  Despite the crafting of the Uganda Sugar Bill in 2015, 
which was intended to address this lacuna, the proposed distributive formula of 40% for 
farmers and 60% for millers based on sugar mills only is still far below the regional and 
international standards. This study asserts that institutional quality accounts for the observed 
global competitiveness rankings. This finding was confirmed by the Global Ranking Reports 
produced by the World Economic Forum. According to the WEF (2010) in their GCR survey 
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of 2010-2011 which covered 139 countries, the institutional quality of the selected countries in 
this study was ranked (with low scores meaning strength and high scores weak institutions) as 
follows: Mauritius 43; South Africa 47; Malawi 52; Zambia 65; Swaziland 70; Tanzania 83 
and Uganda 104. The latest Report of 2014-2015 covered 144 countries and revealed a similar 
trend:  Mauritius 35; South Africa 36; Malawi 77; Zambia 52; Swaziland 61; Tanzania 93 and 
Uganda 115.Expectedly, the countries that improved their institutions are the two leading in 
wealth distribution - Mauritius and South Africa. Uganda’s position declined in the latest 
ranking, implying a further decline in its institutional environment for competitiveness. 
This could explain why the SADC countries are generally globally ranked highly in sugar 
industry competitiveness compared to Uganda. The poor competitiveness can be attributed to 
the existing legislative entry barrier, which provides millers with monopolistic positions that 
enable them to offer low prices to growers and earn abnormal profits. This implies that the 
rules of the game in Uganda allocate rent-seeking opportunities based on monopolistic 
protectionism rather than innovation.  This finding was confirmed during the interviews when 
one of the middle-level executives was asked to identify key success factors for the firm’s 
competitiveness: 
“No competition within vicinity unlike players in other regions” (Agricultural 
Engineering Manager – Sugar Mill). 
The statement above re-confirms that Uganda’s public policy environment favours rent-
seeking behaviour (World Bank, 2012) in their World Development Report (WDR) 2013, 
through monopoly concessions and/or monopsony (WB, 2013) , a situation that promotes 
unproductive and/or at times predatory entrepreneurship behaviour (Baumol 1990). The 
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statement above further confirms that the rules of the game in Uganda allocate rent-seeking 
opportunities based on monopolistic protectionism rather than innovation. This might explain 
the rise in application for cane milling licenses since the sugar zoning policy was enacted in 
2010. Traditionally Uganda had three major sugar mills, yet just before the zoning policy two 
other medium mills obtained licences. Immediately after, the enactment of the zoning policy 
the number of total licensed sugar mills rose from 6 to 26, representing more than 300% 
growth, but less than 50% to-date have been established. 
This implies that a number of market speculators obtained monopoly licenses possibly with a 
purpose of selling them at exorbitant prices to potential prospective investors in the future; the 
way it happened with some of the privatized public enterprises coupled with asset stripping in 
Uganda (Kibikyo, 2011; Tangri and Mwenda, 2013).  Poulton et al. (2008) and WB (2013), 
offered suggestions on state intervention mechanisms to redress such a situation of monopoly 
concessions, by suggesting either through periodic re-tendering or by enacting a competition 
policy that enables growers to receive a fair price for their output. This finding emphasises the 
role of institutional quality. 
Therefore, at the level micro VC enterprise comparative analysis, in answering the research 
question of how institutional quality explains performance differences between high, medium 
and low performing entrepreneurs, no differences were observed, implying that the regulatory 
environment has a similar effect on all entrepreneurs.   
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On the hand, at the level of meso and macro VC sector comparative analysis, regarding how 
institutional quality explains performance differences between VC sectors, initially the 
findings revealed a general agreement for regulation in both sectors. This finding on agreement 
presented conflicting results because it was only the sugarcane sector that experienced high 
levels of exploitation, compounded with the protectionist sugar zoning policy. Therefore, it 
would mainly be the sugarcane sector advocating for regulation.  
The study investigated the paradox and found out that conflicting data emanated from different 
value chain practices between the pole market and the plywood market within the forestry 
sector.  The FSC regulatory framework governs the pole market, while the plywood market has 
no regulatory framework. Therefore, the productive entrepreneurial behaviour observed in the 
pole market and the unproductive entrepreneurial behaviour observed in the plywood market 
could be accounted for by subscription and compliance to the FSC’s regulatory framework. 
This finding resolved the conflicting data and accounts for the agreement on the need for 
regulation in both the sugarcane and forestry industry sectors. This implies that institutional 
quality matters for value chain competitiveness. This finding is unique to this study in the 
sense that generally it has resolved conflicting data and corroborated data patterns from 
quantitative data, as evidenced by the qualitative data and validated by the observatory field 
data. Further, a close fit between theory and data makes this finding stronger and better 
grounded in the debate of new institutional theory (North, 1990; Williamson, 1998). This 
finding has also made a major contribution to the current debate of equitable wealth 
distribution and governance power in the GVC framework (Gereffi et al., 2005; Brewer, 2011; 
Fernández, 2015). This has been achieved by breaking new research frontiers and 
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demonstrating that governance power through consensus exercised by national regulatory 
bodies is the driver of equitable value sharing and ultimately competitiveness, rather than 
governance by powerful lead firms. 
This study also found out that institutional quality defined by the set of rules of the game and 
governance power is a precursor to competitiveness. This has been confirmed by the Global 
Competitiveness Reports of 2010-2011 and 2014-2015, which ranked Uganda at the bottom of 
the pyramid regarding quality of institutions. This (quality of institutions) possibly explains the 
high business failure rate in Uganda, despite the country being on top of the pyramid in 
business start-ups in the world (GEM Report, 2014). The case of Uganda demonstrates that 
while a country can possess high entrepreneurial talent in business start-ups, institutional 
quality is the gravitational force that sustains business competitiveness success in the global 
economic storms. The next section discusses standards for market access in the context of the 
GVC framework. 
7.6. Sub-theme 4: Compliance with standards for market access 
Research question 6: How do perceptions of compliance with standards for market access 
explain performance differences amongst high, medium and low producers and between 
VC sectors?  
The previous sub-section revealed that the quality of institutions matter for a country’s 
competitiveness. This section discusses the role of standards in determining competitiveness in 
the context of the GVC framework. Standards provide a medium of communication for 
buyers’/market requirements, accompanied by financial flow to the suppliers in one direction 
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and flow of the product/commodity to the market in the opposite direction along the value 
chain. The GVC framework defines these standards as key parameters for market access, 
covering product standards, process standards, timely delivery of quantities, and finally pricing 
per grading systems (Humphrey & Schimtz, 2001). At the level of primary production in the 
agri-value chains, it involves production of raw materials by applying best agronomical 
practices. The agronomic practices generally include product/commodity standards, 
process/growing standards, input-output quantities and timing of operations. (The study applies 
the use of the term agronomical practices interchangeably with production standards). The 
pricing per grading system of the commodity is an output of the different 
management/handling of production standards and provides a reflection of quality performance 
differences and ultimately farm enterprise competitiveness.  To maintain quality standards, 
value chain actors are encouraged to join a voluntary certification initiative system that ensures 
market access and thus competitiveness. 
The quantitative results revealed a low use of pricing per grading system for transactions 
between producers and buyers. Similarly, a certification initiative system was not applicable to 
the primary producers and/or growers.  These findings imply that generally all respondents felt 
the impact of the absence of credible pricing per grading systems, as well as a lack of 
certification initiative systems that foster value chain competitiveness. Despite the low 
applicability of pricing per grading systems and lack of certification initiatives, all respondents 
generally accepted having access and exposure to production standards. Therefore, the extent 
of applicability of pricing per grading systems, certification initiatives and production 
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standards cannot be used in explaining performance differences between high, medium and 
low producers in this study.  
At the level of value chain sector performance comparison, significant differences emerged 
between sugarcane producers and forestry producers with respect to production standards and 
pricing per grading systems. There were no significant differences with respect to certification 
initiatives between forestry and sugarcane sectors. Using a two sample t-test, the quantitative 
findings indicated a high statistical significant difference (Forestry –Sugarcane), Pr (T >t) = 
0.0123 for production standards and (Forestry –Sugarcane), Pr (T >t) = 0.0047 pricing per 
grading systems. 
This finding can be augmented with the foreign study tour trips organised by SPGS for the 
Ugandan forestry sector producers (see fig 7.5 below) for exposure to production standards, 
unlike the sugarcane producers. The study tour is not limited to plantation production standards 
but also covers forestry operations along the entire value chain, starting from input suppliers to 
markets. In addition to foreign study tours and local exchange visits, SPGS developed an 
industry standards manual for plantation establishments, which were availed to all registered 
growers with the project. Unfortunately, this formal approach for unified production standards 
and study tour platforms for sharing experiences is lacking in the sugarcane sector. 
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Figure 7.5: Ugandan forestry producers at Bracken Woods plantation in South Africa. 
Source: Primary field data (Author in striped green jacket writing on pad) 
In addition to significant performance differences regarding production standards, the use of 
pricing per grading systems showed a significant difference between Uganda’s commercial 
forestry and sugarcane sectors. The significant difference could be attributed to the basis of 
payment systems in place. The findings of this study revealed that the sugarcane sector was 
mainly applying the quantity-based cane payment system. The statement below can confirm 
this: 
“... the miller is applying uniform/ average rendement whereby the good farmers are 
not reaping good pay from their efforts. In addition, the miller is also loosing by 
applying this uniformity” (Respondent, HPE 1). 
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The statement above can be validated by Table 7.1 below, comparing fixed quantity payment 
systems with the adoption of a sucrose payment system. In processing sugar, sucrose is the 
main extract meaning that high sucrose defines high quality cane. 
Table 7.1: Comparison of fixed cane quantity payment system and sucrose payment system 
Rendement (Sucrose 









USD Equiv. per 
ton 
9 69,930 23.94 59,940 20.52 
10 69,930 23.94 66,600 22.80 
11 69,930 23.94 73,260 25.08 
12 69,930 23.94 79,920 27.36 
*Average annual rendement at 10.5, average market price Ugx 1,800,000/= per tonne
includes both interim & final payment as per CPC, exchange rate   1 USD = 2921.17 UGX
(Bank of Uganda15 20 March 2015).
Table 7.1 above demonstrates that the fixed quantity earnings are a disincentive for 
productivity, depicting a frustrated success story as implied in the quotation above. The 
sucrose payment system would be an incentive for low performers to systematically increase 
sucrose content in their sugar cane in order to earn higher revenues. Therefore, everybody 
gains and the country gains, as predicted by the ‘invisible’ hand theory (Smith, 1776). 
The fixed cane payment system was found to be outdated in comparison with the SADC sugar 
producing countries. SADC countries such as South Africa abandoned the quantity delivered 
payment system in the 1925/26 season, then transformed to the sucrose cane payment system 
in the 1926/27 season, and progressed to the recoverable value (RV) cane payment system in 
15www.bou.or.ug 
250 
the 2000/01 season (Wynne, Murray & Gabriel, 2009). According to the South African Cane 
Growers Association, the purpose of upgrading to the RV cane payment system was to 
maximise sucrose recovery by reducing sucrose loss in fibre and non-sucrose (see 
www.sacanegrowers.co.za16). This implies that a good cane payment system provides 
incentives for both producers and millers to maximise cane quality for good recovery and high 
yields, and to also improve mill performance. This finding is validated by the quote below: 
“If you look after cane properly, you get good rendement (i.e., if cane is left in bush, 
rendement is low), but this is not only on the side of the farmer; also good and efficient 
machines/mill is needed to capture good rendement” (Respondent HPE 2). 
A World Bank and FAO-sponsored study covering Commonwealth Development Corporation 
(CDC) investment projects in Africa did not discount this finding. The study revealed that
Ugandan sugar mills are not competitive in production costs relative to SADC sugar producing 
mills as per paper extract of Tyler (nd) from the main study report (Poulton et al., 2008). 
Unlike the sugarcane industry, the forestry industry applied an ad hoc pricing per grading 
system for logs delivered (see figure 7.4 above). The system is characterised as ad hoc in the 
sense that it was not applied uniformly in the marketplace. This implies that Uganda’s pricing 
per grading system fell short of the minimum requirements for driving competitiveness, unlike 
the standardised pricing per grading system found in South Africa. During the study tour 
16www.sacanegrowers.co.za/wf-content/uploads/2011/04/Explanation-of-RV-formula-PRICE-Flowchart 
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organised by SPGS, the author asked what the company felt were their competitiveness success 
factors and this was the response:  
“Number 1 Quality, Number 2 Quality, and Number 3 Quality” (Respondent Director - 
Bracken Woods). 
The findings revealed that quality is a competitiveness dimension measured along the entire 
value chain, with proceeds fairly shared between the processors/millers and the growers in the 
South African forestry industry. The market expected growers to deliver logs with the 
following quality specifications/standards as alluded to in the quotation above: 
• No.1 Quality – Log dimensions (prescribed by diameter and length) achieved by a good
thinning regime in the plantation.
• No.2 Quality – Form of log (prescribed by straightness of the log) i.e. deformed logs
are not desirable for the timber and pole markets.
• No. 3 Quality – Knot free logs (prescribed by having all-round uniformity without
major dents) achieved by good pruning in the plantation.
The number 1 quality indicator gave growers an additional competitive edge, whereby big logs 
entitled a grower to an immediate bonus upon delivery to the mill. This is because big logs 
were found to achieve a higher recovery rate of approximately 55% compared to medium logs 
which achieve approximately 45%. The logs are labeled for traceability, processed and timber 
graded as shown in figures 7.6 & 7.7 below. Grade S 7 timber is characterised by uniformity in 
rings, meaning that the wood fibre strength properties are evenly spread. Such timber 
commands premium prices in the market and once sold, the grower also receives a bonus share 
of the premium price. Grade S 5 timber is characterised by non-uniformity in rings, including 
minor observable dents. The factors accounting for the discrepancy in uniformity and non-
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uniformity in rings is due to a timely application of the thinning regime at the plantation. This 
implies that once there is a delay in thinning the rings tend to compact due to slow growth, and 
once thinning is done then the rings expand suddenly due to rapid growth. The timing of the 
thinning activity thus has an effect on growth uniformity. Further, figures 7.8 and 7.9 below 
show the aspect of knots in grading timber, thus emphasizing the need for good and timely 
pruning of the standing logs in the plantation. 
Figure 7.6: Grade S 7 timber characterised by ring-uniformity 
Source: Primary field data courtesy of SPGS Study tour Bracken Woods South Africa 
Figure 7.7: Grade S 5 timber characterised by non-ring uniformity 
Source: Primary field data courtesy of SPGS study tour Bracken Woods South Africa 
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Figure 7.8: Well pruned log characterised by the knot firmly embedded in the woodlot fibre 
Source: Primary field data courtesy of SPGS study tour Bracken Woods South Africa 
Figure 7.9: Poorly pruned log characterised by dead knots affecting fibre strength in the 
woodlot (reject) 
Source: Primary field data courtesy of SPGS study tour Bracken Woods South Africa 
A comparison of lessons from the South African forestry industry with respect to Uganda 
reveals that in South Africa, uniform industry standards have been developed for the entire 
value chain. Further, all industry players enforce these standards through mandatory 
membership to the FSC’s certification governance mechanisms for market access. This was 
found to be in contrary to Uganda’s forestry industry case. Although the pricing per grading is 
based on similar log characteristics to that of the South African industry, the pricing per 
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grading varies from buyer to buyer in Uganda. This is because there are no uniform, developed 
market industry standards along the entire value chain. Further, only a few companies 
subscribe to the FSC’s certification governance mechanisms, and these are mainly MNCs. This 
implies that the majority of Uganda’s industry players are neither governed by national 
standards nor international standards for market access17.  The pricing is done with regard to 
certain log characteristics and this creates an incentive for growers to improve and supply 
better quality logs to earn better prices. This improves productivity and hence value chain 
competitiveness in the forestry sector, as compared to the sugarcane sector that applies no 
grading system. 
The findings of this study above can be classified as being quite unique in the sense that 
generally it corroborated data patterns from the quantitative data, as evidenced by the 
qualitative data and validated by observatory field data. The data patterns revealed a close fit 
between theory and data, which makes this finding stronger and better grounded in both the 
GVC framework (Gereffi et al., 2005) and the debate of new institutional theory (North, 1990; 
Williamson, 1998), which explain the relationship between standards and competitiveness at 
firm, sector, country, regional blocks and international trade levels.  
Therefore, at the level of micro VC enterprise comparative analysis, the findings revealed no 
significant performance differences between high, medium and low producers. The finding 
implied that the extent of complying with industry standards is more of an external 
17 At time of data validation FSC was sponsoring a pilot study covering four growers. This was to be scaled-up later 
to cover all growers and other industry players. 
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environmental factor having similar effects on all entrepreneurs’ business competitiveness. 
However, at the level of meso and macro VC sector analysis, strong significant performance 
differences emerged between the sugarcane and forestry sector in Uganda, as enumerated below:  
.  
 The forestry sector was found to have a well-developed standards manual for growers as
a pre-condition for forestry plantation establishments
 The forestry sector growers were also exposed to improved business farming and
processing techniques along the value chain through foreign study tours.
 In addition, the forestry sector practiced a rudimentary pricing per grading system, which
was found to be an incentive for industry competitiveness if it happens to be well-
developed and standardized like in South Africa.
Surprisingly, all these basic requirements of production manuals, exposure through foreign 
study tours and the application of pricing per grading systems were found to be non-existent in 
the sugarcane sector, save for leaflets bearing scant standards information that were distributed 
to interested growers by millers.  
Therefore, the observed performance difference between sugarcane and forestry sector value 
chains could be attributed to the availability of well-developed and documented standards that 
served as communication tools for industry players. According to a European Commission 
(EC) Report (2012), renders support to this finding as it contended that that well-developed 
standards not only serve as communication tools, but also improve the growth and 
competiveness of enterprises and industry.  
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The next section discusses collaboration in vertical and horizontal linkages in strengthening 
production capabilities using the transactional cost theory which is part of the new institutional 
theory, with the purpose of informing the emerging GVC theoretical framework. 
7.7 Sub- theme 5: Collaboration in vertical and horizontal linkages for diffusion of 
production capabilities 
Research question 7: How does vertical and horizontal collaboration for diffusion of 
production capabilities explain performance differences amongst VC participants and 
between VC sectors?  
The previous section revealed that the establishment of formal standards acts as a 
communication tool for inter-firm relationships’ coordination for value chain competitiveness. 
This finding suggests that the adoption of standards facilitates knowledge and skills transfer, 
which partly contributes to the diffusion of supply production capabilities in the industry.  The 
level of availability of supply production capabilities determines the choice of the governance 
structure to coordinate inter-firm relationships; either through spot markets or hierarchies 
(Williamson, 1975). The GVC framework by Gereffi et al. (2005), which is considered to be 
an extension of the TCA (Williamson, 1975), offers intermediary networks or quasi-hierarchies 
(Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000) for inter-firm relationship coordination and production 
organisation in the form of modular, relational and captive value chains.  The existence of the 
various networks for the organisation of production and coordination of inter-firm relationships 
implies the existence of both vertical and horizontal linkage mechanisms.  
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Porter (1998) argued that, the existence of comparative advantage, economies of scale and 
excessive vertical integration are no longer sources of competitiveness and innovation.  He 
contended that it is close linkages between buyers, suppliers and other institutions that are the 
source for firm, industry and sector competitiveness which is reflected in productivity (Porter, 
2009). This statement affirms that the level of strength of collaborative relationships in both 
vertical and horizontal linkages is the source for competiveness.  
According to Navdi and Halder (2005), the cluster theoretical approach assesses the gains of 
clustering as a result of joint action, while the VC approach explores vertical linkages between 
firms and external actors.  Although both approaches offer complementary synergies to each 
other, they do not elaborate on the measures applicable in assessing the strength of the inter-
firm relationships (Martin & Sunley, 2003; Gereffi et al., 2005). This missing link is filled by 
the transactional cost approach (Williamson, 1975), which analyses investment transactional 
costs involved in inter-firm relationships.  Williamson (1975) identified the transactional costs 
in the form of specific investment asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency of transactions, and 
opportunism. In regards to this study, building supplier production capabilities involve 
undertaking investment asset specificity in terms of provision of inputs, knowledge and skills 
acquisition. It also involves transactional costs related to searching, monitoring and 
enforcement of contracts by either party; costs considered as eroding profit margins.  More 
investments in building mutual trust relationships are crucial in order to minimise opportunism. 
This study adopted these measures in assessing the strength of collaborative vertical and 
horizontal linkages for the building of supplier production capabilities. 
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The quantitative results revealed no major differences in perceptions among HPEs, MPEs and 
LPEs with regards to access to investment asset specificity and vulnerability to transactional 
costs and opportunism along vertical linkages. Similar results were obtained regarding 
horizontal linkages, save for opportunism whereby LPEs’ and MPEs’ perceptions had slightly 
above average scores. This finding implies that all primary producers have similar 
opportunities when it comes to access to industry incentives in the form of inputs provision and 
knowledge transfer both in vertical and horizontal linkages for their businesses. They also 
operate in a similar business environment with vulnerability to transactional costs and 
opportunism. Therefore, access to investment asset specificity, vulnerability to coordination 
transactional costs and opportunism do not offer plausible explanations for performance 
differences between high, medium and low producers in this study.  
At the level of value chain sector analysis, using a two sample t-test, the quantitative findings 
indicated a very strong statistical significant difference (Forestry –Sugarcane), Pr (T <t) = 
0.0002 for investment asset specificity in vertical linkages and (Forestry –Sugarcane), Pr (T >t) 
= 0.0023 for investment asset specificity in horizontal linkages. With respect to vulnerability in 
coordination transactional costs, the findings indicated moderate significant differences 
(Forestry –Sugarcane), Pr (T <t) = 0.0266 in vertical linkages and suggestive or little evidence 
(Forestry –Sugarcane), Pr (T >t) = 0.0548 in horizontal linkages. In addition, for vulnerability 
to opportunism, the findings indicated suggestive or little evidence (Forestry –Sugarcane), Pr 
(T <t) = 0.0712 in vertical linkages for the sugarcane sector. 
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The findings above suggest strong collaborative vertical linkages (primary producers/millers) 
with respect to investment asset specificity in the sugarcane sector. The finding shows that the 
provision of inputs, knowledge and skills transfer accrue from millers to farmers, thus building 
supply base production capabilities in the sugarcane sector. Surprisingly, a nuanced view of the 
qualitative data revealed contradictory results as evidenced in this statement by an Opinion 
Leader/ HPE:  
“With Booker Tate knowledge was gained, we used to have courses in Kampala and 
this was helpful, however, with the current miller not much knowledge has been gained. 
Under Booker Tate cane cutting, loading and transporting was by the farmer’s 
company – which was the business arm of the farmers’ association. When current 
management came on board, this was abolished and instead they preferred to employ 
contractors”. 
The statement suggests that diffusion of knowledge and skills in Uganda’s sugarcane sector 
has occurred through contractors and not millers.  A study by Hurly et al. (2015) of small-scale 
growers in the South African sugar industry arrived at similar results, possibly due to their 
heavy reliance on millers. On the other hand, strong collaborative horizontal linkages exist 
with respect to investment asset specificity in the forestry sector. This implies that input 
support, knowledge and skills transfer in the forestry sector is through farmer to farmer 
linkages and/or through farmers’ association or farmers’ support agencies, as evidenced by the 
t-test results showing very strong significant differences (Forestry –Sugarcane), Pr(T >t) =
0.0000 regarding access to both technical and financial support from farmers’ development 
agencies. This finding is corroborated with both foreign and local tours being organised by 
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SPGS – a development support agency in conjunction with UTGA – the National Farmers 
Association, with aims of equipping forestry growers with technical knowledge for building 
production capabilities (see Figures 7.10 and 7.11 below). 
Figure 7.10: Ugandan forestry commercial farmers learning nurturing of quality tree 
seedlings 
Source: Primary field data courtesy of SPGS study tour Mondi nursery facility - South 
Africa 
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Figure 7.11: Ugandan forestry commercial farmers on net working and information sharing 
testing the strength of the pole required by the market 
Source: Primary field data courtesy of UTGA/SPGS local study tour New Forestry 
Company Ltd- pole treatment plant in Uganda 
The pictures above (Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11) demonstrates that there was direct knowledge 
and skills transfer to forestry commercial producers to build their production capabilities by 
being exposed to value chain operations and practices of both vertically integrated millers and 
commercial growers through foreign and local study tours. This phenomenon was found 
lacking in Uganda’s sugarcane industry, as evidenced by weak localised farmers’ associations, 
a situation further exacerbated by the absence of a unifying National Sugarcane Farmers 
Association.  
The findings above explain the investment asset specificity in vertical and horizontal linkages 
for inter-firm relationships. However, as firms engage in the exchange process, they may be 
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vulnerable to coordination transactional costs and opportunism by either party involved in the 
execution of the contracts. The quantitative findings of this study revealed that the sugarcane 
sector is vulnerable to coordination transactional costs, especially with respect to delayed 
payments after the delivery of sugarcane to the sugar mill. The study also found out suggestive 
evidence of a lack of mutual trust between cane producers and miller(s). These findings were 
corroborated by qualitative findings, as evidenced by Opinion Leader/HPE Sugarcane sector: 
“… miller has a tendency of late payments going between 60-90 days, the delayed 
payment causes unnecessary interest accruals resulting into marginal profits”(Opinion 
leader HPE sugarcane sector).   
On the contrary, the Plant Manager of the Forestry Mill had this to say; 
“we pay suppliers within five working days to enhance their cash flow.”(Plant manager 
Forestry mill) 
The two statements above affirm that the sugarcane sector growers are vulnerable to 
coordination transactional costs in comparison to forestry growers. This kind of vulnerability 
also highlights opportunism in the sugarcane sector, as evidenced by the statement of the 
Association Executive regarding the quality of relationships between growers and millers: 
“…uh, uh.... fairly good trust however there is lack of transparency on weigh bridge, 
…. some farmers tend to divert the inputs”.(Association executive sugarcane sector) 
The statement above implied that the relationship between primary producers and millers in the 
sugarcane industry was characterised by suspicion, thus affecting mutual trust. This finding is 
in agreement with similar studies, which found out that mutually benefiting relationships 
develop trust (Dyer 1997; Chivaka 2003), while exploitative relationships exhibit low levels of 
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trust and tend to be characterised by tensions that affect productivity and competitiveness 
along the value chain (da Silva 2005; Brown & Sander 2007; Tijaja 2010).   
Generally, the findings on both the strength of vertical and horizontal collaborative 
relationships in this study can be classified as unique in the sense that they have corroborated 
the data patterns from the quantitative data, as evidenced by the qualitative data and validated 
by the observatory field data. The data patterns revealed a close fit between theory and data, 
which makes the findings stronger and better grounded in the GVC framework (Gereffi et al., 
2005), Cluster theory (Porter, 1998; 2007) and Transactional cost theory (Williamson, 1975; 
1998).  Combinations of these three theoretical frameworks provide relevant data and features 
for understanding industry evolution and competitiveness. For instance, GVC proponents such 
as Humphrey and Schimtz (2001) and Schmitz (2005) argued that a combination of technical 
and investment support in highly governed chains explains how relatively underdeveloped 
regions become major export producers in a short period of time. They cited the example of the 
Brazilian shoe industry in the 1970s and the Vietnamese garment industry in the late 1990s.  A 
similar observation was made by Chivaka (2003) in his study of the textile and garment supply 
chain in South Africa. He found that companies that had closer collaboration in training and 
assistance attained a higher diffusion of skills in a shorter time to achieve supply chain 
efficiency levels. This scenario is a true reflection of Uganda’s evolving commercial forestry 
sector, which enjoys both technical and financial support from development agencies and 
producer associations with a purpose of building production capabilities amongst primary 
producers.  
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Other GVC proponents such as, Humphrey and Schmitz (2001), Schmitz (2006) argue that 
despite the fact that highly governed structures contribute to fast acquisition of production 
capabilities, they also create barriers for functional upgrading and/or investments in forward 
linkages (acquisition of design & marketing capabilities). This is because the lead firms have 
to protect their core capabilities such as acquisition of design & marketing capabilities from 
competition, in order to sustain earning higher rents. The findings of this study revealed a 
contrary view by suggesting that lead firms also create barriers in backward linkages by 
controlling the diffusion of knowledge and skills transfer not directly to primary producers, but 
through use of contractors. This strategy enables the miller(s) to continuously earn higher rents 
by offering; low commodity prices, inputs and services at high prices to the primary producers 
due to existing weak supply base production capabilities, given that the growers investment 
stake is mainly land provision. This scenario happens to be the case with Uganda’s commercial 
sugarcane industry. Therefore, this finding can be classified as a major contribution to the 
emerging GVC theoretical framework (see Gereffi et al.,2005), with respect to lead firms’ 
control of the diffusion of supply production capabilities, for sustained earning of strategic 
rents. 
In addition, the proponents of the cluster theoretical framework argue that diffusion of 
production capabilities are not only limited to GVC participants, but there is also knowledge 
and skills ‘spill over’ in a geographical area and/or localities of business operations (UNIDO, 
2015; WB, 2013; Maya-Ambia 2011; Aznar-Sanchez & Galdeano-Gomez 2011; Guiliani, 
Pietrobelli & Rabellotii 2005; Meyer-Stamer et al., 2003; Navdi & Halder 2002). They argued 
that impact of knowledge and skills ‘spill-over’ accounts for the rise of entrepreneurship in 
various forms such as; functional upgrading, new entrants in the existing clusters and value 
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chains, and the start of new parallel competitive value chains. This potential is available 
especially in Uganda’s commercial forestry sector entrepreneurs, only if other commodities 
can have a ready market when produced on a large scale.  
Therefore, at the level of micro VC enterprise comparative analysis, the findings revealed no 
significant performance differences between HPEs, MPEs and LPEs regarding to inputs 
support, knowledge and skills acquisition for building production capabilities to enhance 
productivity gains and ultimately competitiveness of the value chains. This finding shows that 
all players have similar access to resources and operate in a similar environment. This finding 
confirmed the observed hypothetical question which states that; despite entrepreneurs being 
exposed to similar environments and having access to the same resources, then what factors 
could account for performance differences between successful entrepreneurs and failing or 
struggling entrepreneurs? (Njeru, Bwisa & Kihoro, 2012). The answer lies in the theory of 
internality-externality perceptions, which has been discussed in sub-theme 1 above. 
While at the level of meso and macro VC sector comparative analysis, strong significant 
performance differences emerged between the sugarcane and forestry sectors in Uganda. The 
sugarcane sector exhibits high investment asset specificity in vertical linkages between primary 
producers and millers. The quantitative findings suggested strong collaborative vertical 
linkages for building supplier production capabilities. However, a nuanced view of the 
qualitative data points to the existence of production capabilities in the vertical linkages, but 
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residing in the use of contractors rather than the sugarcane growers themselves. This finding 
confirms that the growers are heavily dependent on the millers and contractors employed by 
the millers to offer services to the contracted growers. This level of high dependency has left 
most of the growers unable to develop production capabilities in the sugarcane sector. 
 Further, the growers were also vulnerable to coordination transaction costs and opportunistic 
behavior, which was manifested in the form of exploitation at the weigh-bridges, coupled with 
receipt of low cane prices in comparison to the forestry sector entrepreneurs.  
On the other hand, the forestry sector growers had been able to develop production capabilities. 
This was evidenced by high investment asset specificity in the human resources development 
through direct access to both technical and financial support. The existence of a national 
forestry growers’ association not only strengthens cluster vertical and horizontal linkages, but 
also served as a powerful policy-lobbying tool for the sector development. Surprisingly, apart 
from access to inputs and services from millers through contractors, the sugarcane sector 
players lack a national unifying body that could step in to lobby favourable policies and also 
provide technical training direct to the primary producers. 
7.8 Summary 
The research findings have demonstrated that business competitive success and/or failure is a 
result of perceptions linked to internal-external entrepreneurial behavioral characteristics. The 
results also revealed that institutional quality matters for competitiveness of agri-business 
value chains. In particular, the prevailing institutional environment was found to determine 
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equitable wealth distribution and allocation of talent between productive innovative investment 
activities and un-productive or predatory rent-seeking investment activities. The study findings 
also revealed that development of production standards manuals acted as a communication 
tools thus guiding primary producers in setting up business farms/firms that were found to 
achieve productivity gains for business growth and ultimately competitiveness. Commodity 
grading based upon price was found to improve farm/firm productivity gains and ultimately 
business competitiveness. Finally, transfer of knowledge, skills and technology i.e., production 
capabilities was found to have not occurred directly to primary producers but through 
contractors employed by millers, save for the forestry sector which had a direct transfer of 
production capabilities directly to primary producers. The next chapter eight presents a 
summary of the findings, conclusions and provides key insights emerging from the study. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a summary of key research findings, theoretical and methodological 
contributions, policy and industry practices contributions, conclusion, study limitations and 
areas for further research. The key findings of this study are derived from the work in this 
thesis and publication research papers derived from data findings of this study. The key 
findings are presented at micro level VC enterprise comparative analysis, i.e., entrepreneurs or 
firms participating in the value chains, and at meso & macro level VC sector analysis, i.e., 
examining the broad value chain inclusive of policies and regulations governing the value 
chain sector as a whole. The research papers contributing to key results of this study are: 
(1) Mugabira M and Chivaka R (2016) Value chain analysis: critical success factors for
competitiveness in Uganda’s commercial sugarcane industry. International Sugar Journal,
vol 118 (1405): 52-59; .
(2) Mugabira M., Chivaka R.,  Dickens Sande D B & Kavuma D, Key Success Factors For
Commercial Forestry & Sugar Value Chains In Uganda: A Comparative Study Of
Linking Producers To Markets. Journal of Forestry, Vol. 3,  No. 6, PP. 1-12;
(3) Mugabira M and Chivaka R (2016) Productive, Unproductive and/or Predatory
Entrepreneur-ship: A Value-Chain Analysis of Institutional Reforms in Uganda’s
Sugarcane Industry with key insights from South Africa and Kenya. Proceedings of the
International Society of Sugar Cane Technologists (ISSCT) Volume 29, 2016.
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(4) Mugabira M and Chivaka R (2017) Collaboration in Agri-Value Chains: Building
Supplier Production Capabilities for Productivity Gains. Book Chapter, in the forth-
coming Agri-Value Chains Publication, Croatia.
8.2 Major-theme: Entrepreneur’s behavior and competitive performance  
The major research question was: How do entrepreneurs’ behavioural practices determine the 
competitive performance of agri-business enterprises undertaking GVC participation in 
Uganda?. The major theme was investigated under five sub-themes below: 
8.2.1 Sub-theme 1: Critical success factors (CSFS) for value chain competitiveness 
Research question 1: Why and how do perceptions of CSFs for competitiveness determine 
performance differences amongst high, medium and low producers and between VC sectors? 
Research question 2: How are producers’ competitiveness expectations compatible with market 
expectations amongst high, medium and low producers and between VC sectors? 
At the level of micro VC enterprise comparative analysis; in answering the questions of 
critical success factors determining performance differences between high, medium and 
low performing entrepreneurs, and compatibility of market expectations with producer 
expectations, the key findings revealed that: 
 The high performing entrepreneurs (HPEs) attributed their success to internal
environmental factors. They emphasized critical success factors  (CSFs)  which were
mainly entrepreneurial traits such as; personal involvement, being passionate, technical
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knowledge, timely application of agronomical practices, prompt payment of workers, 
and commitment. These are factors under entrepreneur’s control, which can be 
developed and nurtured as a business culture resulting into firm’s competencies and 
capabilities for business high productivity and competitiveness.  
 The medium performing entrepreneurs (MPEs) and low performing entrepreneurs
(LPEs) associated their success to external environmental factors. They emphasized
CSFs such as; rainfalls, good climate, prompt service delivery by miller, as source of
their business competitiveness. These are factors outside entrepreneur’s control, which
cannot be developed and nurtured for business success resulting into low productivity
and competitiveness.
 The HPEs were found to be more responsive in complying with market/buyer
expectations compared to both MPEs and LPEs. This finding strengthened the above
finding on perceptions of internal environmental factors as being source of business
success and achieving desired productivity gains.
While at the level of VC sector comparative analysis; with respect to answering the 
question critical success factors determining performance differences between VC 
sectors, and compatibility of market expectations with producer expectations, the key 
findings revealed that: 
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 Entrepreneurial traits such as personal involvement, being passionate was rated as a key
success factor for business competitiveness by respondents in both sugarcane and forestry
value chain sector.
 Cash flow - a financial indicator, and productivity practices such as reliability in quality,
were considered more as key success factors for business competitiveness in the
sugarcane sector than the forestry sector. This possibly could be attributed to the
sugarcane crop as being more sensitive to weeds and susceptible to perishability, thus
requiring regular cash flow for maintenance in comparison to the forestry crop.
 Sugarcane producers generally had a clear grasp of the productivity success factors that
were aligned with market expectations compared to the forestry sector producers.
Industry maturity was likely to be one of the major factors that could offer plausible
explanations for this performance difference. This was because sugarcane took a
shorter time to maturity i.e., 18-20 months to market, thus increasing exposure of cane
growers to market requirements compared to forestry that required 8 years as maturity
period to enter the market. Another factor could be due to the nature of sugarcane being
a perishable commodity, thus requiring tight delivery schedules to the sugar mill in
order to maintain desired quality attributes and quantities.
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8.2.2 Sub theme 2: Equitable value chain sharing (miller-producer equitability)  
Research question 3: How is the equitable value chain sharing of proceeds perceived as a 
challenge for competitive success amongst VC participants and between VC sectors, thus 
creating winners and losers? 
At the level of micro VC enterprise comparative analysis; in answering the question of 
performance differences between high, medium and low performing entrepreneurs, the key 
findings revealed that: 
 There were no significant perceptional differences among all the entrepreneurs (HPEs,
MPEs and LPEs) regarding equitable sharing of value chain proceeds between the
millers and producers. The findings suggests that inequitable sharing of proceeds
between millers and growers is more of an external environment factor impacting all
industry players equally and therefore does not explain performance differences among
high, medium and low performing enterprises.
While at the level of meso and macro VC sector comparative analysis; in answering the 
question of performance differences between VC sectors, the research findings revealed 
the following: 
 The forestry sector was fairly equitable in wealth distribution compared to the
sugarcane sector. The finding suggests that the perceived difference in inequitable
wealth distribution between the two VC sectors was due to existing chain governance
structures. The cane producers’ were found heavily reliant on miller’s loan facilities,
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which attracted interest, coupled with a reliance on contractors deployed by millers to 
growers farms, which exposed cane producers to exploitation.  Therefore, the 
dependency of cane producers upon millers suggested that it was a captive value chain 
governance structure, meaning that producers are locked-up in the chain with powers 
concentrated in the hands of millers. This was found to be in contrast with the forestry 
sector, in which the producers were not operating in a captive value chain and therefore 
exercised some leverage power. 
 An analysis of the revenue earning in the forestry sector with particular reference to
eucalyptus revealed that Ugandan growers were fairly competitive with their counter-
parts in South Africa. In South Africa growers earned approximately 25% with millers
obtaining a mark-up profit of 15-20% (DFID, 2005), while in Uganda growers earned
approximately 20% with millers obtaining a mark-up profit of 20-25% of the value of
eucalyptus poles.
 Ugandan cane growers’ earnings in comparison to cane growers from other countries
suggested dire straits. An analysis of the sugar revenue sharing formula in Uganda
revealed that producers and/or farmers earn 35% and millers 65% as per the existing
cane production contracts. This comparison revealed that Ugandan sugarcane farmers
were among the most exploited in the region and possibly worldwide, as the literature
shows that the share of the sugar value to the beet grower is usually in a range of 40-
60%, and of 50 to over 70% to the cane grower (WABCG, 2015). This level of inequity
possibly explains why the vertically integrated Ugandan millers (backward integration)
into the farmer part of the value chain can afford to produce their cane hundreds of
kilometers away from their mills as they can ‘subsidize’ the potential loss of their farms
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from the huge margins they earn as millers. Cane farmers in Uganda, who depend 
entirely on outsourcing the milling of their cane, being even a short distance from the 
miller can render their businesses unprofitable, as they are currently not on the ‘sweet 
side’ of the cane payment system.  
 Also, the inequitable division of proceeds between millers and growers appears to
explain the observed low attractiveness of commercial growers in the sugarcane sector
(20% - approximately 100 registered growers) compared to the forestry sector (80% -
approximately 400 registered growers), possibly due to low profitability.  The
sugarcane sector was dominated by small-scale growers (less than 8 hectares) & few
medium growers (less than 25 hectares), as they could afford to subsidize labour costs
and some other farm activities with own family labour.
 The inequitable division of proceeds between millers and growers appears to offer
plausible explanations for the observed performance differences in achieving industry
productivity benchmarks between sugarcane and forestry sector primary producers.
Study results indicated that only 18% of the farmers achieved the desired industry
competitive output of at least 100 t/ha from their cane fields, implying that 82% of the
growers were producing below expected industry productivity output. This was in
contrast to the forestry sector were study results indicated that 41.3% of the farmers
achieved the desired industry performance targets, suggesting that only 58.7% of the
growers performed below expected performance targets.
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8.2.3 Sub-theme 3: Entrepreneurial alertness and regulatory regime 
Research question 4: How does entrepreneurial alertness explain enterprise and VC sector 
performance differences, with possibilities for the shaping and re-shaping of governance 
structures? 
At the level of micro VC enterprise comparative analysis; in answering the question of 
how entrepreneurial alertness influences performance differences between high, medium 
and low performing entrepreneurs and re-shaping the value chain governance structures, 
the key findings were arranged as revealed below: 
 Findings of the study revealed that factor production endowments, ease of doing
business and grant incentives did not explain performance differences between
successful and unsuccessful entrepreneur’s businesses. This finding suggests that most
entrepreneurs’ posses entrepreneurial alertness ‘instincts’ with respect to availability of
favorable environmental factors enabling business start-ups and growth. Therefore,
entrepreneurial alertness could not clearly explain the distinction between high
performing entrepreneurs and low performing entrepreneurs in the context of Uganda
found to have a high level of entrepreneurial talent (GEM 2014).
 Process VC upgrading such as investing in farm machinery and increasing yields per unit
area, was generally considered to be an investment opportunity by the HPEs, MPEs and
LPEs, suggesting no differences in entrepreneurial talent.
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 Generational strategy such as having in place a succession plan was perceived as an
investment opportunity by HPEs and MPEs while LPEs considered it as an investment
constraint.
 Functional VC upgrading, such as investing in value-addition plants was perceived as an
investment constraint by HPEs, MPEs and LPEs. This finding suggested that most of
these businesses could not capture higher rents associated with value adding activities.
 Business formalization such as business registration was generally considered to be an
investment constraint by HPEs, MPEs and LPEs. Taxation was identified as the main
factor hindering the process of entrepreneurial businesses to graduate from the informal
to the formal economy.
Generally these findings revealed that there was no clear cut competitiveness performance 
edge that distinguishes high performing enterprises from low performing enterprises with 
respect to entrepreneurial alertness ‘instincts’ for perceiving business opportunities in the 
environment. 
While at the level of meso and macro VC sector comparative analysis; in answering the 
question of how entrepreneurial alertness may explain performance differences between 
VC sectors and the possibilities for shaping and re-shaping the chain governance 
structures, the research findings revealed the following: 
 Grant incentives were found to be a major pull factor for entrepreneurial investment
activities in the forestry sector.
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 Ease of doing business factors such as provision of inputs and guaranteed market by the
miller/buyer were found to be the major pull factors for entrepreneurial investment
activities in the sugarcane sector.
 In both sectors, that is sugarcane and forestry value chains respondents perceived factor
production endowments similar in attracting entrepreneurial activities. This meant that
factor production endowments in geographical areas or clusters such as availability of
favourable climate such as rainfall, and a free flow of market information based on
‘hearsay’ that there are high returns on investment, were found to be the key drivers for
entrepreneurial activities in both the sugarcane and forestry sectors.
 In the sugarcane sector VC process upgrading (e.g., investing in farm machinery and
increased farm output) was the strategy being pursued possibly with a purpose of
transiting from captive value chains characterized with being ‘price takers’ to relational
or modular value chains that increases primary producer’s leverage negotiation powers.
 In the forestry sector business formalization (business registration) strategy was being
pursued by the growers possibly to enable their businesses to shift from the informal to
the formal economy. This is because businesses in the formal economy enjoy credit
facilities from commercial banking institutions that can be used for plantation
maintenance costs.
 None of the sectors (sugarcane and forestry) had intentions of pursuing the lucrative VC
functional upgrading i.e., investing in value addition plants, an investment strategy that
could increase earnings and thus reduce exploitative tendencies, especially evidenced in
the sugarcane sector. The low response for VC functional upgrading could possibly be
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attributed to the high capital investment financing requirements for setting-up value 
addition plants. 
 Miller’s in the sugarcane value chain had investment plans for by-products upgrading
such as utilizing sugarcane bagasse for power production. The quest for power in the
country for industrialization presented an investment opportunity as it may shift the VC
from sugar mills (sugar as core business) to power generation plants (power from
baggase as core business) resulting into chain up-grading.
 Although the growers in the forestry sector also considered functional VC upgrading as a
constraint, the development partners had plans for rolling out SPGS III phase that could
avail cost share production grants for functional VC upgrading either through individual
access or through joint action ownership of the facilities.
Research question 5: How does institutional quality explain the emergence of the productive, 
unproductive and/or predatory behaviours reflected in the competitive success or failure of 
enterprises and VC sectors? 
At the level of micro VC enterprise comparative analysis; in answering the research 
question of how institutional quality explains performance differences between high, 
medium and low performing entrepreneurs, the research findings revealed that: 
 There were no performance differences observed among HPEs, MPEs and LPEs,
implying that the regulatory environment had a similar effect on all the entrepreneurs.
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However, at the level of meso and macro VC sector comparative analysis, with respect to 
performance differences between sugarcane and forestry value chain sectors, the study 
findings indicated that the regulatory framework had profound effects on the sugarcane 
value chain sector compared to the forestry value chain sector with the following 
findings: 
 Generally the study findings revealed that institutional quality determine the reward
structure in the economy, which in turn influences the allocation of entrepreneurial
talent between productive investment activities such as innovation and largely
unproductive or predatory investment activities such as rent-seeking behaviour, that
were prevalent in the sugarcane sector compared to the forestry sector.
 Rent-seeking behaviors were validated with the rise in application for cane milling
licenses with the coming into effect of the sugar zoning policy enacted in 2010 by the
government of Uganda. Traditionally Uganda had three major sugar mills, yet just
before the zoning policy two other medium mills had obtained licenses. Immediately
after, the enactment of the zoning policy the number of total licensed sugar mills rose
from 6 to 26, representing more than 300% growth, but less than 50% to-date have
been established. This implied that a number of market speculators obtained monopoly
licenses thus granting them property rights, possibly with a purpose of selling them at
exorbitant prices to potential prospective investors in the future; the way it happened
with some of Uganda’s privatized public enterprises that were also subjected to asset
stripping (Kibikyo, 2011; Tangri and Mwenda, 2013).
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 Further, the zoning policy was found to have been abused by millers through obtaining
multiple licenses in the same region as a strategy of creating a wider ‘buffer’ area that
hindered new players entering the market. This strategy enabled the miller(s) to earn
strategic rents not by innovation but through rent-seeking entrepreneurial behaviors due
to monopsony.
 The Ugandan sugar industry had no governing body and the proposed governing body
in the Draft Sugar Bill 2015 had gaps in power distribution & equitable representation
of growers & millers on the governance board for effective meaningful-decision
making that fosters a sustainable industry productivity gains and competitiveness.
 Power imbalance among the actors impacts on productivity within value chains in that
it creates inequitable distribution of benefits, which in turn dis-incentivizes the less
powerful actors to be productive.
 It was also evident that ring-fencing policies offered to sugar mills in Uganda provides
a number of challenges to the growth of the sugar sector in Uganda described below:
 Delays in harvesting out-growers cane beyond the stipulated time frame of 18-20
months (UNSP 2010);
 Uncompetitive cane prices with margins of 25% differential between regions with fair
concentration of mills than those with a single miller;
 Inadequate mill capacity of 4500 tonnes cane per day (USMA 2015) compared to an
area’s production potential resulting in overgrown cane of approximately 7,000 ha
(700,000t) - which caused farmers to petition the government for the waiver of
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monopoly policies to enable the establishment of another mill of approximately 3,500 
tonnes cane per day;  
 During dry spells out-growers lost a lot of cane due to fires when cane could not be
harvested timely and delivered to the mill due to inadequate mill capacity coupled with
haulage and mechanical harvesting inadequacies. Thus farmers end up losing
investment funds and revenue without compensation from the government or miller(s)
responsible for enacting uncompetitive policies. As an example in the 2014/2015
financial year, farmers lost 2,500 ha (approximately 250,000 t) to fire with a potential
revenue of UGX20 billion, equivalent to approximately USD 5,000,000. As a result,
the Ugandan government lost gross revenue from milled sugar equivalent to USD
22,000,000, of which USD 4,000,000 alone accounts for value added taxes to the
government.
 The forestry sector in Uganda had MNCs governed by the FSC legislative framework and
therefore they introduced better value chain industry practices as they were bound to
comply with FSC requirements for continued certification to enhance their credibility
especially in export markets and their countries of operation. Unfortunately, Uganda’s
sugarcane sector had no single MNC to act as an industry leader in introducing best value
chain industry practices.
 Despite the significant performance differences between sugarcane and forestry sectors
as evidenced in the findings above, it was surprising that respondents in the forestry
sector were found in agreement with the sugarcane sector as they both advocated for
the establishment of a sound regulatory environment and governing boards that could
enforce compliance with the rules of the game for enhancing productivity gains and
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ultimately competitiveness. This paradox emerged due to different value chain 
practices between the pole market and the plywood market within the forestry sector. 
Productive entrepreneurial behavior was observed in the pole market while the 
plywood market exhibited unproductive entrepreneurial behavior, characterized by 
cheating weighing scales, absence of contractual orders and abrupt price changes 
among others. The observed differences in the value chain practices, was because the 
pole market had MNCs subscribing to the FSC regulatory framework, while the 
plywood market was dominated by Chinese firms that did not subscribe to the FSC 
regulatory framework. It was therefore, the inappropriate value chain practices in the 
plywood market that influenced respondents in the forestry sector to advocate for 
industry regulation as was the case with the sugarcane sector.  
8.2.4 Sub-theme 4: Standards for market access 
Research question 6: How do the perceptions of compliance with standards for market access 
explain the performance differences amongst high, medium and low producers and between VC 
sectors?  
At the level of micro VC enterprise comparative analysis; in answering the question of 
how do perceptions of compliance with standards for market access explain performance 
differences amongst high, medium and low producers, the research findings revealed 
that: 
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 There were no significant performance differences between high, medium and low
producers, with respect to access to production standards and perceiving industry failure
to apply a pricing per grading system and implementation of certification initiatives as
major challenges for enterprise business competiveness in the value chains. Therefore,
this finding implied that compliance with industry standards was more of an external
environmental factor having similar effects on all entrepreneurs’ business
competitiveness.
While at the level of meso and macro VC sector comparative analysis; strong significant 
performance differences emerged between the sugarcane and forestry sector in Uganda 
as follows:  
 The forestry sector had clearly well documented production standards availed to
growers through standards manuals which acted as a communication tool to facilitate
improved productivity and ultimately farm level competitiveness. On the other hand,
the sugarcane sector had no documented production standards availed to the growers
and the mechanisms of production were mainly communicated through seminars to
growers.
 The forestry sector growers were also exposed to improved business farming and
processing techniques along the entire value chain through both foreign study tours and
local field tours. These study tours improved skills, knowledge and information sharing
and also exposed the growers to adopt appropriate technologies relevant to their
businesses. Unfortunately, the sugarcane sector lacked these platforms.
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 The forestry sector practiced a rudimentary pricing per grading system, which was
found to be an incentive for industry competitiveness if it could be well-developed and
standardized like it was in South Africa. On the other hand, the sugarcane sector had no
pricing per grading system which was found as a demotivating factor for better
performance.
 The forestry sector was found to be laying a foundation for certification initiatives as it
practiced training programs coupled with an incentivized bonus payment system that
enhances traceability and also improves compliance to standards. This was contrary to
the sugarcane sector that relied on stick and carrot approach, i.e., threats for contract
termination and soft loan advances.
8.2.5 Sub- theme 5: Collaboration in vertical and horizontal linkages for diffusion of 
production capabilities 
Research question 7: How does vertical and horizontal collaboration for the diffusion of 
supplier production capabilities explain the performance differences amongst VC participants 
and between VC sectors? 
At the level of micro VC enterprise comparative analysis; in answering the question of how 
does vertical and horizontal collaboration for diffusion of production capabilities explain 
performance differences amongst VC participants? The following were the findings: 
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Vertical collaborative relationships; Findings of the study generally revealed weaker 
collaborative relationships along vertical linkages for diffusion of knowledge, skills and inputs 
support for building production capabilities among primary producers. The millers were found to 
prefer either use of contractors or only to purchase final quality commodities. This finding 
suggested that the achieved productivity gains that distinguished HPEs from both MPEs and 
LPEs as found out in results under sub-theme 1 above, could have been attributed to own 
entrepreneur’s learning or acquiring from other sources and not millers. Findings of the study 
also revealed that vulnerability to transactional costs and opportunistic behaviors were perceived 
to be generally at low levels between millers and primary producers, and did not account for 
performance differences between HPEs, MPEs and LPEs. 
Horizontal collaborative relationships; Findings of the study revealed no performance 
differences between HPEs, MPEs and LPEs as a result of access to investment asset specificity 
such as transfer of knowledge, skills and inputs support for building production capabilities. 
Findings also revealed low levels of transactional costs in business dealings, suggesting that they 
could not account for performance differences among HPEs, MPEs and LPEs. Some level of 
vulnerability to opportunistic behaviors manifested among LPEs and MPEs business dealings, 
therefore rendering support in explaining performance differences between HPEs vis a vis MPEs 
and LPEs. 
However, at the level of meso and macro VC sector analysis, strong significant 
performance differences emerged between the sugarcane and forestry sectors in Uganda.  
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Vertical collaborative relationships; 
 The sugarcane sector exhibited high investment asset specificity in vertical linkages
between primary producers and millers. This was evidenced by quantitative data which
suggested strong collaborative vertical linkages for building supplier production
capabilities. However, a nuanced view of the qualitative data pointed to the existence of
production capabilities in the vertical linkages, but residing in the use of contractors
rather than the cane growers themselves. This finding suggested that the growers were
heavily dependent on the millers and contractors employed by the millers to offer
services to the contracted growers. This level of high dependency of growers upon
millers partly had left most of the growers unable to develop production capabilities in
the Ugandan sugarcane sector.
 Further, the growers were found vulnerable to coordination transaction costs and
opportunistic behavior, which manifested in the form of lack of transparency at the
weigh-bridges, absence of grading system for cane supplied, and coupled with receipt
of low cane prices in comparison to the forestry sector entrepreneurs. These findings
confirms that the sugarcane sector was structured as a captive value chain, which
rendered growers having less leverage negotiation market powers as evidenced in sub-
theme 2 and 3 study results above.
Horizontal collaborative relationships; 
 Quantitative data revealed a stronger collaborative relationship among producers and/or
producer support agencies for inputs access, knowledge and skills transfer in the
forestry sector than the sugarcane sector.  This finding was corroborated by qualitative
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data and validated by observatory field data which confirmed that the transfer of 
knowledge, skills and inputs support occurred directly to forestry primary producers 
through both foreign and local exposure learning platforms, thus resulting into building 
production capabilities. 
 Quantitative data revealed suggestive evidence of minimum occurrence of transactional
costs among producers in the forestry sector than the sugarcane sector. This
quantitative finding was validated by the qualitative data finding which suggested
occurrence of transactional costs citing an example of replacing labor force taken by
another grower without the consent of the labor force owner.
 Findings of the study by quantitative and confirmed by qualitative data revealed that
opportunistic behaviors manifestations were not quite rampart among producers in both
the forestry and sugarcane sectors.
 The forestry sector players had a national umbrella organization. The existence of a
national forestry growers’ association not only strengthened cluster vertical and
horizontal linkages, but also served as a powerful policy-lobbying tool for the sector
development. Surprisingly, apart from access to inputs and services from millers
through contractors, the sugarcane sector players lack a national unifying body that
could step in to lobby favorable policies and also provide technical training directly to
the primary producers.
 Results of the study revealed a high statistically significant very strong collaborative
relationship between producers and producer support agencies in the forestry sector, as
compared to the sugarcane sector. This finding suggested that the transfer of
knowledge, skills and inputs support that occurred directly to growers was a result of
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intervention by development partner agencies that provided both technical and financial 
support in the Ugandan forestry value chain sector.  
8.3 Theoretical and methodological contributions: 
Theoretically and methodologically this study has brought into insight new research frontiers: 
 This research revealed that what distinguish successful entrepreneurs from unsuccessful
entrepreneurs are their own perceptions with respect to their beliefs in internality-
externality environmental factors. This finding renders support to a belief in internal-
external locus of control behavioral theory (Rotter, 1966). The theory suggests that
people with internal locus of control of reinforcements believe that personal effort is
the primary determinant of their outcomes and success, while those with external locus
of control of reinforcements believe in external events as determinant of their outcomes
& success. This finding of internality-externality is unique to this study in the sense that
generally it corroborated data patterns from quantitative data, as evidenced from
qualitative data and validated by observatory field data. Further, a close fit between
theory and data makes this finding stronger and better grounded in the theory of
entrepreneurship behavior ( Gatner, 1989; Baumol 1990) and ultimately to our
understanding of entrepreneur’s behavior in the emerging discipline of GVCs (Gereffi
et al, 2005).
 Methodologically, this study has advanced the justification for application of multiple
research instruments, for strengthening research findings. Quantitative results indicated
that there was a fit in perceptions regarding critical success factors among high,
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medium and low performing enterprises. Qualitative results on the other hand offered 
both corroboratory for HPE’s and contrasting views for MPE’s and LPE’s. The 
observed contrast between quantitative and qualitative data suggests that when a 
quantitative tool with critical success factors is given to the respondents, they are 
subconsciously aware of the CSFs that account for business competitiveness. 
Therefore, the respondents tend to tick the items positively regardless of whether they 
have an internal-external locus of control of reinforcements.  
 Findings of the study revealed no clear comparative performance cutting edge between
successful entrepreneurs and unsuccessful entrepreneurs with respect to entrepreneurial
alertness. This finding is a paradox in the discipline of entrepreneurship, which relates
entrepreneurial alertness with business success. The context explaining this paradox
could be attributed to Uganda having a high level of entrepreneurial talent (GEM
2014). This finding rendered support to the global entrepreneurship monitoring survey
data frameworks which ranked Uganda 28.1% as the top most entrepreneurial country
in the world, followed by Thailand 16.7% and Brazil 13.8% (GEM Report 2014).
Interestingly, the USA was found to be lagging far behind with a score of 4.3%, even
though the USA is perceived in everybody’s mind as being the most entrepreneurial in
the world. The GEM Report also rated Uganda’s entrepreneurs as top in the world for
perceived opportunities 76.9%, perceived capabilities 84.9% and fear of failure 12.6%,
all measures of entrepreneurial alertness. Therefore, entrepreneurial alertness does not
offer plausible explanations between successful entrepreneurs and unsuccessful
entrepreneurs in environments of high level entrepreneurial talent.
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 Ugandan entrepreneurs were generally alert to seizing and exploiting opportunities
available in the environment, and therefore they could be classified as opportunity-
driven entrepreneurs and not necessity-driven entrepreneurs. This finding also renders
support to the annual global entrepreneurship monitoring survey data frameworks
published by GEM Reports, which rank countries based on their stage of economic
development, i.e. factor-driven economies, efficiency-driven economies or innovation-
driven economies. According to the 2014 GEM Report, using measures of necessity-
driven entrepreneurship vs. opportunity-driven entrepreneurship revealed the following
results with respect to opportunity-driven entrepreneurship measures.  Uganda, which
was classified as a factor-driven economy, was ranked top 80.8% in this category,
competing favorably with the top efficiency-driven economies of Malaysia 82.5% and
Thailand 80.9%, as well as innovation-driven economies such as the USA 81.5%, UK
83.5%, Sweden (84.2%) and France (82%). Therefore, Uganda’s entrepreneurs being
classified as opportunity-driven rather than necessity-driven demystify the
entrepreneurship behavioral orthodox views which perceive that the level of a country’s
development is commensurate with the stage of its entrepreneurship.
 Findings revealed a general agreement of the need for regulation in both sectors yet it
was only the sugarcane sector that experienced inequalities in wealth distribution
mainly due to monopolistic policies. Productive entrepreneurial behaviour was
observed in the pole market while the plywood market exhibited unproductive
entrepreneurial behavior, characterized by cheating weighing scales, absence of
contractual orders and abrupt price changes among others. The observed differences in
the value chain practices, was because the pole market had MNCs subscribing to the
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FSC regulatory framework, while the plywood market was dominated by Chinese firms 
that did not subscribe to the FSC regulatory framework. It was therefore, the 
inappropriate value chain practices in the plywood market that influenced respondents 
in the forestry sector to advocate for industry regulation as was the case with the 
sugarcane sector. Methodologically, this finding was classified as unique to this study 
in the sense that generally it resolved conflicting data and corroborated data patterns 
from quantitative data, as evidenced by the qualitative data and validated by the 
observatory field data. Therefore, this finding was a major contribution to the 
advancement of the use of the case study approach. The application of the case study 
approach enabled the use of within case analysis and cross-case analysis to highlight 
and harmonize contradicting data, which could not possibly be achieved with other 
research design approaches.   Further, a close fit between theory and the resolving of 
conflicting data made this finding stronger and better grounded in the debate of new 
institutional theory (North, 1990; Williamson, 1998).  
 The finding of equitable value sharing as a result of equality in numerical
representation of key stakeholders in exercising governance power on the national
regulatory bodies as key value chain governance drivers was a departure from the GVC
theoretical framework that mainly considers powerful lead firms as the key governance
value chain drivers. This finding can be regarded as a major contribution to the on-
going globalization debate of addressing inequitable wealth distribution currently re-
shaping the geo-politics of Brexit, Trumpism, and Italy referendum. As per now France
and Germany seem to be trending the same direction because citizens have
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continuously witnessed dwindling of incomes and loss of jobs due to ‘greedy’ corporate 
firms, investors and entrepreneurs. Therefore, in the GVC theoretical framework, this 
finding suggests that in developing and/or emerging economies governments have a 
role to play in markets to achieve equitable wealth distribution resulting into 
productivity gains and ultimately competitiveness of the value chains. 
 The dominant theoretical argument within the GVC discipline has been that while
highly governed structures contribute to fast acquisition of production capabilities, they
can also create barriers for functional upgrading and/or investments in forward linkages
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001; Schmitz, 2006). This is because the lead firms protect
their core capabilities such as acquisition of design & marketing capabilities from
competition, in order to sustain earning higher rents. The findings in this study added
another perspective by showing that the lead firms created barriers in backward
linkages by controlling the diffusion of knowledge and skills transfer not directly to
primary producers, but through use of contractors. This strategy enabled the miller(s) to
continuously earn higher rents by offering; low commodity prices, inputs and services
at high prices to the primary producers through maintenance of weak supplier
production capabilities. Therefore, this finding can be classified as a major contribution
to the emerging GVC theoretical framework (see Gereffi et al., 2005), with respect to
lead firms’ control of the diffusion knowledge and skills for building supply production
capabilities in backward linkages, with intent for sustained earning of strategic rents.
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 GVC and cluster approach studies show that a combination of technical and investment
(financial) support in highly governed chains explains how relatively underdeveloped
regions become major export producers in a short period of time (Humphrey &
Schimtz, 2001; Schmitz, 2005). Further, proponents of the cluster approaches argue
that diffusion of production capabilities are not only limited to GVC participants, but
there is also knowledge and skills ‘spill over’ in a geographical area and/or localities of
business operations (UNIDO, 2015; WB, 2013; Maya-Ambia 2011; Aznar-Sanchez &
Galdeano-Gomez 2011; Guiliani, Pietrobelli & Rabellotii 2005; Meyer-Stamer et al.,
2003; Navdi & Halder 2002). This theoretical assumption was found relevant and a true
reflection of Uganda’s emerging commercial forestry sector. Therefore, this finding can
be classified as unique in the sense that this study corroborated the data patterns from
the quantitative data, as evidenced by the qualitative data and validated by the
observatory field data in support of the GVC and cluster approach studies above. The
data patterns of this study revealed a close fit between theory and data, which made the
findings stronger and better, grounded in the GVC framework (Gereffi et al., 2005),
cluster theory (Porter, 1998; 2007) and transactional cost theory (Williamson, 1975;
1998).  A combinations in the use of these three theoretical frameworks provided
relevant data and features for understanding industry evolutions, productivity gains,
competitiveness and thus a possible path of Ugandan agri-businesses to penetrate
export markets.
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Table 8.1: Summary of thesis theoretical contribution 
Theory / Analysis Contribution 
GVC theoretical framework The finding of equitable value sharing as a result of 
equality in numerical representation of key stakeholders 
in exercising governance power on the national 
regulatory bodies as key value chain governance drivers 
was a departure from the GVC theoretical framework 
that mainly considers powerful lead firms as the key 
governance value chain drivers. 
The dominant theoretical argument within the GVC 
discipline has been that while highly governed structures 
contribute to fast acquisition of production capabilities, 
they can also create barriers for functional upgrading 
and/or investments in forward linkages, in order to 
sustain earning higher rents. The findings in this study 
added another perspective by showing that the lead 
firms created barriers in backward linkages by 
controlling the diffusion of knowledge and skills 
transfer not directly to primary producers, but through 
use of contractors, and thus able to earn strategic rents 
due to a weak supply base. 
The thesis investigated entrepreneurs ‘primary 
producers’ a class that is hardly investigated with most 
GVC studies as mostly they focus on the meso and 
macro environment vc players such as MNCs. 
Other theoretical frameworks: 
Entrepreneurship behavioral 
approaches 
GEM Reports, rank countries based on their stage of 
economic development, i.e. factor-driven economies, 
efficiency-driven economies or innovation-driven 
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Theory / Analysis Contribution 
New institutional theoretical 
framework 
economies. Uganda, is classified as a factor-driven 
economy, competes favorably with the top efficiency-
driven economies, as well as innovation-driven 
economies. Therefore, Uganda’s entrepreneurs being 
classified as opportunity-driven rather than necessity-
driven demystify the entrepreneurship behavioral 
orthodox views which perceive that the level of a 
country’s development is commensurate with the stage 
of a country’s entrepreneurship. 
New institutional theory approach is maianly used in 
business schools in analyzing how and why firms and 
individuals conform or resist institutional change. This 
thesis has applied the institutional theory from the 
organizational behavior perspective in analyzing 
entrepreneurial perceptions, thus a departure from the 
common norm in the business schools. 
Analytical contribution The thesis applied within case analysis and cross-case 
pattern analysis an approach that enabled data 
corroboration and resolving conflicting data, and thus 
strengthening study results. The application of this type 
of case study approach is not common with GVC 
studies. 
Uniqueness of the work The thesis has been able to translate academic work into 
policy formulation and law enactment especially with 
respect to Uganda Sugar Bill 2016 before Parliament – 
The Republic of Uganda. The outcome is a major 
contribution to society and national economy in terms of 
creating an enabling investment climate and business 
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Theory / Analysis Contribution 
environment that spurs job creation, productivity and 
fair share of wealth distribution. 
Similarity with other works GVC and cluster approach studies show that a 
combination of technical and investment support in 
highly governed chains explains how relatively 
underdeveloped regions become major export producers 
in a short period of time. Further, proponents of the 
cluster approaches argue that diffusion of production 
capabilities are not only limited to GVC participants, but 
there is also knowledge and skills ‘spill over’ in a 
geographical area and/or localities of business 
operations. This theoretical assumption was found 
relevant and a true reflection Uganda’s emerging 
commercial forestry sector, which was a subject matter 
under this thesis. 
The findings of this study has demonstrated that sound 
institutional quality matters as envisaged by the ne 
institutional theoretical studiers. Equitable wealth 
distribution was observed among VC participants in 
countries with better developed institutions, and in 
equitability was observed in countries with weak 
institutions.   
8.4 Policy and industry practices contribution: 
This study has also contributed to government and development partners’ policy regarding 
entrepreneurial development, institutional reforms and building supplier production 
capabilities for productivity gains and competitiveness in the context of GVCs as follows: 
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 The finding of internality behavior demonstrates that entrepreneur’s traits,
characteristics and actions are basically behaviors that can be learnt, nurtured, and
developed into a business culture, competencies and capabilities for enterprise growth,
productivity and competitiveness. Therefore, policy program designs should focus on
igniting these behaviors which are already embedded in the minds of the entrepreneurs,
and then supporting the strengthening of such behavioral changes for entrepreneurs to
effectively participate in GVCs in developing economies.
 The study also revealed that when the government exercises governance power by
consensus with equitable representation of key value chain actors which creates a level-
playing field that controls the value chain actors’ behavior. This in turn fosters industry
productivity gains and ultimately enhances competitiveness. This is a total departure
from the GVC literature and practice which mainly characterizes chain governance
power by the powerful lead firms, thus creating the observed situation of winners and
losers in the GVC participants’ competitiveness game.
 The findings of this study has demonstrated that sound institutional quality matters:
According to the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Report
(2010-2011) survey that covered 139 countries, the quality of their institutions were
ranked (with low being desirable) as follows: Mauritius 43; South Africa 47; Malawi
52; Zambia 65; Swaziland 70; Tanzania 83, and Uganda 104 (WEF 2010). The latest
2014-2015 report that covered 144 countries revealed a similar trend: Mauritius 35;
South Africa 36; Malawi 77; Zambia 52; Swaziland 61; Tanzania 93, and Uganda 115.
Expectedly as the New Institutional Theory postulates; the countries that improved
their institutions are the two leading in value chain actor’s wealth distribution -
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Mauritius and South Africa. Uganda’s position declined in the latest ranking, implying 
a further decline in its institutional environment.  
Therefore, from the institutional perspective findings of this study highlighted 
necessary reforms which were then adopted in the consultative meeting of 10th March 
2016 chaired by the Hon. Minister of Trade, Industry & Cooperatives in the drafting of 
the National Sugar Bill ‘Draft Uganda Sugar Bill 2016 (see Appendix 6). These issues 
have also been brought to the attention of Rt. Hon. Speaker of Parliament (see 
Appendix 7). Efforts have also been made in print media publications (see Appendix 8) 
to inform both the Public, Members of Parliament and especially the responsible 
Parliamentary Committee on Trade, Tourism & Industry as they debate the Draft 
Uganda Sugar Bill 2016 tabled before Parliament by Minister of Trade, Industry & 
Cooperatives on Thursday 19th, January 2017 (see Appendix 9). In brief, this study 
made key contributions so far agreed upon during the Ministerial consultative meeting 
of 10th March 2016 during the crafting of the Draft Uganda Sugar Bill 2016 in the 
following key areas: 
 Governance: Equal representation of growers and millers fully agreed upon; members
to be elected by respective associations instead of being hand-picked by the Minister
fully agreed upon; and Chairperson to rotate between growers and millers for a term of
office fully agreed upon.
 Property rights ownership and ‘ring’ fencing policies: No miller should obtain more
than one license in a geographical region and fair competition should be taken into
account during licensing and the approval of mill expansion programs.
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 Equitable value chain proceeds sharing: The growers’ share was increased from 35%
to 50%, thus matching the general world standards in the sugar industry.
 Taxation regimes were identified by entrepreneurs as partly responsible for hindering
business formalization. Government taxation policies should be designed and
incentivized to attract sole-proprietorships to formalize their business operations so that
the firms can graduate from informal to formal economy.
 Government policies should be designed to offer both technical and financial incentives
for the development of other commodity sectors, so that the success story of Uganda’s
commercial forestry sector can be used for replication and scaling-up the development
of other commodity sectors.
 Policy programs should be designed to support the development of production
standards manuals, as they act as communication tools to primary producers to improve
farm/firm productivity gains.
 Policy program interventions need to be designed in such as that knowledge and skills
happens directly to the primary producers to strengthen their production capabilities for
effective participation and upgrading in the GVCs in developing economies.
 Policy programs should be supported by the formation of robust primary growers
associations and/or co-operatives that provides a platform for joint action to effectively
participate in GVCs.
 Foreign Direct Investment (FDIs) policy programs should be designed to attract MNCs
rather individual investor firms in Uganda. MNCs were found responsible to bring
along best industry value chain practices that promote equitable revenue sharing
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coupled with transfer of knowledge, skills and appropriate technology to local 
entrepreneurs as they are obliged to comply with international certification in their 
countries of operations in order for continued access to global markets. On the other 
hand, individual investor firms hardly subscribe to international certification programs 
and therefore were found to promote unproductive and/or predatory value chain 
practices. 
 Dissemination of findings of this study attracted funding for Uganda Timber Growers
Association (UTGA) from the World Wide Fund (WWF) for review of the existing
legal framework and also to initiate consultations for establishment of an industry
regulatory board for the forestry sector in Uganda.
8.5 Lessons for entrepreneurs and enterprises undertaking GVC participation 
The overall arching question for this study is ‘How do entrepreneur’s behavioral practices 
determine competitive performance of agri-business enterprises undertaking GVC 
participation?’.  The research question was developed to address the gap in the GVC literature 
that has identified actor’s (entrepreneur’s) behavior as an area of interest that possibly could 
explain why some countries are advancing in the global economy and while others are failing to 
do so despite. This study investigated behavioral practices grounded in the entrepreneurship 
behavioral approaches. Entrepreneurial behavioral approaches define an entrepreneur by what he 
does (practices that can be replicated) and not what he is (Gartner 1989). A practice that happens 
to be repetitive is said to have formed a pattern of behavior and it is these patterns of behavior 
that this study is interested in studying to inform entrepreneurs and enterprises considering 
undertaking meaningful GVC participation. The key lessons are elaborated below: 
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 Entrepreneurs should start businesses in which they are passionate. Passionate is an
ingredient that helps an entrepreneur to steer the business to success and comply with the
market demand quality requirements for effective GVC participation;
 An entrepreneur should understand the value chain structure and kind of major firms
driving the value chain. Captive value chain structures driven by non-multinational
corporations were possible should be avoided. On the other hand, captive value chains
driven by Multi-national Corporation’s offers better participation opportunities through a
fairly equitable sharing of wealth created along the value chain. This was found to be so
because MNCs are subjected to pressure groups from the global markets they operate in
and also subscribe to international certification schemes that promote better business
ethical behaviors in the marketplace;
 Entrepreneurs should consider undertaking GVC participation with supply contracts
offering both market guarantee and indicative prices;
 Business formalization is important to enable the business to graduate from an informal
to a formal economy with possibilities of accessing credit facilities from financial
institutions. This strategy enables supplier firms to reduce high dependency on buyer
firms with possibilities of increasing governance power in the value chain;
 Entrepreneurs should assess the quality of the business regulatory environment in
determining the reward structure in the economy which in turn influences the allocation
of entrepreneurial talent between productive investment activities such as innovation and
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predatory investment activities such as rent-seeking behaviors that are detrimental for 
GVC participating firms in the upstream value chain; 
 Entrepreneurs should consider participating in GVCs providing clearly documented
standardized manuals, providing learning platforms that facilitates transfer of knowledge,
skills and appropriate technology for building production capabilities and having in place
a transparent grading per pricing system for VC participants;
 Entrepreneurs should consider strengthening collaborative horizontal VC relationships
with a purpose of joint pooling of resources to pursue value addition investments in the
lucrative forward linkages for effective GVC participation and market access.
8.6 Conclusion 
This thesis is positioned from the beginning into the GVC discipline, with an assertion that; 
participation in global production networks and/or GVCs does not deliver the sustainable 
benefits as envisaged by crusaders of liberal reforms. This study affirms that, this failure can 
be attributed for the deregulation (disbandment) of organized cooperatives and marketing 
boards that underpinned producers bargaining positions and economic power in global 
markets. The proponents for liberalization especially in Uganda was based on a flawed 
argument that cooperatives and marketing boards were inefficient and therefore private sector 
(individuals) would perform better. This led to an emergence of an entrepreneurial class of 
market speculators and an expansion of a small number of buyers through direct forein 
investments exercising greater oligopoly power, while producers (growers) were more 
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fragmented, disfranchised and exposed to competition. This has been documented by this study 
as reflected in trend of unproductive and/or predatory entrepreneurial behaviors such as; low 
prices and margins for growers, cheating weighbridges/scales, lack of development of growers 
production capabilities, non-uniformity of grading systems and industry standards, growing 
inequality in value chain wealth distribution between growers and millers due to suppressed 
market bargaining power. This thesis contends that this drawback in market failure is a result 
of the inability by the proponents of the liberal reforms to recognize that free market policies 
deeply rooted in Adam Smith’s book ‘the wealth of nations’, confer success based on sound 
quality institutions that control market behavior.  This evidence is well articulated by De Soto 
2000 in his book; ‘the mystery of capital: why capitalism triumphs in the west and fails 
everywhere else’. Unfortunately, the findings of this study revealed that Uganda’s institutions 
and the production capabilities of the private sector are generally weak. This weakness of 
institutions coupled with low private sector production capabilities, partly explains Uganda’s 
failure to advance in the global economy despite undertaking GVC participation. Hence, this 
study would postulate that effective GVC participation for developing countries is through 
private sector (collectivism/producer organizations) and not through private sector 
(individualism) as envisaged by liberal reforms architects. This study finding was found to be 
in conformity with a major GVC study on capturing the gains by the GVC fraternity 
researchers (Goger, Hull, Barrientos, Gereffi, and Godfrey, 2014). Therefore, this study 
recommends intervention of development partners and governments in developing countries 
especially Uganda to offer both technical and financial support for building production 
capabilities, and the development of sound quality institutions for organized agri-business 
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enterprises structured in producers associations/cooperatives in order to undertake effective 
GVC participation. 
8.7 Limitations of the research 
This study applied theoretical sampling as opposed to statistical sampling. The purpose of this 
research was to contribute towards the emerging GVC theory and therefore, cases were 
selected because of their particular suitability for illuminating and extending relationships and 
logic among constructs. This implies that results of this study cannot be generalized for other 
agri-business value chain studies in Uganda. 
The study investigated relationships between millers and growers participating in the agri-
business value chains. This implies that relationships regarding distributors, whole-sellers, 
retailers, and consumers along the downward value chains and relationships involving input 
suppliers and contractors along the upstream value chains were not investigated. 
8.8 Areas for further research 
 This research was an explanatory case study in nature as it examined the data closely
both at a surface and deep level in order to explain the phenomena in the data sets. The
research adopted a comparative in-depth analysis of the same issues by examining them
several times from different points of view. The issues were investigated by looking at
entrepreneurial behavioral practices that influence competitive success or failure of
enterprises participating in Uganda’s agri-business value chains. Therefore a detailed
study on cost production competitiveness along the value chains is an area of interest for
further research.
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 Entrepreneurial alertness failed to offer plausible explanations for distinguishing
successful entrepreneurs and unsuccessful entrepreneurs in the context of Uganda with a
high level of entrepreneurial talent. Therefore, more research is necessary to investigate
entrepreneurial alertness in environments with high levels of entrepreneurship talent.
 The findings revealed a discrepancy in value chain practices. In particular companies ran
by South Africans and Europeans demonstrated better value chain practices than those
ran by Asians and Chinese. This finding suggests further research on influence of culture
on business ethics and value chain practices.
 Application of case study approach to other agri-business value chains in Uganda would
be an area of interest for future research, in order to draw parallels and contradictions.
 Application of empirical data in hypothesis testing of the relationships between
constructs would be an area of interest to strengthen construct reliability and external
validity of results for generalizations of results.
 This study was conducted in Uganda considered as a low developing economy.
Application of case study approach to investigate the behavior of agri- business value
chains in other developing and emerging economies would be appropriate.
 The results of this study are a reflection of protectionism policies practiced in some
regions of Uganda’s sugarcane industry. A study of regions in Uganda that have a fair
concentration of sugar mills would be appropriate to assess the behavior of the value
chains.
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 Multi-national corporations were found to practice better value chain practices including
equitable sharing of revenue between growers and millers in the industry and were also
subscribers to international certification schemes. Therefore, a detailed comparative study to
investigate value chain practices and equitable sharing of revenue between corporations
subscribing to international certifications and corporations non-subscribing to international
certifications is necessary to guide countries in attracting foreign investments.
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Appendix 1: Research Instrument survey primary producers sugarcane 
Graduate School of Business – University of Cape Town (PhD Survey) 
QUESTIONNAIRE ID: …………………………..  Primary Producers/Commercial Farmers 
CLASSIFICATION:…… 
The purpose of this study is to undertake a value chain analysis for commercial 
entrepreneurs/ enterprises involved in the commercial sugar and/or forestry 
industry.  
The questionnaire will take approx. 45 min - 1 hr. 
Due to the nature of the study you will need to provide the researchers with some 
form of identifiable information however, all responses will be confidential and used 
for the purposes of this research only.  
The researcher also did a pilot study of the South African sugar and forestry value 
chains; the data will be used to inform this study, and the lessons drawn will be 
disseminated, to the interested participants. 
Should you have any questions regarding the research please feel free to contact the 
researcher (0712 534 781, e-mail:mmugabira@gmail.com).   
Kindly endorse your signature consenting to fill the research questionnaire: .............. 
Name of firm: ………………………….. 
Contact person: …………………………….   Position: …………………… 
Zone: ……………………………………………………..Village……………………………… 
Sub-county: ……………………………….District…………………………………… 
Enterprise: Sugarcane Production/Growing 
Tel:...............................................................E-mail: .................................... 
Address: ………………………………………………… 
Level of education: ………………………………………………………….. 
Gender: Male……………………Female…………………………. 
1. Ownership
1.1 what is the form of ownership of your firm? Tick (  ) as appropriate.
(   ) Sole proprietorship/ unregistered 
(…) Partnership 
(…) Corporate Limited, number of shareholders…………, country of origin…. 
(…) Joint Venture; if JV elaborate on partners % share of ownership and country of 
origin 
1.2 when was your firm established?........... 
331 
1.3 form of business land ownership (fill whichever is applicable) 
(a) (……………..) acreage of government (public) leased land
(b) (……………..) acreage of private owned land
(c) (……………..) acreage private leased and/or hired land
1.4 state your average production capacity and revenue generated in last three years 
(a) (……………..) annual tones
(b) (……………..) hectares farmed
( c) (…………….) revenue generated (optional)
A. Value Chain Competitiveness
On a scale of 1-5, rank the importance by ticking of the following key success factors for your 
business competitiveness and/or survival: 















Personal involvement in the business 
Being passionate and/ or interested in the 
business  
Reliable quality (high cane sugar content) 
Reliable quantity (high tonnages per hectare) 
Access to technical knowledge (extension 
advisory services) 
Timely application of best agronomical practices 
Reliable and/or guaranteed market price 
Quality seed cane with long inter-nodes and high 
moisture content  (to enhance weight) 
Reliable cash flow in the business 
Good will for the business with local community 
Prompt payment of workers 















Miller prefers farmers to grow seed cane with 
high sugar content but giving  less weight 
Miller expects farmers to have passion and/ or 
interest in the cane business 
Miller expects farmers to produce good  quality 
(high cane sugar content) 
Miller expects farmers to achieve high 
yields/tonnages per hectare (quantity) 
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Farmers to follow miller’s directives (e.g. 
directives on agronomical practices, quality, 
quantity, etc.) without questioning 
Miller expects farmers to undertake timely 
application of best agronomical practices 
Miller delivers seed cane in time for planting 
Miller pressures farmers to accept price 
reduction on cane  
Miller expects personal involvement of a farmer 
in the business 
B. Appropriation and Distribution of Gains
On a scale of 1-5, rank your perceptions by ticking with regards to appropriation and
















B.1 Factor inputs 
Farm labour wages take greatest share of my 
income/revenue  
Cost of inputs for sugar cane production take 
greatest share of my income/revenue 
Cost of land purchase/ hire takes greatest share 
of my income/revenue 
B.2 Locational dimensions 
There is equitable (fair) sharing of revenue 
between miller & farmers 
Price for cane is agreed upon in advance by both 
miller and farmers through negotiations 















The government takes the ‘lions’ share of the 
sugar market price through taxation 
Middlemen use more information that they have 
about market conditions to get better deals from 
farmers when buying sugar plantations 
The price formula benefits the miller more than 
farmers 
B.3 Value addition and revenue 
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The miller’s processing plant machinery is 
efficient  
Farmers benefit from the by-products (bagasse, 
molasses, mud-fertilizer, etc) 
C. Incentives and Regulatory Investment  Regime
On a scale of 1-5, rank by ticking the relevance of the following factors in motivating
















C.1 Incentives from Development 
Partners/ Government in form of: 
Access to production cost share grants  
and/or inputs from donors attracted me 
to start/ grow my business  
Access to government land issued 
through permits attracted me to invest 
in the cane business 
Access to training/ know how 
supported by donors enabled me start 
my business 
Access to market with help of donors 
assisted me to start my business 

















Existence of a growing farmers cane 
production cluster attracted me to 
invest in the cane business 
Factor production endowment (e.g, 
favorable climate, rainfall, soils and 
temperatures) attracted me to invest in 
cane business 
Free flow of market information based 
on ‘hearsay’ that there are high returns 
(money)  lured me to invest in the cane 
business 
Guaranteed market by presence of a 
major miller attracted me to invest in 
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the cane business 
Availability of and access to affordable 
private land attracted me to invest in 
cane business 
Improved infrastructure especially 
roads attracted me to invest in cane 
business 
Access to loan facility  provided by 
miller attracted me to invest in cane 
business 
C.3 Planned growth potential in the next 
three years: 
I am planning to increase production 
capacity in land area (no. of hectares) 
I am planning to increase productivity 
per hectare (tonnages) 
Planning to purchase new machinery 
(eg. tractors, transport trucks) 
I am planning to undertake sugar cane 
study tour abroad using own financial 
support for personal exposure 
Formalize my business by registering it 
as a company (if not yet registered) 















I am planning to establish a fully 
and/or mini-processing plant for sugar 
cane value addition (eg. Jaggery mill) 
I am planning to initiate the process of 
mentoring family members to manage 
the business for generational continuity 
I am planning to invite the public to 
buy shares in the business 
Request miller to provide financial 
support for farmers sugar cane study 
tour abroad for exposure 
I am planning to gradually move to 
self-reliance by reducing on loans 
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advanced by miller 
I planned the investment in the sugar 
business as my future retirement 
package 
C.4  Regulatory Regime (entry barriers 
and/or open entry): 
Policy of high taxes on sugar imports 
to protect local sugar industry is good 
for my cane business 
Sugar policy requiring one miller per 
25 kilometer radius is restrictive & 
denies farmers fair market competition 
Policy that guarantees security of land 
ownership is an incentive for 
investments in long-term projects 
A Sugar Board need to be established 
to regulate & set standards for the 
sugar industry players 
Access to loan facility (without 
collateral) promotes a culture of 
dependency syndrome among farmers 
“i.e., most farmers expect all work 
activities to be done by miller” 
D. Compliance with Standards for Market Access
On a scale of 1-5, rank your perceptions by ticking regarding clarity on the terms and
conditions embedded in the Cane Production Contract (CPC)














The agronomical practices to be done by the farmer 
The minimum acceptable tonnages per hectare 
The grading system of cane delivered and pricing 
according to grade 
The price formula is clear and easily understandable 
The traceability system (labeling of farmers cane 
delivered to miller) is in place 
The timing and scheduling of operations are 
properly specified 
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The penalties for cane below standards are in place 
Penalties for post-harvest losses in fields and 
haulage (transport) are specified for contractors 
E. 1: Collaboration for Diffusion of Production Capabilities
Vertical Linkages - (Suppliers/Farmers & Miller) 
On a scale of 1-5, identify and rank by ticking the kind of support and business 
















E1.1 Specific investment incentives (identify support 
received and rate its importance to your 
performance): 
Miller’s credit / loans for land development and 
inputs are important for my business’ performance 
Collaboration with miller has improved my price 
negotiation powers 
 Collaboration with miller has improved my 
planning & management skills for cane business 
 Collaboration with miller has  enabled me to adopt 
best agronomical practices 
Collaboration with miller has enabled me acquire 
knowledge in harvesting, packaging & transporting 
sugar cane to the factory  















E1.2 Coordination costs (rate the effect of these 
transactional costs on performance of your 
business): 
There is less cost or time spent on seeking 
information on best agronomical practices by 
farmers from the miller 
There is less cost or time spent on getting payment 
from the miller for cane supplied 
Miller provides farmers with a list of certified 
suppliers of inputs such as chemicals for weed 
control 
E1.3 Quality of relationship (rate your perceptions 
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attached to the quality of your relations): 
Relationship between farmer and miller is mutually 
beneficial  
The weigh bridge is a transparent system 
E. 2: Collaboration for Diffusion of Production Capabilities
Horizontal Linkages – (Producers 2 Producers or Associations or Development
Partners)
On a scale of 1-5, identify and rate by ticking the kind of support and business 
relationships between yourself (farmer) and either fellow farmers, or umbrella 
association of farmers, or development partner   















E2.1 Specific investment incentives (identify support 
received and rate its relevance to your business 
performance): 
We undertake credits  and/or loaning of inputs among 
fellow farmers to facilitate the sugar cane business 
Participation in this famers cluster has improved my 
production planning skills and managing of operations 
for the sugar business 

















Participation in this farmers cluster has improved my 
adoption of best agronomical practices 
We share production machinery (eg. Tractors) among 
farmers for purposes of reducing the cost of cane 
production 
Participation in this farmers cluster enabled me to gain 
knowledge on how to determine  the value of the sugar 
cane plantation for better negotiations with intermediary 
buyers 
E2.2 Coordination costs (rate the effect of these 
transactional costs on performance of your business): 
There is less cost or time spent on searching and/or 
screening credible fellow farmers to associate with 
There is less cost or time spent on  getting information 
related to credible suppliers of chemicals from fellow 
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farmers 
There is less cost or time spent on recovery of loans/cash 
advances and/ or inputs among fellow farmers 
E2.3 Quality of relationship (rate your perceptions 
attached to the quality of your relations) 
Relations among farmers are mutually beneficial 
Trust/goodwill relations exist among the farmers 
E2.4 Significance for source of technical & financial 
support 
I have received significant support from Fellow 
producers/ individual farmers for my cane growing 
business 
I have received significant support from the Umbrella 
Association (s) e.g.  KSGA, MSGA for my cane 
growing business 
I have received significant support from the 
Development Partner (s) or Government (e.g. NAADS, 
PSFU) for my cane growing business 





Appendix 2 Research instrument primary producers interview (first round) 
QUESTIONNAIRE ID: …………………………..  Primary Producers/Commercial Farmers 
The purpose of this study is to undertake a value chain analysis for commercial 
entrepreneurs/ enterprises involved in the commercial sugar and/or forestry industry.  
The questionnaire will take approx. 3 hrs. 
Due to the nature of the study you will need to provide the researchers with some form of 
identifiable information however, all responses will be confidential and used for the 
purposes of this research only.  
Should you have any questions regarding the research please feel free to contact the 
researcher (0712 534 781, e-mail:mmugabira@yahoo.com).   
Kindly endorse your signature consenting to be interviewed: …………………………………… 
Name of firm: ………………………….. 
Contact person: …………………………….   Position: …………………… 
Zone: …………………………………………………………..Village…………………………………….. 
Sub-county: ……………………………….District…………………………………… 
Enterprise: Sugarcane Growing/ Forestry 
Tel:...............................................................E-mail: .................................... 
Address: ………………………………………………… 
Level of education: ………………………………………………………….. 
Gender: Male……………………Female…………………………. 
2. Ownership
2.1 What is the form of ownership of your firm? Tick (  ) as appropriate. 
(   ) Sole proprietorship/ unregistered 
(…) Partnership 
(…) Corporate Limited, number of shareholders…………, country of origin…. 
(…) Joint Venture; if JV elaborate on partners % share of ownership and country of origin 
2.2 When was your firm established? ................ 
2.3 state your average production capacity in last three years 
(  ) annual tones/volume 
(       ) hectares farmed 
( ) revenue generated  
A. Value Chain Competitiveness
What are the key success factors that you consider for your business competitiveness and/or survival? 
B. Appropriation and Distribution of Gains
1. What are your perceptions with regards to appropriation of income among participants within
your firm?
2. What are your perceptions with regards to who determines the distribution of gains along the
value chain among VC participants?
3. Can you elaborate further why you view things the way you do?
C. Business Growth & Investment Incentive Regime
1. Why did you choose this form of business other than others?
2. Which plans do you have for your business growth in the next three years? i.e, expansion in
hectares, purchase of machinery, purchase of transporting trucks, establishment of mini-
processing plant for value addition etc.
3. Which incentives and/or factors do you think can explain your business start-up and/or
expansion in this cluster?
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4. Have you received any incentives from development partners and/or government? Mention
source and kind of support so far received?
D. Compliance with Standards for Market Access
1. Do buyer/miller (s) avail you standards that you must meet in order to become their supplier.
2. If so how are they specified?
3. Is price agreed upon in advance?
4. Do you have a grading system commensurate with price premiums? Probe if payment is
based on quality or volume delivered………………………………. 
5. Do buyers reject some of your commodities?
6. If so, approximately which percentage has been rejected per ton/ or per bag of 100 kg?
7. What reasons do they provide for rejecting your commodities?
8. Which reasons seem to be the common one?
9. What have you done to address the reasons given by the buyers?
10. Have you ever been excluded from future business by buyer(s) due to poor quality?
E. Collaboration for Diffusion of Production Capabilities (Vertical Linkages)
1. What kind of support do you receive from buyer/miller (s)?
2. How has that support enabled you to improve capacity in:
(a) Production planning to meet buyers’ demands;
(b) Production methods for better yields;
(c) Price negotiations;
(d) Packaging and transporting logistics to markets?
3. Do you experience post-harvest losses at the farm fields? If so approx. what percentage per ton?
4. Do you incur losses as a result of transporting your commodities to the market? If so approx.
what percentage per ton?
5. In your view is the support (credit, inputs) received from buyer/miller(s) appropriately used for
the intended purpose?
6. Do you sign a formal contract with buyer (s)?
7. If so, how are contracts enforced by either party in case of breach of contract?
8. What is the quality of relationship and/or trust between you and the buyer (s)?
F. Collaboration for Diffusion of Production Capabilities (Horizontal Linkages)
1. What kind of support do you receive from your competitors (i.e., farmers) in this cluster?
2. Do you have any formal association and if so what role does it play for businesses operating in
this cluster?
3. How has your participation in this cluster/association enabled you to gain knowledge in:
(a) Production planning to meet buyer’s demands;
(b) Optimization of production equipments through sharing;
(c) Perfection of production methods for better yields,
(d) Price negotiations?
4. What is the quality of relationship and/or trust among you (in association, competitors)
5. What lessons have you gained by participating in this business cluster?
6. Do you think lessons from this business cluster can be replicated and scaled up in other sectors
and/or areas of the country?
Kindly do you have any question, comment or observation to make? (Option)
Thank you 
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Appendix 3: Research instrument interview for policy (first round) 
QUESTIONNAIRE ID:…………………………..Policy/Associations 
The purpose of this study is to undertake a value chain analysis for commercial 
entrepreneurs/ enterprises involved in the commercial sugar and/or forestry industry. 
The questionnaire will take approx. 3 hrs. 
Due to the nature of the study you will need to provide the researchers with some form of 
identifiable information however, all responses will be confidential and used for the 
purposes of this research only.  
Should you have any questions regarding the research please feel free to contact the 
researcher (0712 534 781, e-mail:mmugabira@yahoo.com).   
Kindly endorse your signature consenting to be interviewed: …………………………………… 
Name of firm: ………………………….. 





Level of education: …………………………………………………………. 
Gender: Male…………………………….Female…………………………. 
Enterprise: Sugarcane / Forestry 
3. Ownership
3.1 What is the form of ownership of this body? Tick (  ) as appropriate.
(   ) Co-operative 
(…) Partnership 
(…) Corporate Limited, number of shareholders…………, country of origin…. 
(…) Joint Venture; if JV elaborate on partners % share of ownership and country of 
origin 
3.2 When was the association established? ........... 
3.3 Do you purchase raw materials, if so state your average  capacity in last three years 
(    ) annual tones/ volume 
(…) hectares harvested 
(…) revenue generated  
3.4 Do you engage in primary production/farming as an association, if so state your 
average production capacity in last three years 
(  ) annual tones/volume 
( ) hectares farmed 
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( ) revenue generated 
G. Value Chain Competitiveness
What do you think are the key success factors considered by commercial farmers for their business 
competitiveness and/or survival? 
H. Appropriation and Distribution of Gains
4. What are your perceptions with regards to appropriation of income among participants within
the farmer’s enterprises/farms?
5. What are your perceptions with regards to who determines the distribution of gains along the
value chain among VC participants?
6. Can you elaborate further why you view things the way you do?
I. Business Growth & Investment Incentive Regime
5. Why do farmers  choose this form of business other than others?
6. Which plans do commercial farmers generally have for their business growth in the next three
years? i.e, expansion in hectares, purchase of machinery, purchase of transporting trucks,
expansion of processing plant for value addition etc.
7. Which incentives and/or factors do you think can explain business start-ups and/or expansion
in this cluster?
8. Have commercial farmers received any incentives from development partners and/or
government? Mention source and kind of support so far received?
J. Compliance with Standards for Market Access
11. Are farmers availed with standards that they must meet in order to supply the miller (s)?
12. If so how are they specified?
13. Is price agreed upon in advance?
14. Do you have a grading system commensurate with price premiums? Probe if payment is
based on quality or volume delivered……. 
15. Do millers reject some of the suppliers’ commodities?
16. If so, approximately which percentage has been rejected per ton?
17. What reasons do millers provide to the suppliers/farmers for rejecting their commodities?
18. Which reasons seem to be the common one?
19. What has the miller (s) done to address the reasons for rejecting suppliers/farmers
commodities?
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20. Have the miller (s) ever excluded suppliers/farmers from future business due to poor quality?
K. Collaboration for Diffusion of Production Capabilities (Vertical Linkages)
9. What kind of support do miller (s) avail their supplier/farmer (s)?
10. How has that support enabled farmers/suppliers to improve capacity in:
(a) Production planning to meet miller (s) demands,
(b) Production methods for better yields,
(c) Price negotiations,
(d) Packaging and transporting logistics to the miller (s)?
11. Do farmers experience post-harvest losses at the farm fields? If so approx. what percentage
per ton? I.e. association fields………………….; farmer fields ………………………… 
12. Do farmers incur losses as a result of transporting raw materials to the miller (s)? If so
approx. what percentage per ton?
13. In your view is the support (credit, inputs) received by commercial supplier/farmer(s)
appropriately used for the intended purpose?
14. Do farmers sign a formal contract with the miller (s)?
15. If so, how are contracts enforced by either party in case of breach of contract?
16. What is the quality of relationship and/or trust between farmers and the miller (s)?
L. Collaboration for Diffusion of Production Capabilities among suppliers (Horizontal
Linkages)
7. What kind of support do suppliers receive from fellow competitors (i.e., farmers) in this
cluster?
8. Do suppliers have any formal association and if so what role does it play for businesses
operating in this cluster?
9. How has suppliers/farmers association in this cluster enabled them to gain knowledge in:
(a) Production planning to meet buyer’s demands,
(b) Optimization of production equipments through sharing,
(c) Perfection of production methods for better yields,
(c) Price negotiations?
10. What is the quality of relationship and/or trust among suppliers/farmers (in association,
competitors)?
11. What lessons have suppliers/farmers gained by associating in this business cluster?
12. Do you think lessons from this business cluster can be replicated and scaled up in other
sectors and/or areas of the country?
Kindly do you have any question, comment or observation you would like to make. 
Thank you
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Appendix 4: Research instrument interview millers (first round) 
QUESTIONNAIRE ID:…………………………..Processors/Buyers (miller employees) 
The purpose of this study is to undertake a value chain analysis for commercial 
entrepreneurs/ enterprises involved in the commercial sugar and/or forestry industry. 
The questionnaire will take approx. 3 hrs. 
Due to the nature of the study you will need to provide the researchers with some form of 
identifiable information however, all responses will be confidential and used for the 
purposes of this research only.  
Should you have any questions regarding the research please feel free to contact the 
researcher (0712 534 781, e-mail:mmugabira@yahoo.com).   
Kindly endorse your signature consenting to be interviewed: …………………………………… 
Name of firm: ………………………….. 





Level of education: …………………………………………………………. 
Gender: Male………………………….Female……………………………. 
Enterprise: Sugarcane / Forestry 
4. Ownership
4.1 What is the form of ownership of your firm? Tick (  ) as appropriate.
(   ) Sole proprietorship/ unregistered 
(…) Partnership 
(…) Corporate Limited, number of shareholders…………, country of origin…. 
(…) Joint Venture; if JV elaborate on partners % share of ownership and country of 
origin 
4.2 When was your firm established? ........... 
4.3 Do you purchase raw materials, if so state your average  capacity in last three years 
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(    ) annual tones/ volume 
(…) hectares harvested 
(…) revenue generated  
4.4 Do you engage in primary production/farming, if so state your average production 
capacity in last three years 
(  ) annual tones/volume 
( ) hectares farmed  
( ) revenue generated 
M. Value Chain Competitiveness
What are the key success factors that you consider for your business competitiveness and/or survival? 
N. Appropriation and Distribution of Gains
7. What are your perceptions with regards to appropriation of income among participants within
your firm?
8. What are your perceptions with regards to who determines the distribution of gains along the
value chain among VC participants?
9. Can you elaborate further why you view things the way you do?
O. Business Growth & Investment Incentive Regime
9. Why did you choose this form of business other than others?
10. Which plans do you have for your business growth in the next five years? i.e, expansion in
hectares, purchase of machinery, purchase of transporting trucks, expansion of processing
plant for value addition etc.
11. Which incentives and/or factors do you think can explain your business start-up and/or
expansion in this cluster?
12. Have you received any incentives from development partners and/or government? Mention
source and kind of support so far received?
P. Compliance with Standards for Market Access
21. Do you avail standards that suppliers/farmers must meet in order to become your supplier?
22. If so how are they specified?
23. Is price agreed upon in advance?
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24. Do you have a grading system commensurate with price premiums? Probe if payment is
based on quality or volume delivered……. 
25. Do you reject some of your suppliers/farmers’ commodities?
26. If so, approximately which percentage has been rejected per ton?
27. What reasons do you provide to your suppliers/farmers for rejecting their commodities?
28. Which reasons seem to be the common one?
29. What have you done to address the reasons for rejecting suppliers/farmers commodities?
30. Have you ever excluded suppliers/farmers from future business due to poor quality?
Q. Collaboration for Diffusion of Production Capabilities (Vertical Linkages)
17. What kind of support do you avail your supplier/farmer (s)?
18. How has that support enabled you to improve capacity in:
(a) Production planning to meet your demands,
(b) Production methods for better yields,
(c) Price negotiations,
(d) Packaging and transporting logistics to your firm?
19. Do you experience post-harvest losses at the farm fields? If so approx. what percentage per
ton? I.e. own fields………………….; supplier fields ………………………… 
20. Do you incur losses as a result of transporting raw materials to your firm? If so approx.
what percentage per ton?
21. In your view is the support (credit, inputs) received by supplier/farmers (s) appropriately
used for the intended purpose?
22. Do you sign a formal contract with supplier/farmer (s)?
23. If so, how are contracts enforced by either party in case of breach of contract?
24. What is the quality of relationship and/or trust between you and the supplier/farmer(s)?
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R. Collaboration for Diffusion of Production Capabilities among suppliers (Horizontal
Linkages)
17. What kind of support do suppliers receive from fellow competitors (i.e., farmers) in this
cluster?
18. Do suppliers have any formal association and if so what role does it play for businesses
operating in this cluster?
19. How has suppliers/farmers association in this cluster enabled them to gain knowledge in
(a) Production planning to meet buyer’s demands,
(b) Optimization of production equipments through sharing,
(c) Perfection of production methods for better yields,
(c) Price negotiations?
20. What is the quality of relationship and/or trust among suppliers/farmers (in association,
competitors)?
21. What lessons have suppliers/farmers gained by associating in this business cluster?
22. Do you think lessons from this business cluster can be replicated and scaled up in other
sectors and/or areas of the country?
Kindly do you have any question, comment or observation you would like to make. 
Thank you
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Appendix 5: Research Instrument survey primary producer forestry 
Graduate School of Business – University of Cape Town (PhD Survey) 
QUESTIONNAIRE ID: …………………………..  Primary Producers/Commercial Farmers 
CLASSIFICATION:…… 
The purpose of this study is to undertake a value chain analysis for commercial 
entrepreneurs/ enterprises involved in the commercial sugar and/or forestry 
industry.  
The questionnaire will take approx. 45 min - 1 hr. 
Due to the nature of the study you will need to provide the researchers with some 
form of identifiable information however, all responses will be confidential and used 
for the purposes of this research only.  
The researcher also did a pilot study of the South African sugar and forestry value 
chains; the data will be used to inform this study, and the lessons drawn will be 
disseminated, to the interested participants. 
Should you have any questions regarding the research please feel free to contact the 
researcher (0712 534 781, e-mail:mmugabira@gmail.com).   
Kindly endorse your signature consenting to fill the research questionnaire: .............. 
Name of firm: ………………………….. 
Contact person: …………………………….   Position: …………………… 
Zone: ……………………………………………………..Village……………………………… 
Sub-county: ……………………………….District…………………………………… 
Enterprise: Forestry Production/Growing 
Tel:...............................................................E-mail: .................................... 
Address: ………………………………………………… 
Level of education: ………………………………………………………….. 
Gender: Male……………………Female…………………………. 
5. Ownership
5.1 what is the form of ownership of your firm? Tick (  ) as appropriate.
(   ) Sole proprietorship/ unregistered 
(…) Partnership 
(…) Corporate Limited, number of shareholders…………, country of origin…. 
349 
(…) Joint Venture; if JV elaborate on partners % share of ownership and country of 
origin 
5.2 when was your firm established?........... 
5.3 form of business land ownership (fill whichever is applicable) 
(d) (……………..) acreage of government (public) leased land
(e) (……………..) acreage of private owned land
(f) (……………..) acreage private leased and/or hired land
5.4 state your average production capacity and revenue generated in last three years 
(c) (…………..    ) annual tones
(d) (……………..) hectares farmed
( c) (……………..) revenue generated (optional)
S. Value Chain Competitiveness
On a scale of 1-5, rank the importance by ticking of the following key success factors for your 
business competitiveness and/or survival: 















Personal involvement in the business 
Being passionate and/ or interested in the 
business  
Reliability in quality (properly pruned logs ) 
Reliability in  quantity (high yields/tonnages per 
hectare by proper thinning) 
Access to technical knowledge (extension 
advisory services) 
Timely application of best silvi-culture practices 
Reliable and/or guaranteed market price 
Availability of quality seed  and/or seedlings 
Reliability of cash flow in the business 
Good will of the business with local community 
Prompt payment of workers 















Miller expects farmers to have passion and/ or 
interest in the forestry business 
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Miller expects reliable  quality logs (properly 
pruned, straight logs & suitable fiber strength) 
Miller expects reliable supply quantities (high 
volume/tonnages) 
Farmers to follow miller’s directives (e.g. 
directives on quality, quantity, suitable sizes of 
logs/poles etc.) without questioning 
Miller expects a well maintained forest 
plantation  (based on timely application of silvi-
culture practices) 
Miller expects timely delivery of logs 
Miller pressures farmers to accept price 
reduction on logs or forestry plantation 
Miller expects personal involvement of a farmer 
in the forestry business 
T. Appropriation and Distribution of Gains
On a scale of 1-5, rank your perceptions by ticking with regards to appropriation and
















B.1 Factor inputs 
Farm labour wages take greatest share of my 
income/revenue  
Cost of inputs for forestry establishment take 
greatest share of my income/revenue 
Cost of land purchase/ hire takes greatest share 
of my income/revenue 
B.2 Locational dimensions 
There is equitable (fair) sharing of revenue 
between miller & farmers 
Price for logs is agreed upon in advance by both 
miller and farmers through negotiations 















The government takes the ‘lions’ share of the 
timber/pole market price through taxation 
Middlemen use more information that they have 
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about market conditions to get better deals from 
farmers when buying forestry plantations 
The price formula benefits the miller more than 
farmers (if applicable) 
B.3 Value addition and revenue 
The miller’s processing plant machinery is 
efficient  
Farmers benefit from the log by-products 
(shavings, tree barks used for composite fire, 
etc) 
U. Incentives and Regulatory Investment Regime
On a scale of 1-5, rank by ticking the importance of the following factors in motivating
















C.1 Incentives from Development Partners/ 
Government in form of: 
Access to production cost share grants (i.e 
by SPGS) and/or inputs attracted me to 
start/grow my business  
Access to government land issued through 
permits attracted me to invest in the 
forestry business 
Access to training/ know how supported 
by donors enabled me to invest in the 
forestry business 
Access to market supported by donors 
enabled me to invest in the forestry 
business 

















Existence of a growing farmers forestry 
production cluster attracted me to invest 
in the forestry business  
Factor production endowment (e.g, 
favorable climate, rainfall, soils and 
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temperatures) attracted me to invest in the 
forestry business 
Free flow of market information based on 
‘hearsay’ that there are a lot of returns 
(money) lured me to invest in the forestry 
business 
Guaranteed market by presence of a major 
miller(s) attracted me to invest in the 
forestry business 
Availability of and access to affordable 
private land attracted me to invest in the 
forestry business 
Improved infrastructure especially roads 
attracted me to invest in the forestry 
business 
Access to loan facility  provided by miller 
attracted me to invest in the forestry 
business 
C.3 Planned growth potential in the next 
three years: 
I am planning to increase production 
capacity in land area (no. of hectares) 
I am planning to increase productivity per 
hectare (tonnages) 
Planning to purchase new machinery (eg. 
tractors, transport trucks) 
I am planning to undertake forestry study 
tour abroad using own financial support 
for personal exposure 
Formalize business by registering it as a 
company (if not yet registered) 















I am planning to establish a fully and/or 
mini-processing plant (eg. Saw mill) for 
timber value addition 
I am planning to initiate the process of 
mentoring family members to manage the 
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business for generational continuity 
I am planning to invite the public to buy 
shares in the business 
Request miller or donor to provide 
financial support for farmers forestry 
study tour abroad for exposure 
I am planning to gradually move to self-
reliance by reducing on loans  
I planned the investment in the forestry 
business as my future retirement package 
C.4 Regulatory Regime (entry barriers and/ 
or open entry): 
High taxes on timber imports to protect 
local forestry industry would be good 
Forestry policy allowing many millers to 
operate in farmers clusters promotes fair 
market competition 
Policy mandating local cluster farmers to 
access carbon trading will promote 
forestry business & clean environment 
Policy that guarantees security of land 
ownership is an incentive for investments 
in long-term projects  
A Forestry Board need to be established 
to regulate & set standards for the forestry 
industry players 
Access to financial assistance through 
phased reimbursement of costs (eg. SPGS 
pay system) deters fraudulent behavior of 
entrepreneurs  
V. Compliance with Standards for Market Access
On a scale of 1-5, rank your perceptions by ticking regarding clarity on the terms and
conditions embedded in the Industry Forestry Production Contract (IFPC) and the
associated forestry establishment manual and other relevant guiding documents














The silvi-culture practices to be done by the farmer 
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The minimum acceptable survival rate per hectare 
The grading system of logs delivered and pricing 
according to grade 
Bench marks for price determination are clear and 
easily understandable to guide price negotiations 
The timing and scheduling of operations 
The traceability (labeling of farmers logs) is in place 
The penalties for forestry being below standards 
Penalties for post-harvest losses in fields and 
haulage (transport) are specified for contractors 
W. 1: Collaboration for Diffusion of Production Capabilities Vertical Linkages -
(Suppliers/Farmers & Miller)
On a scale of 1-5, identify and rank by ticking the kind of support and business
















E1.1 Specific investment incentives (identify support 
received and rate its importance to your 
performance): 
Miller’s credit / loans for land development and 
inputs are important for my business’ performance 
Collaboration with miller has improved my price 
negotiation powers 
Collaboration with miller has improved my 
planning & management skills for forestry business 
 Collaboration with miller has  enabled me to adopt 
best silvi-culture practices 
Collaboration with miller has enabled me acquire 
knowledge in harvesting, packaging & transporting 
of logs or transmission poles to the factory  















E1.2 Coordination costs (rate the effect of these 
transactional costs on performance of your 
business): 
There is less cost or time spent on seeking 
information on best silvi-culture practices by 
farmers from the miller 
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There is less cost or time spent on getting payment 
from the miller for logs or poles supplied 
Miller provides farmers with a list of certified 
suppliers of inputs such as chemicals for weed 
control and seedlings 
E1.3 Quality of relationship (rate your perceptions 
attached to the quality of your relations): 
Relationship between farmer and miller is mutually 
beneficial  
The weigh bridge is a transparent system 
F. 2: Collaboration for Diffusion of Production Capabilities
Horizontal Linkages – (Producers 2 Producers or Associations or Development
Partners)
On a scale of 1-5, identify and rate by ticking the kind of support and business 
relationships between yourself (farmer) and either fellow farmers, or umbrella 
association of farmers, or development partner agencies   















E2.1 Specific investment incentives (identify support 
received and rate its importance to your 
performance): 
We undertake credits  and/or loaning of inputs among 
fellow farmers to facilitate the forestry business 
Participation in this farmers cluster has improved my 
production planning skills and managing of operations 
for the forestry business 

















Participation in this farmers cluster enhanced my 
adoption of best silvi-culture practices 
We share production machinery (eg. Tractors, pruning 
saws) among farmers for purposes of reducing the cost 
of forestry production or growing 
Participation in this farmers cluster enabled me to gain 
knowledge on how to determine  the value of the 
forestry plantation for better negotiations with 
intermediary buyers of forestry plantations 
E2.2 Coordination costs (rate the effect of these 
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transactional costs on performance of your business): 
There is less cost or time spent on searching and/or 
screening credible fellow farmers to associate with 
There is less cost or time spent on getting information 
related to credible suppliers of chemicals from fellow 
farmers 
There is less cost or time spent on recovery of loans/cash 
advances and/or inputs among fellow farmers 
E2.3 Quality of relationship (rate your perceptions 
attached to the quality of your relations) 
Relations among the farmers are mutually beneficial 
Trust/goodwill relations exist among the farmers 
E2.4 Significance for source of technical & financial 
support 
I have received significant support from Fellow 
producers/ individual farmers for my forestry business 
I have received significant support from the Umbrella 
Association (s) e.g.  UTGA, UTGA–SACCO for my 
forestry business 
I have received significant support from the 
Development Partner (s) or Government e.g. SPGS for 
my forestry business 





Appendix 6: Key policy lessons to the crafting of the draft Uganda Sugar bill 2016 
UGANDA OUT-GROWER ASSOCIATIONS PRESENTATION & SUBMISSION  TO THE 
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON TRADE, TOURISM & INDUSTRY AND MEMBERS OF 
PARLIAMENT (LOBBY GROUP) FOR GUIDING DELIBERATIONS ON FLOOR OF 
PARLIAMENT - REPUBLIC OF UGANDA 
THREE KEY POLICY AREAS THAT REQUIRE ATTENTION FOR UGANDA’S SUGAR 
INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS: 
 Governance: A Balanced Power Sharing Regulatory Board ‘Uganda Sugar Board”
 Property Rights Ownership: Dismantling the Ring Fencing Policy ‘i.e., specifies One Mill per 25
kilometre radius’.
 Equitable Sharing of Revenue among Value Chain producers: Revised Cane Payment System
Summary Tabulation Regional Policy Lessons for Draft Uganda Sugar Bill 2016 




South Africa Sugar Act 1978 
& Sugar Industry 
Agreement 2000 
South African Sugar Association (SASA) is the main 
Regulatory Body; 
SASA  is composed of two major bodies, namely South 
African Cane Growers Association (SACGA) & South 
African Sugar Millers Association (SASMA); 
Both SACGA & SASMA are equal partners by electing 11 
members to SASA Council; 
Chairmanship & Vice rotates every 2 years. 
Tanzania Sugar Industry 
Act 2001 
Tanzania Sugar Board is the regulatory agency; 
Chairman appointed by the President as advised by the 
Minister; 
1 Consumer representative; 
2 members from Millers Association; 
2 members from Growers Association; 
1 member representing Government from Ministry of 
Agriculture; 
1 member from amongst persons who in the opinion of the 
Minister possesses the knowledge and experience 
beneficial to the sugar industry. 




Non-executive Chairman elected by the board from among 
growers representatives on the board & appointed by the 
Minister;  
7 representatives elected by growers & appointed by the 
Minister, amendment- approved by National Assembly; 
3 representatives elected by Millers & appointed by the 
Minister, amendment 2 representatives-approved by 
National Assembly; 
Permanent Secretary of the responsible Ministry  being 
Agriculture; 
Permanent Secretary Treasury; 
Director Agriculture; amended - three members who shall 
be nominated by the Minister following a competitive and 
transparent process, approved by the National Assembly 
and appointed by the Minister. 
C.E.O of the board as an ex-officio
Note: the board mandated to elect a vice-chairperson
Uganda Draft Uganda 
Sugar Bill 2016 
Proposed Uganda Sugar Board as 1st June 2015; 
Chairperson 
Permanent Secretary MTIC 
Permanent Secretary MAAIF 
Permanent Secretary MFPED 
5 Miller representatives 
2 Grower representatives 
Key Issues & Lessons: Globally, distribution of earnings in global value chains is about power relations. 
In the context of the proposed representation on Uganda’s Sugar Board, the following questions need to 
be carefully explored to constitute a fairly representative board; (1) Where is the balance of power in the 
proposed representation on Uganda’s Sugar Board, especially Millers vis-à-vis Growers?.  S.A & 
Tanzania presents a balance of power between out-growers and millers, only Kenya presents a tilting of 
power where out-growers are more than millers possibly because the out-growers contribute highest on 
cane supply relative to nucleus estates. 
Resolutions: PART II – UGANDA SUGAR BOARD DRAFT BILL 2016  Agreed Positions MTIC 
Meeting 30th March 2016 
(1) Millers and Growers representation be equalized as partners in business for meaningful decision-
making by CONSESUS in the industry, i.e., 4 Millers rep: 4 Out-growers rep;
(2) Members to be elected by their respective organisations i.e, millers and growers associations for
appointment by responsible Minister. The idea of hand-picking representatives on the board by
Minister as seems suggested earlier draft bills is not permissible as it is designed to staff the
board with ‘puppets’.
(3) Chairmanship rotation between millers and growers elected from board representatives during
board term;
(4) Once a person has assumed position of Chairmanship, the respective constituency will replace
him/her with a new member on the board;
359 
(5) Government representatives to play advisory role and guidance on the board rather than directly
taking sides while voting on crucial decisions.
(6) Establishment of Sugar Board with Full Powers Not an Advisory Board/Council (as proposed at
MTIC meeting above) that will be subject to power abuse; i.e., ‘remote’ controlled to serve
interests of the Sugar barons through the Minister. Note: the Sugar Development Fund (industry
levy) in the proposed framework (see last page of this report) be used to support the Sugar Board
functions.
Policy Issue: Property Rights Ownership - Ring Fencing Policy ‘One Mill per 25 kilometre 
radius’ 
South Africa N/A in the Act 
Tanzania N/A in the Act 
Kenya Sugar Act 2001 Part 1 defines as "zone" means the area within a radius of 
up to a maximum of forty Kilometres of a sugar mill; 
A case practice of mill licensing exist, whereby regulator 
registered 2 more sugar mills in the Mumias zone to also 
produce ethanol & co-generate power, i.e., West Kenya 
and Mundika. 
The registration by the directorate was based on an 
evaluation carried out prior to registration of the three 
companies indicated that the area had the potential to 
accommodate additional factories. 
Therefore, Mumias objection application for licensing 3 
more mills citing the zoning sugar act was rejected by the 
regulator citing that the area had a potential to sustain all 
the industries. 
Part V Clause 30 ‘Rights of growers’ 
51 % shareholding of all privatized sugar 
factories; 
51 % representation on the Boards of Directors of 
milling companies. 
Uganda Draft Uganda 
Sugar Bill 
Zone defined as one mill per 25 kilometer radius. This 
provision contravenes the free market spirit which Uganda 
pursues. Current challenges: delays in harvesting out-
growers cane at times up to 30 months, uncompetitive 
prices, mill capacity cannot handle cluster production 
capacity, dry spells out-growers losing a lot of cane due to 
fires which cane cannot be timely harvested and delivered 
to mill due to inadequate mill capacity coupled with 
haulage and mechanical harvesting inadequacies thus 
farmers end up losing a lot of investment funds and 
revenue without recourse for compensation, low prices to 
farmers due lack of alternative market for cane, etc.,  
This calls for the dismantling of the ring fencing policy. 
Key Lessons: A case study of Umufolozi Sugar Mill in South Africa shows that despite liberal reforms it 
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is a co-operative based arrangement. 
A case study of one the world best sugar producer in the world emanates from USA; the architect & 
preacher of liberal reforms. What we find here is that the Sugarcane Growers Co-operative of Florida 
Belle glade is vertically integrated, and co-owns the largest refining sugar company in the world; 
American Sugar Refining Inc. The Sugarcane Growers Co-operative jointly with the American Sugar 
Refining Inc also operates 8 sugar refineries across North America & Europe.  
In both case studies above farmers sell cane to the mill but they receive more revenue from processing on 
pro-rata value of cane delivered to mill by each individual farmer, and thus promoting equitable value 
chain wealth distribution. 
The Kenyan zonal modal takes care of area productivity and/or production potential in determining 
number of mills to be licensed in an area with regards to mill crushing capacity. If properly implemented 
enables growers cane to be timely harvested fostering regular revenue. Growers entitled to shares in 
privatized mills and representation on all mill boards.  
The ring-fencing policy in Uganda violates individual fundamental property rights ownership enshrined 
in the Constitution by attaching private property(land) to another individual ‘investor’ without consent 
and absence of an institutionalized sound regulatory framework to guard against abuse and exploitation. 
This lacuna in the law tot amounts to the Government of Uganda overstepping its mandate and exposing 
itself to legal battles and heavy compensation to the affected citizens. 
Market forces would be the best option however where the Ring Fencing Policy is to be applied, then the 
following investment arrangements are proposed/ Resolutions: PART V LICENSING OF SUGAR 
MILLS 
 An affirmative INDEGENOUS INDUSTRIALIZATION policy that reserves at least thirty (30)
percent of the zoning area production potential only for Ugandans to invest in licensed Jaggery,
open pan mills  and small scale mills to facilitate acquisition of knowledge, skills and appropriate
technology.  This strategy will lead to Equitable & Inclusive Economic Growth;   Note: zoning
policy that does not take care of Indigenous entrepreneurs/investors should be treaded on with
care as it will subject Ugandans to perpetual slavery as commodity producers, i.e.,’ land is a
birth right for Ugandans therefore implementing zoning without caution will be like the
Biblical Esau giving his birth rights to Jacob.
 Investments by foreigners should be for larger sugar mills not less than 2000 TCD;
 No single investor permitted to obtain licenses in close neighborhood to his/her existing plant  for
purposes of encouraging fair competition;
 Independent farmers growing cane on commercial scale are free to negotiate and sale their cane
to the highest buyer, as per Sugar Policy 2010 clause 4.2 (iv);
 Farmers shall be encouraged to form Co-operatives Societies to enable them to; strengthen
members bargaining powers, as well as access technical guidance and capacity building services,
as per Sugar Policy 2010 clause 4.2 (viii);.
 Contracted out-grower representation on Mill Boards.
 Zoning should not be based on circular rings as it distorts placement of plants given a fact that
some areas lack utilities such as power, water etc., to serve the plant. Instead industrial clusters
which is an established international business norm be the basis for zoning a region based on
production potential to determine number of plants to be established in that region, i.e., this is
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similar to business & industrial parks concept by Uganda Investment Authority; 
 Note: The above resolutions are in line with the current National Sugar Policy 2010 which states as
follows:
 Economic interdependency between the sugar manufacturers and sugarcane growers, clause 3.3
(1)
 Market forces shall determine sugarcane as well as its products’ prices, clause 3.3 (2)
 Equitable distribution of productive enterprises nationally, clause 3.3 (4)
 Equitable sharing of revenue from sugar and its by-products, clause 3.3 (5)
Therefore, the out-growers associations emphasize that all these Guiding Principle clauses in
the National Sugar Policy  should be  the basis for informing the drafting exercise and be
embedded in the National Sugar Act 2015.
POLICY ISSUE: Equitable Sharing of Revenue among Value Chain producers - Cane Payment 
System 
South Africa Sugar Industry 
Agreement 2000 
Sugar Industry Administration Board; 
1 representative by SASA 
2 representatives by Millers 
2 representatives by Out-growers 
Recoverable Value (RV) Formulae; Farmers receive 64 
percent: Millers 36 percent of the mill sugar and molasses 
proceeds. Currently under review to match industry needs. 
Tanzania N/A Best practices in industry are attributed to Kilombero 
whereby division of proceeds system is farmers 57 %: 
Miller 43% based on actual sales achieved for sugar and 
molasses. 
IDRC Industry Report (2014) indicates farmers 53 – 
56.5%: Millers 43.5-47%    
Kenya The Sugar Act 
2001 
PART 3 Clause 8 (1) Cane Pricing Policy. 
The mandate is by the Sugar Cane Pricing Committee 
comprising representatives: 
Kenya Sugar Board, 
 Kenya Sugar Manufacturers Association, 
 and Kenya Sugarcane Growers Association. 
The committee reviews sugar cane prices annually and 
formula based on sucrose content. 
Farmers share 50 percent, rendement not below 10 percent 
(see Kenya National Assembly Official Record -Hansard) 
14 Dec 2010. Question No. 562 
*Mauritius (included






Clause 20 Control & Arbitration Committee: 
(a)a chairperson who is, and has for at least 10 years been,
a judicial officer, a law officer or a barrister;
(b) a representative of the Board;
(c) a representative of the Ministry;
(d) one independent member;
(e) one representative of millers; and
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(f) two representatives of planters, one of whom shall be a
representative of small planters.
Clause 39 Planters and Millers entitlements:
(a) every planter entitled to receive for his canes 78 per
cent of the quantity of sugar from his canes basing on
yield according to the average efficiency of all factories.
(b) where the efficiency of the factory where the canes
have been milled is higher than the average efficiency of
all factories, the planter shall, in addition  be entitled to
receive 50 per cent, and the miller the remaining 50 per
cent, of such
quantity of sugar actually produced from the planter’s
canes.
(c) the average quantity of scums produced by the factory
per ton of canes milled during the preceding crop year;
and
(d) 100 per cent of the molasses produced by the factory
per ton of canes milled by the factory during that crop
year.
Uganda Draft Uganda 
Sugar Bill 2016 
Price sugar cane = C x R x 40% see Schedule 3, 40% 
being farmers share. Formula based on mill sugar only. 
Draft 16th March 2015 Part VII Clause 22 (2c) states ‘ a 
formula for determining the price to be paid by millers to 
growers for sugar cane or any other designated 
agricultural produce, which may include any factor 
related to the sale or other disposal of sugar industry 
products’. Surprisingly, this clause was omitted in the 
draft of 1st June 2015. This clause requires re-
instatement in the current bill  
Key Lessons: Worldwide most farmers earn in range of 60-65 percent while millers earn 35-40 percent of 
the sugar industry proceeds (see World Association of Beet & Cane Growers Association, Report 2015). 
This happens to be the reverse trend in Uganda. In Ugandan context, the 40% is based on mill sugar alone 
(exclusive of sugarcane other products) implying that farmers earn less than 40% of the sugarcane 
proceeds. 
Resolution:, the value that will be shared between farmers and millers should take care of Sugar and all 
the Sugar by- products such as Molasses, Bagasse for Power Generation and mud-fertilizer based on a 
particular mill recoverable values (RV). A share formula of proceeds to match worldwide and regional 
trends reveals Farmers 60-65%: Millers 35-40%.  The industry framework is proposed below to guide the 
formulation of the Price Formulae. Rendement be fixed in range of 9-11 as per sugar policy 2010. In the 
MTIC Meeting 10th March 2016 (Agreed 50% Farmers: 50%Millers). 
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PROPOSED SHARE OF SUGARCANE INDUSTRY FRAMEWORK BELOW: 
CALCULATION OF THE RV PRICE 
 
*RV Price is not industry ceiling price but the floor price to guide negotiations between millers and cane
producers
Other Important Issues: 
SUGAR 
CANE 





Less INDUSTRY LEVY 
(Sugar Development Fund)




GROWERS’ SHARE (50%) 
Less NATIONAL CANE GROWERS 
ASSOCIATION LEVY 
PROCEEDS FOR RV PRICE 
RV TONNES PRODUCED
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 A sub-committee for determining sugarcane price be constituted with equal representation of
growers and millers.
 Establishment of a National Cane Research Institute for development of seed cane varieties to
match the changing weather patterns. Part of the Sugar Development Fund (industry levy) in
the framework below could be used to support the research institute.
 The issue of weighbridge monitoring and inspection team to be under the mandate of the cane
pricing committee.
 A Standardized guiding Cane Production Contract (CPC) be developed and revision be done with
common basic principles across the country.
 WHT be exempted from sugarcane farmers given the fact that cane farmers are struggling with
paying land development loans with interest. If this is implemented farmers will shy away from
cane farming as a business. Further, the taxes paid by millers are a direct result of cane supplied
by famers.
 Transfer of sugarcane farmers to the responsible Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and
Fisheries
Acknowledgement:  information extract from multiple sources; The World Association of Beet & 
Cane Growers (WABCG) – France and the International Sugar Organization (ISO)- UK of which 
both Uganda is a member, The International Society of Sugarcane Technologists (ISSCT) – 
Mauritius, The South African Sugarcane Technologists Association (SASTA)- South Africa and a 
PhD Study program at the Graduate School of Business – University of Cape Town, South Africa. 
FOR GOD AND MY COUNTRY 
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Appendix 7: Petition letter on draft sugar bill 2016 to the Speaker of Parliament of Uganda 
UGANDA SUGARCANE GROWERS’ ASSOCIATIONs 
c/o P.O. BOX 213 – MASINDI, 
14th February 2017 
The Rt. Hon. Madam Speaker, 
 Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, 
KAMPALA 
Thru: The Hon. Chairperson, 
 Bunyoro Parliamentary Caucus 
Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, 
KAMPALA 
RE: PETITION ON KEY CLAUSES IN THE UGANDA SUGAR BILL 2016 
On Thursday 02nd February 2017, we held a meeting at the Committee Room, 3rd Floor, South 
Wing - Parliamentary Building with the Bunyoro Parliamentary Forum in which Mr. Michael 
Mugabira as lead presenter presented the key contentious issues in current Sugar Bill 2016 tabled 
before Parliament by the Minister of Trade, Industry & Cooperatives on 19th January 2017. 
The Honorable Members of Parliament commended the issues and recommended to bring them 
to the attention of the Rt. Hon. Madam Speaker for the Parliament of the Republic of Uganda.  
Therefore, we the undersigned Chairpersons of the Sugarcane Growers Associations in Uganda, 
acting on behalf of sugarcane out-growers in Uganda supplying sugar factories with over 70% of 
sugarcane required to run the factories’ business year draw your attention to the following:  
a) Unethical Behaviors in Crafting Sugar Bill 2016: The current Sugar Bill 2016
presented before you by the Ministry of Trade Industry and Cooperatives (MTIC) does
not reflect aspirations of the sugar cane growers/farmers due to underhand methods that
were used in the drafting process as per our petition letter to your office dated 17th July
2015. It is against this background that we advocate for the proposed government
representatives on the sugar board to act as technical advisors and not wield any voting
rights.
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b) Board Governance: The Bill before you puts Board Governance Power in the hands of
Millers at the expense of Growers with the intention of continued exploitation of growers
despite the meeting held at MTIC on 10th March 2016 which resolved for a balanced
governance power sharing between millers and growers through equal board
representation. Numerical representation - a reflection of Governance Power cannot be
over emphasized before this August House as Power determines the appropriation and
distribution of wealth created in the value chain sugar industry;
c) Enactment of an INDEGENOUS INDUSTRIALIZATION POLICY: The zoning
policy ‘ring-fencing of markets i.e., one sugar mill per 25 kilometer radius’ without a
prescribed expiry time framework does have the consequence of enriching the few and
foreign based investments, as Ugandans will be subjected to perpetual slavery as
commodity producers on their own land since the law will be restricting them from
engaging into the lucrative Value Addition investments. It should be noted that land is a
birth right for Ugandans therefore implementing zoning without caution will be like
the Biblical Esau giving his birth rights to Jacob.  Therefore, we are proposing an
affirmative INDEGENOUS INDUSTRIALIZATION POLICY that reserves at least
thirty (30) percent of the zoning area production potential only for Ugandans to invest in
licensed Jaggery, Open Pan Mills and small scale mills with possibilities for up-grading
to facilitate acquisition of knowledge, skills and appropriate technology with intent to
build production capabilities.  This strategy will re-dress the current In-equitability and
lead to Equitable & Inclusive Economic Growth in Uganda’s Sugar Industry;
d) Sugar Cane Pricing Formulae: Sharing of sugar and its by-products proceeds between
growers and millers is an international practice guided by a percentage share formula.
The World Association of Beet & Cane Growers (Paris-based) and the International
Sugar Organization (London-based) published a 2015 report covering sugarcane and beet
growing countries in the world. The report revealed that the value of share percentage in
the formula for cane growers ranged from 50 to over 70 percent. It is unfortunate that
despite the sugar factories having exploited Ugandans for the last decades, the Sugar Bill
2016 Schedule 3 is proposing a value share based on sugar milled only of just 40 percent
for cane growers, yet it TAKES CANE FARMERS APPROXIMATELY 2 YEARS FOR
CANE TO MATURE AND READY FOR MARKET. Millers on the other hand only
need 24 HOURS TO CRUSH THE CANE after buying it from cane farmers!  It goes
without saying that cane farmers are taking the lion’s share of risk by investing for 2
years before marketing the cane, and yet the Sugar Bill 2016 Schedule 3 proposes giving
them a smaller share of the value created. Our proposal, which was documented at the
MTIC meeting of 30th March 2016 and agreed upon, suggested a minimum of 50 percent
share, based on a comprehensive value-sharing model that includes all sugarcane by-
products being produced by the particular sugar factory to match the World Sugar
Producing Country Standards.
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e) Sugar Board vs Advisory Council: Lack of leadership is being demonstrated by
proposals for an Advisory Board/Council instead of establishment of Sugar Board with
Full Powers. The argument being advanced is that a Sugar Board will be expensive and
bureaucratic to manage. We do object to the proposal of an Advisory Board/Council (as
proposed at MTIC meeting above) as this will be subject to power abuse; i.e., ‘remote’
controlled by those intent to serve the interests of the Sugar barons. Putting a structure
that doesn’t have full power, such as the proposed Advisory Board/Council is actually an
expensive option when we consider the real issue that we are attempting to address, such
as inequitable distribution of value within this industry. Such a body is unlikely to
effectively represent the interests of the Ugandan sugar cane growers, which has the
effect of perpetuating the current inequitable distribution of sugar cane value in favour of
millers, while at the same time burdening the farmers with the huge cost and risk of
growing sugar cane for two years before marketing. That should be the real cost under
consideration here, and not the cost of having an effective body such as the Sugar Board.
In fact, we propose that the Sugar Development Fund (say a 5 percent levy) should be
used to finance the Sugar Board, and related sugar industry development activities;
f) Suitable Ministry for Cane Growers: Transfer of growers from MTIC to MAAIF so
that cane crop can be prioritized by Government for funding and research development;
g) Double taxation: Growers supply cane to factories for milling sugar and its by-products
that are taxed by government. Therefore, the introduction of withholding taxes to cane
growers’ amounts to double taxation, which invariably worsens their already weak
financial position and sustainability.
h) Re-dressing Monopoly/ Monopsony in Bunyoro Region: Unlike in Busoga region
were licenses were issued to competing investors under fair competition rules as
prescribed by the sugar policy 2010, in Bunyoro the policy was grossly abused by issuing
licenses to one investor, namely Kinyara Sugar Ltd, with the consequence of this
company dominating the whole of Bunyoro region. This situation has hindered other
competing players to enter the market due to the monopoly power bestowed on the
Kinyara Sugar Ltd by the unfair competition rules. As such, this has contributed to the
massive exploitation of cane farmers, as evidenced by low cane prices, harvesting over
grown cane due to lack of alternative markets, loss of cane to fire during drought without
due compensation from Kinyara Sugar Ltd nor Government, among others.  Therefore,
we propose that another license be issued to growers so that they can identify a suitable
investor to partner with in setting up sugar factory in the region in order to promote fair
competition in the sugar industry.
Hon. Madam Speaker, in addition, to the above key aspects for consideration in the Sugar Bill 
2016, below we present specifics for revision in the Sugar Bill 2016: 
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CLAUSES IN SUGAR BILL 2016 PROPOSED AMMENDMENTS 
PART II UGANDA SUGAR BOARD 
CLAUSE 3 COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD 
Clauses a, b, c and d are ok. Clause b, c and d ‘government officials will 
have no voting powers/ act as advisors 
e) Five representatives of millers Four representatives of millers 
f) Two representatives of growers Four representatives of growers 
Clause 3 (3) the chairperson shall be appointed 
from the private sector and shall be a person 
with knowledge and experience of the sugar 
industry 
The chairperson shall be elected from growers 
and millers on a rotational term basis and a 
replacement done within where the chairperson 
has been elected 
PART V LICENSING OF MILLS 
Clause 21 additional clauses required No single investor permitted to obtain licenses 
in close neighborhood to his/her existing plant  
for purposes of encouraging fair competition;   
Where the Board perceives lack of fair 
competition in a region, a license may be 
granted for purposes of breaking monopoly 
and/or monopsony for effective and fair 
competition. 
Clause 22(1) in licensing sugar mills, the 
Board shall ensure that there is one mill in a 
zone 
In licensing sugar mills, the Board shall ensure 
that 30 percent of zone production potential is 
reserved for jaggery, open pan mills and small 
scale mills for indigenous proprietors only for 
purposes of knowledge, skills and appropriate 
technological transfer due to presence of one 
big mill. For avoidance of doubt big sugar 
mills not less than 2000 TCD; 
Clause 22(3) in this section, a “zone” means an 
area of a radius of twenty five kilometers 
A zone means an area of a radius of twenty 
five kilometers but placement of mills should 
not be based on circular rings as it distorts 
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measured from one mill to another placement of plants given a fact that some 
areas lack utilities such as power, water etc., to 
serve the plant. Instead industrial clusters 
(which may combine a number of zonal areas) 
which is an established international business 
norm be the basis for determining number of 
plants to be established in that region, i.e., this 
is similar to business & industrial parks 
concept by Uganda Investment Authority; 
Additional important clauses missing in the 
current bill yet are in the sugar policy 2010: 
Independent farmers growing cane on 
commercial scale are free to negotiate and sale 
their cane to the highest buyer, as per Sugar 
Policy 2010 clause 4.2 (iv); 
Farmers shall be encouraged to form Co-
operatives Societies to enable them to; 
strengthen members bargaining powers, as 
well as access technical guidance and capacity 
building services, as per Sugar Policy 2010 
clause 4.2 (viii);. 
Contracted out-grower representation on Mill 
Boards (not in policy but critical). 
PART VII SUGAR CANE PRICING 
Clause 25 (1) the price of sugar cane shall be 
determined in accordance with the formula set 
out in Schedule 3. 
The price of sugar cane shall be determined in 
accordance with the formula set out in 
Schedule 3, where 50 percent is the minimum 
share for milled sugar and its by-products. 
Rendement (tons of sugar made per every 100 
tons of sugarcane) shall be fixed at 9-11 
percent as per sugar policy 2010 in order to 
enhance factory efficiency. 
Hon. Madam Speaker, we therefore request for your intervention in this matter so that aspirations 
of Uganda’s Cane Growers are given due respect and consideration in the review of the Uganda 
Sugar Bill 2016, so that we build a sugar industry that promotes equitable and inclusive 
economic growth for all the value chain participants.  
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APPENDICIES: 
1. Key Policy Country Case Studies Relevant to the Crafting of the Draft Uganda
Sugar Bill 2016
2. How is the Value of Beet and Cane Shared between Growers and Factories
throughout the World? Report 2015 by World Association of Beet & Cane Growers –
Paris and International Sugar Organization – London
3. Paper Extract: Sugarcane Production Costs in Uganda. Proceedings of the
International Society of Sugar Cane Technologists (ISSCT Congress), volume 29,
2016. Thailand
4. Draft Minutes of the Consultative Meeting with the Hon. Minister of Trade,
Industry and Cooperatives with the Stakeholders to discuss the Draft Sugar Bill at
Farmers House on Thursday 10th March 2016.
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